14 ideas
4020 | The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: The modern notion of the self is defined by disengaged reason (with its associated freedom and dignity), by self-exploration, and by personal commitment. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1) | |
A reaction: Taylor makes a good case that this broader view of how the self is seen is as important as narrow debates about personal identity. |
4002 | My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: My entire way of proceeding involves mapping connections between the sense of the self and moral visions, between identity and the good. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], Pref) | |
A reaction: An interesting project. Modern brain research supports the idea that emotions and values are tightly integrated into al thought. |
4006 | I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: As a being who grows and becomes I can only know myself through the history of my maturations and regressions, overcomings and defeats. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §2.3) | |
A reaction: An important insight. My immediate sense of self makes my personal history central, not an extra. But a history must be a history OF something. |
23111 | If we say that freedom depends on rationality, the irrational actions are not free [Sidgwick] |
Full Idea: If we say that a man is a free agent in proportion as he acts rationally, we cannot also say that it is by free choice that he acts irrationally. | |
From: Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874], p.511), quoted by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 7.4 | |
A reaction: A very nice riposte. Clearly people can rationally choose to act irrationally, e.g. at a wild party. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
4003 | Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Selfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
A reaction: This seems an inevitable convergence of three centuries of thought about personal identity and morality. |
23059 | Self-interest is not rational, if the self is just a succession of memories and behaviour [Sidgwick, by Gray] |
Full Idea: Sidgwick said self-interest is not self-evidently rational. Unless we invoke a religious idea of the soul, human personality is no more than a succession of continuities in memory and behaviour. In that case, why should anyone favour their future self? | |
From: report of Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874]) by John Gray - Seven Types of Atheism 2 | |
A reaction: This sounds like Locke's account of the self, as psychological continuity. We can say that our continuous self is a fiction, the hero of our own narrative. Personally I think of the self as a sustained set of brains structures which change very little. |
4021 | Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1) | |
A reaction: Which is why war is required. The growth of civil society meant the inevitable rise of other virtues. |
4005 | To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: If you want to discriminate more finely what makes humans worthy of respect, you must call to mind the claim of human suffering, or what is repugnant about justice, or the awe you feel about human life. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
A reaction: A persuasive part of the claim that such feelings are inseparable from thinking about people in any way at all. |
4004 | Consistency presupposes intrinsic description [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: The issue of consistency presupposes intrinsic description. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
A reaction: This may be the key criticism of Kant. The so-called 'maxim' of an action can be almost infinitely re-expressed to suit the agent. |
4129 | It is self-evident (from the point of view of the Universe) that no individual has more importance than another [Sidgwick] |
Full Idea: It is a self-evident principle that the good of one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view of the Universe, than the good of any other, ..and as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally, not merely at a particular part. | |
From: Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874], III.XIII.3) | |
A reaction: Showing that even a very empirical theory like utilitarianism has an a priori basis. Of course, the principle is false. What about animals, the senile, criminals, androids? What bestows 'importance'? |
4010 | In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: In mature utilitarianism , the stress on modern freedom emerges in the rejection of paternalism. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3) | |
A reaction: This seems good; it is the beginnings of a rejection of paternalism. What is better, happiness or freedom? What is the value of freedom? |
20588 | Sidwick argues for utilitarian institutions, rather than actions [Sidgwick, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
Full Idea: Sidgwick's complex version of utilitarianism urges that institutions should be set in place to maximise utility, but that individual actions people undertake might not appear to be justifiable on utilitarian terms. | |
From: report of Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874]) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 1 Refs | |
A reaction: This seems to be a specifically political version of utilitarianism, but isn't cited much by political philosophers who discuss utilitarianism. |
4009 | Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Late medieval nominalism defended the sovereignty of God as incompatible with there being an order in nature which by itself defined good and bad. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3) | |
A reaction: Part of their attack on Platonism. But what made them place such a high value on the sovereignty of God? |