72 ideas
18330 | Judging by the positive forces, the Renaissance was the last great age [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Ages are to be assessed by their positive forces - and by this assessment the age of the Renaissance, so prodigal and so fateful, appears as the last great age. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.37) | |
A reaction: I suspect that Nietzsche places art very high among the positive forces. Science and technology showed barely a glimmer during the Renaissance. Mathematics moved very little, Copernicus was ignored, and logic was static. |
2900 | I revere Heraclitus [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I set apart with high reverence the name of Heraclitus. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.2) |
2913 | Thucydides was the perfect anti-platonist sophist [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: My recreation, my preference, my cure from all Platonism has always been Thucydides. …Sophist culture, by which I mean realist culture, attains in him its perfect expression. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 9.2) |
2909 | Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 7.7) | |
A reaction: Nice. At its deepest level thinking isn't a rational process? |
2892 | Wanting a system in philosophy is a lack of integrity [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to system is a lack of integrity. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 26) |
6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The acknowledgement that the sphere of knowledge is wider than the sphere of 'science' seems to me to be a cultural necessity if we are to arrive at a sane and human view of ourselves or of science. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro) | |
A reaction: A very nice remark, with which I intuitively agree, but then you are left with the problem of explaining how something can qualify as knowledge when it can't pass the stringent tests of science. How wide to we spread, and why? |
6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Some non-scientific knowledge is presupposed by science; for example, I have been arguing that 'refers' and 'true' cannot be made scientifically precise; yet truth is a fundamental term in logic - a precise science. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec VI) | |
A reaction: We might ask whether we 'know' what 'true' and 'refers' mean, as opposed to being able to use them. If their usage doesn't count as knowledge, then we could still end up with all actual knowledge being somehow 'scientific'. |
2896 | I want to understand the Socratic idea that 'reason equals virtue equals happiness' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I seek to understand out of what idiosyncrasy that Socratic equation 'reason equals virtue equals happiness' derives. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.04) |
2897 | With dialectics the rabble gets on top [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: With dialectics the rabble gets on top. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.05) |
2898 | Anything which must first be proved is of little value [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What has first to have itself proved is of little value. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.05) |
6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
Full Idea: 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: The word 'warranted' seems to be ambiguous in modern philosophy. See Idea 6150. There seem to be internalist and externalist versions. It seems clear to say that a belief could be well-justified and yet false. |
6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
Full Idea: A correspondence theory of truth is needed to understand how language works, and how science works. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro) | |
A reaction: Putnam retreated from this position to a more pragmatic one later on, but all my sympathies are with the present view, despite being repeatedly told by modern philosophers that I am wrong. See McGinn (Idea 6085) and Searle (Idea 3508). |
6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The great nineteenth century argument against the correspondence theory of truth was that one cannot think of truth as correspondence to facts (or 'reality') because one would need to compare concepts directly with unconceptualised reality. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: Presumably the criticism was offered by idealists, who preferred a coherence theory. The defence is to say that there is a confusion here between a concept and the contents of a concept. The contents of a concept are designed to be facts. |
6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Anyone who accepts the notions of whatever object language is in question - and this can be chosen arbitrarily - can also understand 'true' as defined by Tarski for that object language. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro) | |
A reaction: Thus if we say "'snow is white' is true iff snow is white", then if you 'accept the notion' that snow is white in English, you understand what 'true' means. This seems to leave you with the meaning of 'snow is white' being its truth conditions. |
6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
Full Idea: What Tarski has done is to give us a perfectly correct account of the formal logic of the concept 'true', but the formal logic of the concept is not all there is to the notion of truth. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro) | |
A reaction: I find this refreshing. A lot of modern philosophers seem to think that truth is no longer an interesting philosophical topic, because deflationary accounts have sidelined it, but I take the concept to be at the heart of metaphysics. |
6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
Full Idea: There is only one way anyone knows how to define 'true' and that is Tarski's way. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec II.5) | |
A reaction: However, Davidson wrote a paper called 'On the Folly of Trying to Define Truth', which seems to reject even Tarski. Also bear in mind Putnam's earlier remark (Idea 6265) that there is more to truth than Tarski's definition. Just take 'true' as primitive. |
