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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason' and 'fragments/reports'

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9 ideas

19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
1554 Contradiction is impossible, since only one side of the argument refers to the true facts [Prodicus, by Didymus the Blind]
     Full Idea: Prodicus insists that contradiction is impossible, since if two people are contradicting each other, they cannot both be speaking of the same fact. Only the one who is speaking the truth is speaking of facts as they are; the other does not speak facts.
     From: report of Prodicus (fragments/reports [c.423 BCE]) by Didymus the Blind - Commentary on Ecclesiastes (frags)
     A reaction: cf. Kant's 100 thalers example
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20034 Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Bratman's three main norms of intention are 'internal consistency' (between a person's intentions), 'means-end coherence' (the means must fit the end), and 'consistency with the agent's beliefs' (especially intending to do and believing you won't do).
     From: report of Michael Bratman (Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [1987]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 4
     A reaction: These are controversial, but have set the agenda for modern non-reductive discussions of intention.
20033 Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Intentions involve normative commitments. We settle on intended courses, if there is no reason to reconsider them, and intentions put pressure on us to form further intentions in order to more efficiently coordinate our actions.
     From: report of Michael Bratman (Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [1987]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 4
     A reaction: [a compression of their summary] This distinguishes them from beliefs and desires, which contain no such normative requirements, even though they may point that way.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
20026 Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: We need to distinguish intention as an aim or goal of actions, and intentions as a distinctive state of commitment to future action, a state that results from and subsequently constrains our practical endeavours as planning agents.
     From: report of Michael Bratman (Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [1987]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 2
     A reaction: I'm not sure how distinct these are, given the obvious possibility of intermediate stages, and the embracing of any available short-cut. If I could mow my lawn with one blink, I'd do it.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20032 Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Bratman motivated the idea that intentions are psychologically real and not reducible to desire-belief complexes by observing that they are motivationally distinctive, and subject to their own unique standards of rational appraisal.
     From: report of Michael Bratman (Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [1987]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 4
     A reaction: If I thought my belief was a bit warped, and my desire morally corrupt, my higher self might refuse to form an intention. If so, then Bratman is onto something. But maybe my higher self has its own beliefs and desires.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
468 Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
1555 People used to think anything helpful to life was a god, as the Egyptians think the Nile a god [Prodicus]
     Full Idea: In the old days people regarded the sun, the moon, rivers, springs, and everything else which is helpful for life as gods, because we are helped by them, just as the Egyptians regard the Nile as a god.
     From: Prodicus (fragments/reports [c.423 BCE], B05), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 9.18
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
1543 He denied the existence of the gods, saying they are just exaltations of things useful for life [Prodicus]
     Full Idea: He says that the gods worshipped by men neither exist nor have knowledge, but that the ancients exalted crops and everything else which is useful for life.
     From: Prodicus (fragments/reports [c.423 BCE]), quoted by Anon (Herc) - fragments 1428 19.12
535 The gods are just personified human benefits [Prodicus]
     Full Idea: Things from which benefits to human life have been derived have come to be considered deities, such as Demeter and Dionysus.
     From: Prodicus (fragments/reports [c.423 BCE], B5), quoted by (who?) - where?