Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Tusculan Disputations' and 'Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
A wise man has integrity, firmness of will, nobility, consistency, sobriety, patience [Cicero]
     Full Idea: The wise man does nothing of which he can repent, nothing against his will, does everything nobly, consistently, soberly, rightly, not looking forward to anything as bound to come, is not astonished at any novel occurrence, abides by his own decisions.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], V.xxviii)
     A reaction: Notice that the wise man never exhibits weakness of will (an Aristotelian virtue), and is consistent (as Kant proposed), and is patient (as the Stoics proposed). But Cicero doesn't think he should busy himself maximising happiness.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Philosophy is the collection of rational arguments [Cicero]
     Full Idea: Philosophy consists in the collection of rational arguments. [Philosophia ex rationum collatione constet]
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], IV.xxxviii.84)
     A reaction: A nice epigraph for this database. Philosophy is, I trust, a little more than that, because you don't just hide them away in a drawer. But if you arrange them nicely in a museum (a website, for example), not a lot more can be done.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
The meaning of 'know' does not change from courtroom to living room [Unger]
     Full Idea: There is no reason to suppose that the meaning of 'know' changes from the courtroom to the living room and back again; no more than for supposing that 'vacuum' changes from the laboratory to the cannery.
     From: Peter Unger (Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism [1975], 2.1)
     A reaction: I disagree. Lots of words change their meaning (or reference) according to context. Flat, fast, tall, clever. She 'knows a lot' certainly requires a context. The bar of justification goes up and down, and 'knowledge' changes accordingly.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
No one knows anything, and no one is ever justified or reasonable [Unger]
     Full Idea: I argue for the thesis that no one ever knows about anything, ...and that consequently no one is ever justified or at all reasonable in anything.
     From: Peter Unger (Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism [1975], Intro)
     A reaction: The premiss of his book seems to be that knowledge is assumed to require certainty, and is therefore impossible. Unger has helped push us to a more relaxed and fallibilist attitude to knowledge. 'No one is reasonable' is daft!
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism
An evil scientist may give you a momentary life, with totally false memories [Unger]
     Full Idea: The evil scientist might not only be deceiving you with his electrodes; maybe he has just created you with your ostensible memory beliefs and experiences, and for good measure he will immediately destroy you, so in the next moment you no longer exist.
     From: Peter Unger (Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism [1975], 1.12)
     A reaction: This is based on Russell's scepticism about memory (Idea 2792). Even this very train of thought may not exist, if the first half of it was implanted, rather than being developed by you. I cannot see how to dispute this possibility.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
The soul is the heart, or blood in the heart, or part of the brain, of something living in heart or brain, or breath [Cicero]
     Full Idea: Some think the soul is the heart; Empedocles holds that the soul is blood in the heart; others said one part of the brain claimed the primacy of soul; others say the heart or brain are habitations of the soul; while others identify soul and breath.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.ix.17-19)
     A reaction: A nice survey of views. Note that many of them identify the psuché/anima with physical parts of the body; only the fourth option seems to be dualist. This is despite the contemptuous response to Democritus' atomist theory of soul.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
How can one mind perceive so many dissimilar sensations? [Cicero]
     Full Idea: Why is it that, using the same mind, we have perception of things so utterly unlike as colour, taste, heat, smell and sound?
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xx.47)
     A reaction: This leaves us with the 'binding problem', of how the dissimilar sensations are pulled together into one field of experience. It is a nice simple objection, though, to anyone who simplistically claims that the mind is self-evidently unified.
The soul has a single nature, so it cannot be divided, and hence it cannot perish [Cicero]
     Full Idea: In souls there is no mingling of ingredients, nothing of two-fold nature, so it is impossible for the soul to be divided; impossible, therefore, for it to perish either; for perishing is like the separation of parts which were maintained in union.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xxix.71)
     A reaction: Cicero knows he is pushing his luck in asserting that perishing is a sort of division. Why can't something be there one moment and gone the next? He appears to be in close agreement with Descartes about being a 'thinking thing'.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Like the eye, the soul has no power to see itself, but sees other things [Cicero]
     Full Idea: The soul has not the power of itself to see itself, but, like the eye, the soul, though it does not see itself, yet discerns other things.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xxvii)
     A reaction: The soul is a complex item which contributes many layers of interpretation to what it sees, so there is scope for parts of the soul seeing other parts. Somewhere in the middle Cicero seems to be right - there is an elusive something we can't get at.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Souls contain no properties of elements, and elements contain no properties of souls [Cicero]
     Full Idea: No beginnings of souls can be found on earth; there is no combination in souls that could be born from earth, nothing that partakes of moist or airy or fiery; for in those elements there is nothing to possess the power of memory, thought, or reflection.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xxvi.66)
     A reaction: Interesting, but I think magnetism is an instructive analogy, which has weird properties which we never perceive in elements (though it is there, buried deep - suggesting panpsychism). Cicero would be disconcerted to find that fire isn't an element.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
We should not share the distress of others, but simply try to relieve it [Cicero]
     Full Idea: We ought not to share distresses ourselves for the sake of others, but we ought to relieve others of their distress if we can.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], IV.xxvi.56)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a sensible and balanced attitude. Some people, particularly in a Christian culture, urge that feeling strong and painful compassion for others is an intrinsic good, but the commonsense view is that that just increases human suffering.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
All men except philosophers fear poverty [Cicero]
     Full Idea: All men are afraid of poverty, but not a single philosopher is so.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], V.xxxi.88)
     A reaction: Not a thought which is encountered very often in modern philosophy journals. If a person is to be 'philosophical' in the way they live, calm endurance of the vicissitudes and hardships of life has to be a key prerequisite.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
If one despises illiterate mechanics individually, they are not worth more collectively [Cicero]
     Full Idea: Can anything be more foolish than to suppose that those, whom individually one despises as illiterate mechanics, are worth anything collectively?
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], V.xxxvi.104)
     A reaction: Aristotle disagrees (Idea 2823). In 1906 a huge number of people guessed the weight of a cow at a fair, and the average was within one pound of the truth. In our world the healthy workings of the group are warped by the mass media.