Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Meaning' and 'Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology'

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6 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Intentional theory is vacuous as psychology because it presupposes and does not explain rationality or intelligence.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.15?)
     A reaction: Virtually every philosophical theory seems to founder because it presupposes something like the thing it is meant to explain. I agree that 'intentionality' is a slightly airy concept that would probably reduce to something better.
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Intentional systems don't really have beliefs and desires, but one can explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them. This strategy is pragmatic, not right or wrong.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.7?)
     A reaction: If the ascription of beliefs and desires explains behaviour, then that is good grounds for thinking they might be real features of the brain, and even if that is not so, they are real enough as abstractions from brain events, like the 'economic climate'.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice]
     Full Idea: For a statement to have (non-naturally) meant something, not merely must it have been 'uttered' with the intention of inducing a certain belief, but also the utterer must have intended an 'audience' to recognise the intention behind the utterance.
     From: H. Paul Grice (Meaning [1957], p.43)
     A reaction: This is Grice's famous and distinctive theory of meaning. I am struck by the problem of a password, which seems to have a quite different intention from its literal meaning. Also a speaker with two different audiences and opposite intentions.
Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice]
     Full Idea: Only what I may call the primary intention of an utterer is relevant to the (non-natural) meaning of an utterance.
     From: H. Paul Grice (Meaning [1957], p.47)
     A reaction: This sounds okay for simple statements, but gets really tricky with complex statements, such as very ironic remarks delivered to an audience of diverse people.
We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice]
     Full Idea: To show that the criteria for judging linguistic intentions are very like the criteria for judging non-linguistic intentions is to show that linguistic intentions are very like non-linguistic intentions.
     From: H. Paul Grice (Meaning [1957], p.48)
     A reaction: This hint at the end of his paper is one of the key attractions of Grice's view. It offers an account of language that fits it into the world of animal communication and evolution. It never seems to quite capture the way meaning goes beyond intentions.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?