9 ideas
| 12170 | Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: There are three common accounts of amusement: superiority theories (Hobbes's 'sudden glory'), 'relief from restraint' (Freud on jokes), and 'incongruity' theories (Schopenhauer). | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §5) | |
| A reaction: All three contain some truth. But one need not feel superior to laugh, and one may already be in a state of unrestraint. Schopenhauer seems closest to a good general account. |
| 12173 | The central object of amusement is the human [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: There are amusing buildings, but not amusing rocks and cliffs. If I were to propose a candidate for the formal object of amusement, then the human would be my choice, ...or at least emphasise its centrality. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §9) | |
| A reaction: Sounds good. Animal behaviour only seems to amuse if it evokes something human. Plants would have to look a bit human to be funny. |
| 12169 | Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Man is the only animal that laughs, so a starting point for all enquiries into laughter must be the hypothesis that it is an attribute of reason (though that gets us no further than our definition of reason). | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §1) | |
| A reaction: I would be inclined to say that both our capacity for reason and our capacity for laughter (and, indeed, our capacity for language) are a consequence of our evolved capacity for meta-thought. |
| 12172 | Objects of amusement do not have to be real [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: It is a matter of indifference whether the object of amusement be thought to be real. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §7) | |
| A reaction: Sort of. If I say 'wouldn't it be funny if someone did x?', it is probably much less funny than if I say 'apparently he really did x'. The fantasy case has to be much funnier to evoke the laughter. |
| 22320 | An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: What I once called 'objects', simples, were simply what I could refer to without running the risk of their possible non-existence. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.72), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 52 'Simp' | |
| A reaction: For most of us, you can refer to something because you take it to be an object. For these Fregean influenced guys (e.g. Hale) something is an object because you can refer to it. Why don't they use 'object*' for their things? |
| 12174 | Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: It is only rational beings who can be attentive without a motive; only rational beings who can be interested in that in which they have no interest. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §12) | |
| A reaction: Rational beings make long term plans, so they cannot prejudge which things may turn out to be of interest to them. Scruton (a Kantian) makes it sound a little loftier than it actually is. |
| 18283 | Language pictures the essence of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The essence of language is a picture of the essence of the world. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.85), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 17 | |
| A reaction: Hence for a long time the study of language seemed to be the way to do metaphysics. Now they study mathematical logic, with the same hope. |
| 18282 | You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: It isn't possible to believe something for which you cannot imagine some kind of verification. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.200), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 13 'Constr' | |
| A reaction: In 1930 LW was calling this his 'old principle'. As it stands here it is too vague to assert very much. |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |