5 ideas
14286 | In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: Consider a possible world in which A is true and otherwise differs minimally from the actual world. 'If A, then B' is true (false) just in case B is true (false) in that possible world. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (A Theory of Conditionals [1968], p.34), quoted by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.1 | |
A reaction: This is the first proposal to give a possible worlds semantics for conditional statements. Edgington observes that worlds which are nearby for me may not be nearby for you. |
14285 | A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: A possible world is the ontological analogue of a stock of hypothetical beliefs. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (A Theory of Conditionals [1968], p.34), quoted by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.1 | |
A reaction: Sounds neat and persuasive. What is the ontological analogue of a stock of hopes? Heaven! |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
20977 | Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham] |
Full Idea: Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense — nonsense upon stilts. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Anarchical Fallacies: on the Declaration of Rights [1796]) | |
A reaction: If you want your opinion to be remembered, express it memorably! I take natural rights to be the basic principles and values which are obvious to almost everyone when they come for formulate legal rights (which are the only true rights). |
21003 | Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham] |
Full Idea: Right, the substantive right, is the child of law; from real laws come real rights; but from imaginary laws, from 'law of nature' can come only imaginary rights. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Anarchical Fallacies: on the Declaration of Rights [1796], II.523), quoted by Amartya Sen - The Idea of Justice 17 'Ethics' | |
A reaction: I am coming to agree with this. What are called 'natural rights' are just self-evident good reasons why someone should be allowed a right. A right can, of course, come from an informal agreement. The question is: why award that particular legal right? |