10 ideas
| 15717 | Using Choice, you can cut up a small ball and make an enormous one from the pieces [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
| Full Idea: The problem with the Axiom of Choice is that it allows an initiate (by an ingenious train of reasoning) to cut a golf ball into a finite number of pieces and put them together again to make a globe as big as the sun. | |
| From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 9) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure how this works (and I think it was proposed by the young Tarski), but it sounds like a real problem to me, for all the modern assumptions that Choice is fine. |
| 15712 | 1 and 0, then add for naturals, subtract for negatives, divide for rationals, take roots for irrationals [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
| Full Idea: You have 1 and 0, something and nothing. Adding gives us the naturals. Subtracting brings the negatives into light; dividing, the rationals; only with a new operation, taking of roots, do the irrationals show themselves. | |
| From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 1 'Mind') | |
| A reaction: The suggestion is constructivist, I suppose - that it is only operations that produce numbers. They go on to show that complex numbers don't quite fit the pattern. |
| 15711 | The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
| Full Idea: The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else. | |
| From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 1 'Nameless') | |
| A reaction: Nice. That is, the rationals may be dense (you can always find another one in any gap), but the irrationals are continuous (no gaps). |
| 15714 | 'Commutative' laws say order makes no difference; 'associative' laws say groupings make no difference [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
| Full Idea: The 'commutative' laws say the order in which you add or multiply two numbers makes no difference; ...the 'associative' laws declare that regrouping couldn't change a sum or product (e.g. a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c ). | |
| From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 2 'Tablets') | |
| A reaction: This seem utterly self-evident, but in more complex systems they can break down, so it is worth being conscious of them. |
| 15715 | 'Distributive' laws say if you add then multiply, or multiply then add, you get the same result [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
| Full Idea: The 'distributive' law says you will get the same result if you first add two numbers, and then multiply them by a third, or first multiply each by the third and then add the results (i.e. a · (b+c) = a · b + a · c ). | |
| From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 2 'Tablets') | |
| A reaction: Obviously this will depend on getting the brackets right, to ensure you are indeed doing the same operations both ways. |
| 15713 | The first million numbers confirm that no number is greater than a million [Kaplan/Kaplan] |
| Full Idea: The claim that no number is greater than a million is confirmed by the first million test cases. | |
| From: R Kaplan / E Kaplan (The Art of the Infinite [2003], 2 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: Extrapolate from this, and you can have as large a number of cases as you could possibly think of failing to do the inductive job. Love it! Induction isn't about accumulations of cases. It is about explanation, which is about essence. Yes! |
| 12314 | Audience-relative explanation, or metaphysical explanation based on information? [Stanford] |
| Full Idea: Rather than an 'interest-relative' notion of explanation (Putnam), it can be informational content which makes an explanation, which is an 'audience-invariant' contraint, which is not pragmatic, but mainly epistemological and also partly metaphysical. | |
| From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.172) | |
| A reaction: [compressed summary of Ruben 1990] Examples given are that Rome burning explains Nero fiddling, even if no one ever says so, and learning that George III had porphyria explains his madness. |
| 12313 | Explanation is for curiosity, control, understanding, to make meaningful, or to give authority [Stanford] |
| Full Idea: There are a number of reasons why we explain: out of sheer curiosity, to increase our control of a situation, to help understanding by simplifying or making familiar, to confer meaning or significance, and to give scientific authority to some statement. | |
| From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.172) |
| 12315 | We can explain by showing constitution, as well as showing causes [Stanford] |
| Full Idea: The powerful engine of my car can be explained by an examination of each of its parts, but it is not caused by them. They do not cause the engine; they constitute it. | |
| From: Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.174) | |
| A reaction: [example from Ruben 1990:221] This could be challenged, since there is clearly a causal connection between the constitution and the whole. We distinguish engine parts which contribute to the power from those which do not. |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |