27 ideas
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
Full Idea: The fallacy of 'ad obscurum per obscurius' is to explain the obscure by appeal to what is more obscure. | |
From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §3) | |
A reaction: Not strictly a fallacy, so much as an example of inadequate explanation, along with circularity and infinite regresses. |
10775 | The axiom of choice now seems acceptable and obvious (if it is meaningful) [Tharp] |
Full Idea: The main objection to the axiom of choice was that it had to be given by some law or definition, but since sets are arbitrary this seems irrelevant. Formalists consider it meaningless, but set-theorists consider it as true, and practically obvious. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §3) |
10766 | Logic is either for demonstration, or for characterizing structures [Tharp] |
Full Idea: One can distinguish at least two quite different senses of logic: as an instrument of demonstration, and perhaps as an instrument for the characterization of structures. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) | |
A reaction: This is trying to capture the proof-theory and semantic aspects, but merely 'characterizing' something sounds like a rather feeble aspiration for the semantic side of things. Isn't it to do with truth, rather than just rule-following? |
10767 | Elementary logic is complete, but cannot capture mathematics [Tharp] |
Full Idea: Elementary logic cannot characterize the usual mathematical structures, but seems to be distinguished by its completeness. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10769 | Second-order logic isn't provable, but will express set-theory and classic problems [Tharp] |
Full Idea: The expressive power of second-order logic is too great to admit a proof procedure, but is adequate to express set-theoretical statements, and open questions such as the continuum hypothesis or the existence of big cardinals are easily stated. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10762 | In sentential logic there is a simple proof that all truth functions can be reduced to 'not' and 'and' [Tharp] |
Full Idea: In sentential logic there is a simple proof that all truth functions, of any number of arguments, are definable from (say) 'not' and 'and'. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §0) | |
A reaction: The point of 'say' is that it can be got down to two connectives, and these are just the usual preferred pair. |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
Full Idea: Anyone should agree that a justification for regarding a singular term as having objectual reference is provided just as soon as one has justification for regarding as true certain atomic statements in which it functions as a singular term. | |
From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §9) | |
A reaction: The meat of this idea is hidden in the word 'certain'. See Idea 10314 for Hale's explanation. Without that, the proposal strikes me as absurd. |
10776 | The main quantifiers extend 'and' and 'or' to infinite domains [Tharp] |
Full Idea: The symbols ∀ and ∃ may, to start with, be regarded as extrapolations of the truth functional connectives ∧ ('and') and ∨ ('or') to infinite domains. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §5) |
10774 | There are at least five unorthodox quantifiers that could be used [Tharp] |
Full Idea: One might add to one's logic an 'uncountable quantifier', or a 'Chang quantifier', or a 'two-argument quantifier', or 'Shelah's quantifier', or 'branching quantifiers'. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §3) | |
A reaction: [compressed - just listed for reference, if you collect quantifiers, like collecting butterflies] |
10773 | The Löwenheim-Skolem property is a limitation (e.g. can't say there are uncountably many reals) [Tharp] |
Full Idea: The Löwenheim-Skolem property seems to be undesirable, in that it states a limitation concerning the distinctions the logic is capable of making, such as saying there are uncountably many reals ('Skolem's Paradox'). | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10777 | Skolem mistakenly inferred that Cantor's conceptions were illusory [Tharp] |
Full Idea: Skolem deduced from the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem that 'the absolutist conceptions of Cantor's theory' are 'illusory'. I think it is clear that this conclusion would not follow even if elementary logic were in some sense the true logic, as Skolem assumed. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §7) | |
A reaction: [Tharp cites Skolem 1962 p.47] Kit Fine refers to accepters of this scepticism about the arithmetic of infinities as 'Skolemites'. |
10765 | Soundness would seem to be an essential requirement of a proof procedure [Tharp] |
Full Idea: Soundness would seem to be an essential requirement of a proof procedure, since there is little point in proving formulas which may turn out to be false under some interpretation. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10763 | Completeness and compactness together give axiomatizability [Tharp] |
Full Idea: Putting completeness and compactness together, one has axiomatizability. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §1) |
10770 | If completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the valid formulas [Tharp] |
Full Idea: In general, if completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the valid formulas. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) | |
A reaction: I.e. the theory is not effectively enumerable. |
10771 | Compactness is important for major theories which have infinitely many axioms [Tharp] |