18317 | The 'real being' of things is a nothingness constructed from contradictions in the actual world [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The characteristics which have been assigned to the 'real being' of things are the characteristics of non-being, of nothingness - the 'real world has been constructed out of the contradiction of the actual world. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.6) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a critique of Hegel, in particular. Could we describe the metaphysics of Nietzsche as 'constructivist'? I certainly think he is underrated as a metaphysician, because the ideas are so fragmentary. |
18315 | We get the concept of 'being' from the concept of the 'ego' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Being is everywhere thought in, foisted on, as cause; it is only from the conception 'ego' that there follows, derivatively, the concept 'being'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.5) | |
A reaction: 'Being' is such a remote abstraction that I doubt whether we can say anything at all meaningful about where it 'comes from'. |
6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Realism is an empirical theory; it explains the convergence of scientific theories, where earlier theories are often limiting cases of later theories (which is why theoretical terms preserve their reference); and it explains the success of language. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: I agree. Personally, I think of Plato's Theory of Forms and all religions as empirical theories. The response from anti-realists is generally to undermine confidence in the evidence which these 'empirical theories' are said to explain. |
18316 | The grounds for an assertion that the world is only apparent actually establish its reality [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The grounds upon which 'this' world has been designated as apparent establish rather its reality - another kind of reality is absolutely undemonstrable. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.6) |
18314 | In language we treat 'ego' as a substance, and it is thus that we create the concept 'thing' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It is the metaphysics of language (that is, of reason) ....which believes in the 'ego', in the ego as being, in the ego as substance, and which projects its belief in the ego-substance on to all things - only thus does it create the concept 'thing'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.5) |
6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
Full Idea: If we held, say, 'All unmarried men are unmarried' as absolutely immune from revision, why would this make it true? | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: A very nice question. Like most American philosophers, Putnam accepts Quine's attack on the unrevisability of analytic truths. His point here is that defenders of analytic truths are probably desperate to preserve basic truths, but it won't work. |
18309 | The evidence of the senses is falsified by reason [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: 'Reason' is the cause of our falsification of the evidence of the senses. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.1) | |
A reaction: One for McDowell. |
6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Our ability to picture how people are likely to respond may well be innate; indeed, our disposition to believe what other people tell us (which is fundamental to knowledge) could hardly be an inference, as that isn’t good enough for knowledge. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec VI) | |
A reaction: An interesting claim. There could be an intermediate situation, which is a hard-wired non-conscious inference. When dismantled, the 'innate' brain circuits for assessing testimony could turn out to work on logic and evidence. |
6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Empathy with others may give less than 'Knowledge', but it gives more than mere logical or physical possibility; it gives plausibility, or (to revive Platonic terminology) it provides 'right opinion'. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec VI) | |
A reaction: See Ideas 174 and 2140 for Plato. Putnam is exploring areas of knowledge outside the limits of strict science. Behind this claim seems to lie the Principle of Charity (3971), but a gang of systematic liars (e.g. evil students) would be a problem case. |
17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Explanation is an interest-relative notion …explanation has to be partly a pragmatic concept. To regard the 'pragmatics' of explanation as no part of the concept is to abdicate the job of figuring out what makes an explanation good. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], p. 41-2), quoted by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 1 | |
A reaction: I suppose this is just obvious, depending on how far you want to take the 'interest-relative' bit. If a fool is fobbed off with a trivial explanation, there must be some non-relative criterion for assessing that. |
18323 | Any explanation will be accepted as true if it gives pleasure and a feeling of power [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To trace something unknown back to something known is alleviating, soothing, gratifying and gives moreover a feeling of power. ...First principle: any explanation is better than none. ...Proof by pleasure ('by potency') as criterion of truth. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.5) | |
A reaction: By 'proof by pleasure' he means that we find an explanation so satisfying that we cling to it. I assume it is a criterion of rationality (an epistemic virtue) to reject the principle 'any explanation is better than none'. Negative capability. |
18310 | The 'highest' concepts are the most general and empty concepts [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The 'highest concepts' ...are the most general, the emptiest concepts, the last fumes of evaporating reality. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.4) | |
A reaction: This could be seen as an attack on the aspirations of all of philosophy, which seeks general truths out of the chaos of experience. Should we shut up, then, and just be and do? |
