5 ideas
19735 | Wisdom has a higher value than understanding, which has a higher value than knowledge [Greco] |
Full Idea: Intuitively, understanding is more valuable than knowledge and wisdom is more valuable than understanding. | |
From: John Greco (The Value Problem [2011], 'Knowledge') | |
A reaction: Down at the bottom is having an 'inkling' of something, I presume. Not convinced of this. I would rate understanding above knowledge, but wisdom seems rather different. It implies a breadth that does not focus on any particular topic. |
19734 | If value is practical, knowledge is no better than true opinion [Greco] |
Full Idea: Why should knowledge be more valuable than true opinion, if their practical value is the same? | |
From: John Greco (The Value Problem [2011], Intro) | |
A reaction: We have exam systems and academic titles to bestow social prestige on people who know, not to mention quiz shows. Modern society needs lots of knowledgeable citizens. I'm not sure what intrinsic value knowledge could have. |
19733 | Externalist theories don't explain why knowledge has value [Greco] |
Full Idea: Externalist theories do not give knowledge the sort of value that internalists want knowledge to have. | |
From: John Greco (The Value Problem [2011], Intro) | |
A reaction: [He cites Pritchard 2008] This is not a very strong argument, given the uncertainties and complexities in the idea that we share a 'value'. If the value of knowledge is really instrumental (and loved no less because of that), then externalism could cope. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
2116 | The concept of an existing thing must contain more than the concept of a non-existing thing [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There must be more in the concept of a thing which exists than in that of one which does not exist. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Principles of Indiscernibles [1696], p.134) |