23684
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Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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Full Idea:
In her early work she also defends moral rationalism, which is the idea that morality gives reasons for action to everyone, even those who lack the desire to do what is right.
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From:
report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
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A reaction:
Evidently a rejection of the Humean view that only a desire can motivate action, including moral action. There is an ongoing debate about whether reasons can cause anything, or motivate anything. I think the contents of reasons pull us towards action.
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23690
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We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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Full Idea:
Foot advocates the view that anyone has reason to cultivate the virtues, even if they lack the desire to do so at a given moment.
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From:
report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], Pt II) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 2 'Concepts'
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A reaction:
The view which she soon abandoned, but then returned to later. It specifically repudiates the view of Hume, that only desires can motivate. I'm unsure, because the concept of 'reason' strikes me as too imprecise. She sees self-interest as a reason.
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22379
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The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot]
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Full Idea:
There is no describing the evaluative meaning of 'good', evaluation, commending, or anything of the sort, without fixing the object to which they are supposed to be attached.
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From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], p.112)
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A reaction:
I go further, and say that a specification of the feature(s) of the object that produce the value must also be available (if requested). 'That's a good car, but I've no idea why' makes no sense. 'Apparently that's a good car', if other people know why.
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23530
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The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA]
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Full Idea:
For Mill and De Tocqueville the greatest of the dangers was not that in fact the majority might use their power to oppress a minority, but that, with the spread of democratic ideas, it might come to be thought unobjectionable that they should do so.
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From:
H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], III 'Populism')
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A reaction:
This was vivid in the 2016 Brexit referendum, which was 52-48 in favour of leaving. There were lots voices saying 'you lost, get over it'. It should be a basic (if neglected) principle that the winners of elections now represent the whole population.
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23528
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The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA]
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Full Idea:
Recognition of individual liberty as a value involves, as a minimum, acceptance of the principle that the individual may do what he wants, even if others are distressed when the learn what it is that he does.
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From:
H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Private')
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A reaction:
He notes that there could be other reasons to block the freedom, such as harm done. This idea seems to identify a key component of liberalism - that we must all tolerate actions which we dislike.
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23521
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Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA]
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Full Idea:
Four questions: 1) Has the development of law been influenced by morals? 2) Must reference to morality enter into an adequate definition of law or legal system? 3) Is law open to moral criticism? 4) Does immorality justify legal punishment?
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From:
H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Enforcement')
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A reaction:
[compressed] Three nice questions, which are his agenda for the book. It is obvious that immoral laws can be created, and that laws can be criticised for being too concerned with morality, so there is no clear general answer to these dilemmas.
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23527
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Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA]
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Full Idea:
Leslie Stephen argued that when the question is how severely an offender should be punished, an estimate of the degree of moral wickedness involved in the crime is always relevant.
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From:
H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Moral')
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A reaction:
[Stephen 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' 1873] The degree of responsibility (after excuses etc.) is obviously also highly relevant. If vicious murder is punished more harshly, that seems to be an assessment of the character of the murderer.
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