4901
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Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
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Full Idea:
I think knowledge and truth are a matter of correspondence to facts, despite all the energy spent showing the naïveté of this view. The connections of our ideas in our heads correspond to relations in the outside world.
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From:
John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1)
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A reaction:
Yes. Modern books offer the difficulties of defining 'correspondence', and finding an independent account of 'facts', as conclusive objections, but I say a brain is a truth machine, and it had better be useful. Indefinability doesn't nullify concepts.
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4885
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Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
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Full Idea:
The truth of "a=b" doesn't require much of 'a' and 'b' other than that there is a single thing to which they both refer. They needn't be interdefinable, or have supervenient properties. In this sense, identity is a very weak relation.
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From:
John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §1.2)
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A reaction:
Interesting. This is seeing the epistemological aspects of identity. Ontologically, identity must invoke Leibniz's Law, and is the ultimately powerful 'relation'. A given student, and the cause of a crop circle, may APPEAR to be quite different.
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9212
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Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Possible states of affairs have often been taken to be propositions, but this cannot be correct, since any possible state of affairs is possibly a state of affairs, but no proposition is possibly a state of affairs.
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From:
Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
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A reaction:
The point is, presumably, that the state of affairs cannot be the proposition itself, but (at least) what the proposition refers to. I can't see any objection to that.
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4899
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Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
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Full Idea:
Using possible worlds to model truth-conditions of statements has led to considerable clarity about the logic of modality. Attempts to use the system for epistemic purposes, however, have been plagued by problems.
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From:
John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1)
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A reaction:
Presumably what lurks behind this is a distinction between what is logically or naturally possible, and what appears to be possible from the perspective of a conscious mind. Is there a possible world in which I can fly?
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4898
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Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
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Full Idea:
Possible worlds can be thought of as indices for models of the language in question, or as concrete realities (David Lewis), or as abstract ways the world might be (Robert Stalnaker), or in various other ways.
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From:
John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1)
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A reaction:
I strongly favour the Stalnaker route here. Reducing great metaphysics to mere language I find abhorrent, and I suspect that Lewis was trapped by his commitment to strong empiricism. We must embrace abstractions into our ontology.
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9213
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The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
A possible world can't be defined (by Stalnaker and Plantinga) as a way the world might have been, because a possible world is possibly the world, yet no way the world might have been is possibly the world.
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From:
Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
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A reaction:
His point is that any definition of a possible world must cover the actual world, because that is one of them. 'Might have been' is not applicable to the actual world. It seems a fairly important starting point for discussion of possible worlds.
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4891
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If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
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Full Idea:
Epiphenomenalism is usually considered to be a form of dualism, but if we define it as the doctrine that conscious events are effects but not causes, it appears to be consistent with physicalism.
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From:
John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §4.2)
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A reaction:
Interesting. The theory was invented to put mind outside physics, and make the closure of physics possible. However, being capable of causing things seems to be a necessary condition for physical objects. An effect in one domain is a cause in another.
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4889
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Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
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Full Idea:
Although we classify ideas by content for many purposes, we do not individuate them by content. The content of an idea can change.
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From:
John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §3.2)
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A reaction:
As the compiler of this database, I find this very appealing. The mind works exactly like a database. I have a 'file' (Perry's word) marked "London", the content of which undergoes continual change. I am a database management system.
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4896
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The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
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Full Idea:
In possible-worlds semantics, expressions have intensions, which are functions from possible worlds to appropriate extensions (names to individuals, n-place predicates to n-tuples, and sentences to truth values, built from parts).
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From:
John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1)
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A reaction:
Interesting. Perry distinguishes 'referential' (or 'subject matter') content, which is prior to the link to extensions - a link which creates 'reflexive' content. He is keen that they should not become confused. True knowledge is 'situated'.
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