10838
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To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett]
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Full Idea:
We cannot in general suppose that we give a proper account of a concept by describing those circumstance in which we do, and those in which we do not, make use of the relevant word. We explain the point of the concept, what we use the word for.
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From:
Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.231)
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A reaction:
Well said. I am beginning to develop a campaign to make sure that analytical philosophy focuses on understanding concepts (in a full 'logos' sort of way), and doesn't just settle for logical form or definition or rules of usage.
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10840
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We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett]
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Full Idea:
For a particular bounded language, if it is free of ambiguity and inconsistency, it must be possible to characterize the true sentences of the language; somewhat as, for a given game, we can say which moves are winning moves.
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From:
Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.237)
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A reaction:
The background of this sounds rather like Tarski, with truth just being a baton passed from one part of the language to another, though Dummett adds the very un-Tarskian notion that truth has a value.
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4688
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We imagine small and large objects scaled to the same size, suggesting a fixed capacity for imagination [Lavers]
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Full Idea:
If we think of a pea, and then of the Eiffel Tower, they seem to occupy the same space in our consciousness, suggesting that we scale our images to fit the available hardware, just as computer imagery is limited by the screen and memory available.
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From:
Michael Lavers (talk [2003]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
Nice point. It is especially good because it reinforces a physicalist view of the mind from introspection, where most other evidence is external observation of brains (as Nietzsche reinforces determinism by introspection).
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