15 ideas
22384 | A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot] |
Full Idea: 'Double effect' refers to action having an effect aimed at, and also one foreseen but in now way desired. The 'doctrine' is that it is sometimes permissible to bring about by oblique intention what one may not directly intend. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.20) | |
A reaction: Presumably this can only be justified by a trade-off. The unfortunate side effect must be rated as a price worth paying. If the side effect is not foreseen, that is presumably either understandable, or wickedly negligent. No clear rule is possible. |
22385 | The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot] |
Full Idea: Supporters of double effect say that sometimes it makes a difference to the permissibility of an action involving harm to others that this harm, although foreseen, is not part of the agent's intention. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.22) | |
A reaction: The obvious major case is the direction of wartime bombing raids. Controversial, because how can someone foresee a side effect and yet claim to have no intention to cause it? Isn't it wickedly self-deluding? |
22386 | Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of double effect offers us a way out [of the trolley problem], insisting that it is one thing to steer towards someone foreseeing that you will kill him, and another to aim at his death as part of your plan. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.23) | |
A reaction: [She has just created her famous Trolley Problem]. Utilitarians must constantly rely on the doctrine of double effect, as they calculate their trade-offs. |
22387 | Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot] |
Full Idea: Rejection of the doctrine of double effect puts us hopelessly in the power of bad men. Anyone who wants us to do something we think is wrong has only to threaten that otherwise he himself will do something we think worse. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.25) | |
A reaction: Her example is they will torture five if you don't torture one. Bernard Williams's famous Jim and the Indians is they will shoot twenty if you don't shoot one. Williams aims it at utilitarian calculations. Double effect is highly relevant. |
22388 | Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot] |
Full Idea: The strength of the doctrine of double effect seems to lie in the distinction it makes between what we do (equated with direct intention) and what we allow (thought of as obliquely intended). | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.25) | |
A reaction: She objects (nicely), saying her trolley driver 'does' the side-effect killing, and someone might 'allow' an obvious criminal death. There is also an intermediate class of 'brought about', where you set up a killing, but don't do it. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
4061 | The right to life is not a right not to be killed, but not to be killed unjustly [Thomson] |
Full Idea: Maybe the right to life consists not in the right not to be killed, but in the right not to be killed unjustly. | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.131) | |
A reaction: Sounds tautological. There is no right to life, then, but just the requirement that people behave justly? |
4060 | The right to life does not bestow the right to use someone else's body to support that life [Thomson] |
Full Idea: Having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person's body. | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.131) | |
A reaction: A very nice point. You have a right to your life once you are the sole owner of it. |
4062 | No one is morally required to make huge sacrifices to keep someone else alive for nine months [Thomson] |
Full Idea: No one is morally required to make large sacrifices, of health, and other interests and commitments, for nine months, in order to keep another person alive. | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.135) | |
A reaction: It is a trade-off. It might become a duty if society (or even a husband) urgently needed the baby. |
22383 | Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot] |
Full Idea: One reason why most of us feel puzzled about the problem of abortion is that we want, and do not want, to allow to the unborn child the rights that belong to adults and children. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.19) | |
A reaction: We also do and don't want children to have the same rights as adults. Rights should accrue with development and maturity, it seems. No one thinks sperm and egg have rights. Why stop at 'adult'? Superior adults deserve more rights! |
4695 | Maybe abortion can be justified despite the foetus having full human rights [Thomson, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Thomson suggests that abortion can be justified without the need to deny that the foetus has the moral rights of a human person. | |
From: report of Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971]) by Philippa Foot - Killing and Letting Die p.86 | |
A reaction: Thomson uses a dubious analogy between pregnancy and being hooked up to someone for life-support. Presumably killing an innocent person is occasionally justifiable, but the situation would normally be more abnormal than pregnancy. |
4696 | The foetus is safe in the womb, so abortion initiates its death, with the mother as the agent. [Foot on Thomson] |
Full Idea: A fetus is not in jeopardy because it is in the womb, so an abortion originates the fatal sequence, and the mother is the agent. Hence Thomson's argument is invalid, and we must return to question of the moral status of the foetus. | |
From: comment on Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971]) by Philippa Foot - Killing and Letting Die p.86 | |
A reaction: The problem would be if a 'person' was safe, but only if I continue some sustained effort which is not required of me by normal duties. |
4057 | A newly fertilized ovum is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree [Thomson] |
Full Idea: A newly fertilized ovum, a newly implanted clump of cells, is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree. | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.125) | |
A reaction: This relies heavily on the philosopher's concept of a 'person', but it seems right to me. |
4058 | Is someone's right to life diminished if they were conceived by a rape? [Thomson] |
Full Idea: Can we say that a person has a right to life only if they didn't come into existence through rape, or that the latter have less right to life? | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.126) | |
A reaction: This would clearly be an inconsistency for some opponents of abortion who allow rape as an exception. |
4059 | It can't be murder for a mother to perform an abortion on herself to save her own life [Thomson] |
Full Idea: It cannot seriously be thought to be murder if a mother performs an abortion on herself to save her own life (if, say, she had a serious heart condition). | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.127) | |
A reaction: An extreme view might condemn such an action, but it can hardly be based on the 'sanctity of life'. |