20368 | There are no 'individual' persons; we are each the sum of humanity up to this moment [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The 'individual' ...is an error: he does not constitute a separate entity, an atom, a 'link in the chain', something merely inherited from the past - he constitutes the entire single line 'man' up to and including himself. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.33) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but you can sort of imagine yourself as a culmination of something, rather than as an isolated entity. I'm not sure how that is supposed to affect my behaviour. |
2899 | The fanatical rationality of Greek philosophy shows that they were in a state of emergency [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays itself as a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish or- be absurdly rational. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.10) |
6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: How can you have a theory of understanding without a meaning that requires to be understood? Personally I think about the minds of small animals when pondering this, and that seems to put reference and truth at the front of the queue. |
6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
Full Idea: You can't treat understanding a sentence as knowing its truth conditions, because it then becomes unintelligible what that knowledge in turn consists in. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: The implication, I take it, is circularity; how can you specify truth conditions if you don't understand sentences? Putnam here agrees with Dummett that verification must be involved. Something has to be taken as axiomatic in all this. |
6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
Full Idea: I am suggesting that we reject the view that truth (based on the semantic theory) is prior to meaning. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: It is a nice question which of truth or meaning has logical priority. One might start by speculating about how and why animals think. A moth attracted to flame is probably working on truth without much that could be called 'meaning'. |
6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
Full Idea: A theory of how reference is specified isn't a theory of what reference is. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec V) | |
A reaction: A simple and important point. We may achieve reference by naming, describing, grunting or pointing, but the question is, what have we achieved when we get there? |
6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The line of reasoning of Kuhn and Feyerabend can be blocked by arguing (as I have in various places, and as Saul Kripke has) that scientific terms are not synonymous with descriptions. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec II.2) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of the motivation for creating the causal theory of reference. See Idea 6162. We could still go back and ask whether we could block scientific relativism by rethinking how descriptions work, instead of abandoning them. |
6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
Full Idea: A language made up and used by a being who belonged to no community would have no need for such a concept as the 'meaning' of a term. To state the reference of each term and what the language speaker believes is to tell the whole story. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: A subtle response to Wittgenstein's claim (e.g. Ideas 4152,4158), but I am not sure what Putnam means. I would have thought that beliefs had to be embodied in propositions. They may not need 'meaning' quite as urgently as sentences, but still… |
6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
Full Idea: What it is to be a correct translation is to be the translation that best explains the behaviour of the speaker. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec III) | |
A reaction: This seems fairly close to Quine, but rather puzzlingly uses the word 'correct'. If our criteria of translation are purely behavioural, there is no way we can be correct after one word ('gavagai'), so at what point does it become 'correct'? |
6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
Full Idea: We could say that the language has more than one correct way of being mapped onto the world (it must, since it has more than one way of being correctly mapped onto a language which is itself correctly mapped onto the world). | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four) | |
A reaction: This spells out nicely the significance of Quine's 'indeterminacy of translation'. Others have pointed out that the fact that language maps onto world in many ways need not be anti-realist; the world is endless, and language is limited. |
6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The maxim that 'most of a speaker's beliefs are true' as an a priori principle governing radical translation seems to me to go too far; first, I don't know how to count beliefs; second, most people's beliefs on some topics (philosophy) are probably false. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: Putnam prefers a pragmatic view, where charity is applicable if behaviour is involved. Philosophy is too purely theoretical. The extent to which Charity should apply in philosophy seminars is a nice question, which all students should test in practice. |
18313 | The big error is to think the will is a faculty producing effects; in fact, it is just a word [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: At the beginning stands the great fateful error that the will is something which produces an effect - that will is a faculty.... Today we know it is merely a word. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.5) | |
A reaction: This is despite Nietzsche's insistence that 'will to power' is the central fact of active existence. The misreading of Nietzsche is to think that this refers to the conscious exercising of a mental faculty. |
20133 | The 'motive' is superficial, and may even hide the antecedents of a deed [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The so-called 'motive' is another error. Merely a surface phenomenon of consciousness - something alongside the deed which is more likely to cover up the antecedents of the deed than to represent them. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 6.3) | |
A reaction: [Leiter gives 'VI.3', but I can't find it] As far as you can get from intellectualism about action, and is more in accord with the picture found in modern neuro-science. No one knows why they are 'interested' in something, and that's the start of it. |
18326 | The beautiful never stands alone; it derives from man's pleasure in man [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Anyone who tried to divorce the beautiful from man's pleasure in man would at once feel the ground give way beneath him. The 'beautiful in itself' is not even a concept, merely a phrase. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.19) | |
A reaction: I love the insult 'not even a concept'! It's like Pauli's 'not even wrong'! |
20101 | Without music life would be a mistake [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Without music life would be a mistake. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 33) | |
A reaction: Cf Schopenhauer in Idea 21469. If you, dear reader, don't love music, then I sincerely hope that there is something in your life which can match it. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
2902 | Healthy morality is dominated by an instinct for life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All naturalism in morality, that is all healthy morality, is dominated by an instinct for life. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.4) | |
A reaction: Sounds right. There is no reasoning against a moral nihilist, because they seem to have no instinct in favour of life. It is the given of morality. |
18311 | Philosophers hate values having an origin, and want values to be self-sufficient [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: For philosophers, the higher must not be allowed to grow out of the lower, must not be allowed to have grown at all ...Moral: everything of the first rank must be causa sui. Origin in something else counts as an objection, as casting a doubt on value. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.4) | |
A reaction: This is so deep and central that I wrote a paper on it, advocating that the theory of values should focus of value-makers. |
18324 | There are no moral facts, and moralists believe in realities which do not exist [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: An insight formulated by me: that there are no moral facts whatever. Moral judgement has this in common with religious judgement that it believes in realities which do not exist. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 6.1) | |
A reaction: Not only a slogan for non-cognitivism, but also a clear statement of the error theory about morality, a century before John Mackie. |
2904 | The doctrine of free will has been invented essentially in order to blame and punish people [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of will has been invented essentially for the purpose of punishment, that is of finding guilty. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.7) | |
A reaction: Michael Frede says free will was invented to feel wholly in charge of our own actions. I doubt whether punishment was the first motive. The will just gives a simple explanation of actions. |
2895 | The value of life cannot be estimated [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The value of life cannot be estimated. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02) | |
A reaction: Military leaders apparently judge that the death of one of their own soldiers is worth between 12 and 20 enemy deaths (so history suggests). How about ransom money? |
18322 | When we establish values, that is life itself establishing them, through us [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: When we speak of values we do so under the inspiration and from the perspective of life: life itself evaluates through us when we establish values | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.5) | |
A reaction: I love Nietzsche's ideas about the source of values, and his remarks about the value of life. Other thinkers sound so simplistic in comparison. |
2893 | In every age the wisest people have judged life to be worthless [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In every age the wisest have passed the identical judgement on life: it is worthless. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.01) | |
A reaction: I guess he was having a bad day. Since the whole universe is clearly 'worthless', this judgement must in some sense be correct. But I love my books. |
2894 | Value judgements about life can never be true [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Judgements, value judgements concerning life, for or against it, can in the last resort never be true. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02) | |
A reaction: I suppose this is in the same spirit as judging whether celery tastes nice. Are you for or against the Moon? |
18321 | To evaluate life one must know it, but also be situated outside of it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One would have to be situated outside life ....[and yet know it thoroughly] ....to be permitted to touch on the problem of the value of life at all. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.5) | |
A reaction: Can practising artists question the value of their art? The whole point of objectivity is that we can mentally step 'outside' of something, without actually withdrawing from it. |
18308 | A philosopher fails in wisdom if he thinks the value of life is a problem [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: For a philosopher to see a problem in the value of life thus even constitutes an objection to him, a question-mark as to his wisdom, a piece of unwisdom. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02) | |
A reaction: I take his point to be neither that life is unquestionably valuable nor that it is valueless, but that the very question is ridiculous. If we live, we value living. Sounds right. |
18319 | Love is the spiritualisation of sensuality [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The spiritualization of sensuality is called 'love': it is a great triumph over Christianity. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.3) | |
A reaction: I'm not quite clear what 'spiritualization' means, particularly when it comes from Nietzsche. |
