Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Rationalists' and 'Leibniz'

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6 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham]
     Full Idea: Descartes was a dualist about substance, Spinoza was a monist, and Leibniz was a pluralist (an infinity of substances).
     From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.76)
     A reaction: Spinoza is appealing. We posit a substance, as the necessary basis for existence, but it is unclear how more than one substance can be differentiated. If mind is a separate substance, why isn't iron? Why aren't numbers?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R]
     Full Idea: For Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, if a state of things is possible, it must occur at some time, whether past, present or future. For Leibniz possibility makes no reference to time; an individual is possible if its concept contains no contradiction.
     From: Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 4 'Contingent')
     A reaction: It has always struck me as fallacious to say that anything that is possible must at some time occur. If '6' is possible on the die, what will constrain it to eventually come up when thrown? Mere non-contradiction doesn't imply possibility either.
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham]
     Full Idea: The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics.
     From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.75)
     A reaction: The idea of 'substance' has had an interesting revival in modern philosophy (though not, obviously, in physics). Maybe physics and philosophy have views of reality which are not complementary, but are rivals.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Occasionalism contradicts the Eucharist, which needs genuine changes of substance [Arthur,R]
     Full Idea: The Jesuits rejected occasionalism ... because it is incompatible with the Catholic interpretation of the Eucharist, which there is genuine change of substance of the bread into the substance of Christ (transubstantiation).
     From: Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 5 'Substance')
     A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but I take it that the Eucharist needs a real relation across the substance-spirit boundary, and not just a co-ordination.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham]
     Full Idea: The rationalist view of causation takes it that to make effects intelligible, it must be shown that they are in principle deducible from their causes.
     From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.92)
     A reaction: This has intuitive appeal, but deduction is only possible with further premises, such as the laws of physics. The effects of human behaviour look a bit tricky, even if we cause them.