5 ideas
9465 | Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type [Jacquette] |
Full Idea: The substitutional interpretation says the universal quantifier is true just in case it remains true for all substitutions of terms of the same type as that of the universally bound variable. | |
From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to III: Quantifiers [2002], p.143) | |
A reaction: This doesn't seem to tell us how it gets started with being true. |
9466 | Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects [Jacquette] |
Full Idea: Some substitutional quantificationists in logic hope to avoid philosophical entanglements about the metaphysics of objects, ..and nominalists can find aid and comfort there. | |
From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to III: Quantifiers [2002], p.143) | |
A reaction: This has an appeal for me, particularly if it avoids abstract objects, but I don't see much problem with material objects, so we might as well have a view that admits those. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
12719 | Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The notion of force is as clear as that of action and passion, because it is that from which action follows when nothing prevents it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4 | |
A reaction: For Leibniz, force seems to be a metaphysical notion, rather than a feature of the physical world. I take it to be the bottom level of explanation, and it equates with Aristotelian form and essence. |
12720 | Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Time never exists, since all of its parts never exist together. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4 | |
A reaction: The problem here is that he seems to be admitting that time has 'parts'. Can something have parts and not exist? Events will also fail to exist by this criterion, though we could hardly deny that events (or some such) 'happen'. |