2903 | A good human will be virtuous because they are happy [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A well-constituted human being, a 'happy one', must perform certain actions and shrink from other actions. In a formula: his virtue is the consequence of his happiness. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.2) | |
A reaction: A nice reversal of basic Aristotle, though Aristotle does say that the truly virtuous person is happy in their actions. Treat unhappy people with caution! |
2891 | Only the English actually strive after happiness [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Man does not strive after happiness; only the Englishman does that. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 12) | |
A reaction: The Danes keeping being voted the happiest nation, so presumably that results from some sort of effort on their part. The easiest is happiness is to achieve security, then do nothing. |
18327 | A wholly altruistic morality, with no egoism, is a thoroughly bad thing [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: An 'altruistic' morality, a morality under which egoism languishes - is under all circumstances a bad sign. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.35) |
15606 | Military idea: what does not kill me makes me stronger [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: From the military school of life. - What does not kill me makes me stronger. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 08) | |
A reaction: The published version! Perhaps the most famous remark in all of Nietzsche, and no one realises it is ironic! It is a sarcastic remark about the battering ram mentality of the Prussian militarist! He had served in the army. |
18328 | Invalids are parasites [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The invalid is a parasite on society. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.36) | |
A reaction: I'll skip the rest, but you get the idea. The point (with which I sympathise) is that life is primarily about what healthy people do. Something has gone wrong if all we do is worry about the sick and the suffering. |
18331 | Democracy is organisational power in decline [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Democracy has always been the declining form of the power to organise. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.39) | |
A reaction: Even when Nietzsche is wrong (and who knows, here?) he always challenges you to think! |
18332 | The creation of institutions needs a determination which is necessarily anti-liberal [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: For institutions to exist there must exist the kind of will, instinct, imperative which is anti-liberal to the point of malice: the will to tradition, to authority, to centuries-long responsibility, to solidarity between succeeding generations. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.39) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a lovely challenge to Popper, who seems to have been a liberal who pinned his faith on institutions. |
2911 | True justice is equality for equals and inequality for unequals [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: 'Equality for equals, inequality for unequals' - that would be the true voice of justice. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.48) |
18320 | To renounce war is to renounce the grand life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One has renounced grand life when one renounces war. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.3) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche was a medical orderly in the 1870 Franco-Prussian war, so he had seen it at first hand. I think the machine gun and the heavy bomber would have changed his attitude to warfare. He sounds a bit silly now. Nostalgia for the Iliad. |
2908 | There is a need for educators who are themselves educated [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is a need for educators who are themselves educated. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 7.5) |
18329 | Sometimes it is an error to have been born - but we can rectify it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We have no power to prevent ourselves being born: but we can rectify this error - for sometimes it is an error. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.36) |
2905 | 'Purpose' is just a human fiction [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We invented the concept 'purpose': in reality purpose is lacking. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.8) |
18312 | The supreme general but empty concepts must be compatible, and hence we get 'God' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The supreme concepts of philosophers cannot be incommensurate with one another, be incompatible with one another... Thus they acquired their stupendous concept 'God'.... The last, thinnest, emptiest is placed as the first, as cause in itself. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.4) |
2906 | By denying God we deny human accountability, and thus we redeem the world [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We deny God; in denying God we deny accountability; only by doing that do we redeem the world. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.8) |
18325 | Christians believe that only God can know what is good for man [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Christianity presupposes that man does not know, cannot know what is good for him and what evil: he believes in God, who alone knows. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.05) |
2901 | How could the Church intelligently fight against passion if it preferred poorness of spirit to intelligence? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The primitive church fought against the 'intelligent' in favour of the 'poor in spirit': how could one expect from it an intelligent war against passion? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.1) |
18318 | People who disparage actual life avenge themselves by imagining a better one [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If there is a strong instinct for slandering, disparaging and accusing life within us, then we revenge ourselves on life by means of the phantasmagoria of 'another', a 'better' life. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.6) |