23 ideas
10571 | Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is often the case that the concern for rigor gets in the way of a true understanding of the phenomena to be explained. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: This is a counter to Timothy Williamson's love affair with rigour in philosophy. It strikes me as the big current question for analytical philosophy - of whether the intense pursuit of 'rigour' will actually deliver the wisdom we all seek. |
22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
Full Idea: One conception of objectivity is that the facts are 'out there', and it is the task of scientists to discover, analyze and sytematize them. 'Objective' is a success word: if a claim is objective, it successfully captures some feature of the world. | |
From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2) | |
A reaction: This seems to describe truth, rather than objectivity. You can establish accurate facts by subjective means. You can be fairly objective but miss the facts. Objectivity is a mode of thought, not a link to reality. |
22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
Full Idea: Sense experience is necessarily perspectival, so to the extent to which scientific theories are to track the absolute conception [of reality], they must describe a world different from sense experience. | |
From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This is a beautifully simple and interesting point. Even when you are looking at a tree, to grasp its full reality you probably need to close your eyes (which is bad news for artists). |
22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
Full Idea: There may be values involved in the choice of a research problem, the gathering of evidence, the acceptance of a theory, and the application of results. ...The first and fourth do involve values, but what of the second and third? | |
From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] My own view is that the danger of hidden distorting values has to be recognised, but it is then possible, by honest self-criticism, to reduce them to near zero. Sociological enquiry is different, of course. |
22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
Full Idea: According to the Value-Free Ideal, scientific objectivity is characterised by absence of contextual values and by exclusive commitment to epistemic values in scientific reasoning. | |
From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1) | |
A reaction: This seems appealing, because it concedes that we cannot be value-free, without suggesting that we are unavoidably swamped by values. The obvious question is whether the two types of value can be sharply distinguished. |
22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
Full Idea: Three components of value-free science are Impartiality (appraising theories only by epistemic scientific standards), Neutrality (the theories make no value statements), and Autonomy (the theory is motivated only by science). | |
From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.3) | |
A reaction: [They are summarising Hugh Lacey, 1999, 2002] I'm not sure why the third criterion matters, if the first two are met. If a tobacco company commissions research on cigarettes, that doesn't necessarily make the findings false or prejudiced. |
22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
Full Idea: Thermometers assume the length of the fluid or gas is a function of temperature, and different substances yield different results. It was decided that different thermometers using the same substance should match, and air was the best, but not perfect. | |
From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.1) | |
A reaction: [summarising Hasok Chang's research] This is a salutary warning that instruments do not necessarily solve the problem of objectivity, though thermometers do seem to be impersonal, and offer relative accuracy (i.e. ranking temperatures). Cf breathalysers. |
10565 | There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated, since the set of all those sets which have been generated at a given stage will itself give us something new. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) |
10564 | We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We might combine the standard axioms of set theory with the standard axioms of mereology. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) |
10569 | If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We are tempted to ask of second-order quantifiers 'what are you quantifying over?', or 'when you say "for some F" then what is the F?', but these questions already presuppose that the quantifiers are first-order. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005]) |
10570 | Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: In doing semantics we normally assign some appropriate entity to each predicate, but this is largely for technical convenience. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) |
10573 | Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Because of Dedekind's definition of reals by cuts, there is a bizarre modern doctrine that there are many 1's - the natural number 1, the rational number 1, the real number 1, and even the complex number 1. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: See Idea 10572. |
10575 | Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: By what right can Dedekind suppose that there is a number corresponding to any pair of irrationals that constitute an irrational cut? | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) |
10574 | Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: What is the union of the singleton {0}, of zero, and the singleton {φ}, of the null set? Is it the one-element set {0}, or the two-element set {0, φ}? Unless the question of identity between 0 and φ is resolved, we cannot say. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) |
10560 | Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Set-theoretic imperialists think that it must be possible to represent every mathematical object as a set. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) |
10568 | Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Logicists traditionally claim that the theorems of mathematics can be derived by logical means from the relevant definitions of the terms, and that these theorems are epistemically innocent (knowable without Kantian intuition or empirical confirmation). | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 2) |
10563 | A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is natural to have a generative conception of abstracts (like the iterative conception of sets). The abstracts are formed at stages, with the abstracts formed at any given stage being the abstracts of those concepts of objects formed at prior stages. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: See 10567 for Fine's later modification. This may not guarantee 'levels', but it implies some sort of conceptual priority between abstract entities. |
22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
Full Idea: The 'experimenter's regress' says that to know whether a result is correct, one needs to know whether the apparatus is reliable. But one doesn't know whether the apparatus is reliable unless one knows that it produces correct results ...and so on. | |
From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3) | |
A reaction: [H. Collins (1985), a sociologist] I take this to be a case of the triumphant discovery of a vicious circle which destroys all knowledge turning out to be a benign circle. We build up a coherent relationship between reliable results and good apparatus. |
22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |
Full Idea: The Bayesian approach is outspokenly subjective: probability is used for quantifying a scientist's subjective degree of belief in a particular hypothesis. ...It just provides sound rules for learning from experience. | |
From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.2) |
10561 | Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think that it must be possible to represent every mathematical object as a Fregean abstract. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) |
10562 | We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: I propose a unified theory which is a version of ZF or ZFC with urelements, where the urelements are taken to be the abstracts. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) |
10567 | We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Instead of viewing the abstracts (or sums) as being generated from objects, via the concepts from which they are defined, we can take them to be generated from conditions. The number of the universe ∞ is the number of self-identical objects. | |
From: Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: The point is that no particular object is now required to make the abstraction. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |