Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Daodejing (Tao Te Ching)' and 'The Varieties of Necessity'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise people choose inaction and silence [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: The sage keeps to the deed that consists in taking no action and practises the teaching that uses no words.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.II.6)
     A reaction: Notice that this is an active 'deed', and a positive 'practice'. He is not just recommending indifference and lethargy. Personally I don't find the advice very appealing, but it might be good if you live in 'interesting times'.
One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LVI.128)
     A reaction: A famous remark, which my western mind finds simply perplexing. It strikes me as wicked selfishness to keep your wisdom to yourself, and not try to persuade others to follow it. We are all in this together, I say.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Vulgar people are alert; I alone am muddled [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Vulgar people are alert; I alone am muddled.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.XX.47)
     A reaction: Personally I think all human beings are deeply perplexed when they actually address their situation, but most people never spend more than a few minutes a year worrying about it.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The three sources of necessity - the identity of things, the natural order, and the normative order - have their own peculiar forms of necessity. The three main areas of human enquiry - metaphysics, science and ethics - each has its own necessity.
     From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6)
     A reaction: I would treat necessity in ethics with caution, if it is not reducible to natural or metaphysical necessity. Fine's proposal is interesting, but I did not find it convincing, especially in its view that metaphysical necessity doesn't intrude into nature.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Pursuit of learning increases activity; the Way decreases it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: In the pursuit of learning one knows more every day; in the pursuit of the Way one does less every day.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLVII.108)
     A reaction: Everything in my culture has raised the status of the pursuit of learning, so that I can hardly comprehend what is proposed by the Way. I don't believe that the Way can be achieved without great learning, but one might move beyond learning.
To know yet to think that one does not know is best [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: To know yet to think that one does not know is best.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXI.173)
     A reaction: Tricky. Self-deception doesn't sound like a virtue to me. There are epistemic virtues, and caution about one's own knowledge has to be one of them, but a totally false assessment sounds counter-productive.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: I may have good reason to believe some testimony, for example, even though the person providing the testimony has no good reason for saying what he does.
     From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 5)
     A reaction: Thus small children, madmen and dreamers may occasionally get things right without realising it. I take testimony to be merely one more batch of evidence which has to be assessed in building the most coherent picture possible.
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Truth is not beautiful; beautiful speech is not truthful [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Truthful words are not beautiful; beautiful words are not truthful.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXXI.194)
     A reaction: A sharp disagreement with Keats ('Ode to a Grecian Urn'). A deep and important question, especially in relation to Plato's discussion of rhetoric (where he is very ambivalent). Great mathematics is beautiful. Truth can harsh. On the whole, I disagree.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
One with no use for life is wiser than one who values it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: It is just because one has no use for life that one is wiser than the man who values life.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXV.181a)
     A reaction: To have no use for life certainly seems to put a person into a position of superiority, especially when the 'Titanic' is sinking. However, if our lives have no value, I don't know what does. A balance must clearly be struck.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Do good to him who has done you an injury [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Do good to him who has done you an injury.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXIII.148)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 6288 (Jesus). People like this really mess up the social contract theory of morality. If they are going to return good for your evil, there doesn't seem much point in helping them, given how much effort is involved. Most peculiar…
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The highest virtue is achieved without effort [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Those of highest virtue do not strive for virtue, and so they have it.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], 38), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 8.II.2
     A reaction: Every moralist's dream is the person to whom virtue comes so naturally that no thought is required. This says they don't even notice it; Aristotle says they simply enjoying behaving virtuously.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
To gain in goodness, treat as good those who are good, and those who are not [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Those who are good I treat as good; those who are not good I also treat as good; in doing so I gain in goodness.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLIX.111)
     A reaction: Socrates (idea 346) and Jesus (Idea 6288) had similar ideas. Who, though, is going to administer justice, and where is the idea that people 'deserve' good or ill treatment? Schoolteachers should treat all children as if they were good.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / g. Desires
There is no crime greater than having too many desires [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: There is no crime greater than having too many desires.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLVI.104)
     A reaction: It seems harsh to call this a 'crime', given that no one is likely to choose to have 'too many' desires. The crime is in deciding to stimulate desire to excess, or deciding to show no sensible restraint.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
The best rulers are invisible, the next admired, the next feared, and the worst are exploited [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: The best of all rulers is but a shadowy presence to his subjects; next comes the ruler they love and praise; next comes one they fear; next comes one with whom they take liberties.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.XVII.39)
     A reaction: This fits our understanding of football referees to perfection. It might apply to anyone doing a vital adminstrative job, such as compiling a school timetable. It is hard, though, to accept anonymity as a mark of success.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
People are hard to govern because authorities love to do things [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: It is because those in authority are too fond of action that the people are difficult to govern.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXV.181)
     A reaction: I love this. It should be on the wall of every human institution in our civilization. How the heart sinks at the prospect of a 'new initiative'. Not that I am against action; it is just important to recognise that inaction is sometimes the best option.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The better known the law, the more criminals there are [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: The better known the laws and edicts, the more thieves and robbers there are.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LVII.132)
     A reaction: Nice. I link this with my favourite moral maxim from Democritus (Idea 519). The idea is that continual emphasis on what you should not do fills the mind with evil possibilities. Moral perfection must start by taking goodness for granted.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
A military victory is not a thing of beauty [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
     Full Idea: A military victory is not a thing of beauty.
     From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], 31), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 8.II.1
     A reaction: Should be written on the wall of every military academy and barracks.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: It would be harder to break P-and-Q implying P than the connection between cause and effect. This difference in strictness means it is more plausible that natural necessities include metaphysical necessities, than vice versa.
     From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6)
     A reaction: I cannot see any a priori grounds for the claim that causation is more easily disrupted than logic. It seems to be based on the strategy of inferring possibilities from what can be imagined, which seems to me to lead to wild misunderstandings.