Full Idea: It is strange that compactness is often ignored in discussions of philosophy of logic, since the most important theories have infinitely many axioms. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) | |
A reaction: An example of infinite axioms is the induction schema in first-order Peano Arithmetic. |
10772 | Compactness blocks infinite expansion, and admits non-standard models [Tharp] |
Full Idea: The compactness condition seems to state some weakness of the logic (as if it were futile to add infinitely many hypotheses). To look at it another way, formalizations of (say) arithmetic will admit of non-standard models. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10764 | A complete logic has an effective enumeration of the valid formulas [Tharp] |
Full Idea: A complete logic has an effective enumeration of the valid formulas. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10768 | Effective enumeration might be proved but not specified, so it won't guarantee knowledge [Tharp] |
Full Idea: Despite completeness, the mere existence of an effective enumeration of the valid formulas will not, by itself, provide knowledge. For example, one might be able to prove that there is an effective enumeration, without being able to specify one. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) | |
A reaction: The point is that completeness is supposed to ensure knowledge (of what is valid but unprovable), and completeness entails effective enumerability, but more than the latter is needed to do the key job. |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
Full Idea: A third way has been offered to 'make sense' of neo-Fregeanism: we should reject Quine's well-known criterion of ontological commitment in favour of one based on 'truth-maker theory'. | |
From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §4 n19) | |
A reaction: [The cite Ross Cameron for this] They reject this proposal, on the grounds that truth-maker theory is not sufficient to fix the grounding truth-conditions of statements. |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
Full Idea: It is claimed that neo-Fregeans are committed to 'maximalism' - that whatever can exist does. | |
From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §4) | |
A reaction: [The cite Eklund] They observe that maximalism denies contingent non-existence (of the £20 note I haven't got). There seems to be the related problem of 'hyperinflation', that if abstract objects are generated logically, the process is unstoppable. |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
Full Idea: Identity is sometimes read so that 'Pegasus is Pegasus' expresses a truth, the non-existence of any winged horse notwithstanding. | |
From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §5) | |
A reaction: This would give you ontological commitment to truth, without commitment to existence. It undercuts the use of identity statements as the basis of existence claims, which was Frege's strategy. |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
Full Idea: There is a compatibilist view which says that it is for the abundant properties to play the role of 'bedeutungen' in semantic theory, and the sparse ones to address certain metaphysical concerns. | |
From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §9) | |
A reaction: Only a philosopher could live with the word 'property' having utterly different extensions in different areas of discourse. They similarly bifurcate words like 'object' and 'exist'. Call properties 'quasi-properties' and I might join in. |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
Full Idea: The good standing of a predicate is already trivially sufficient to ensure the existence of an associated property, a (perhaps complex) way of being which the predicate serves to express. | |
From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §9) | |
A reaction: 'Way of being' is interesting. Is 'being near Trafalgar Sq' a way of being? I take properties to be 'features', which seems to give a clearer way of demarcating them. They say they are talking about 'abundant' (rather than 'sparse') properties. |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
Full Idea: Abstractionism needs a face-value, existentially committed reading of the terms occurring on the left-hand sides together with sameness of truth-conditions across the biconditional. | |
From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §5) | |
A reaction: They employ 'abstractionism' to mean their logical Fregean strategy for defining abstractions, not to mean the older psychological account. Thus the truth-conditions for being 'parallel' and for having the 'same direction' must be consistent. |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
Full Idea: Abstraction principles purport to introduce fundamental means of reference to a range of objects, to which there is accordingly no presumption that we have any prior or independent means of reference. | |
From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §8) | |
A reaction: There's the rub! They make it sound like a virtue, that we open up yet another heaven of abstract toys to play with. As fictions, they are indeed exciting new fun. As platonic discoveries they strike me as Cloud-Cuckoo Land. |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
Full Idea: It takes, over and above the possession of sense, the truth of relevant contexts to ensure reference. | |
From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §9) | |
A reaction: Reference purely through sense was discredited by Kripke. The present idea challenges Kripke's baptismal realist approach. How do you 'baptise' an abstract object? But isn't reference needed prior to the establishment of truth? |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |