16766
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One thing needs a single thing to unite it; if there were two forms, something must unite them [Aquinas]
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Full Idea:
One thing simpliciter is produced out of many actually existing things only if there is something uniting and tying them to each other. If Socrates were animal and rational by different forms, then to be united they would need something to make them one.
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From:
Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones de anima [1269], 11c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.2
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A reaction:
This is the reply to the idea that a single thing is just an interesting of many sortal essences. It presumes, of course, that a thing like a horse has something called 'unity'.
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12314
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Audience-relative explanation, or metaphysical explanation based on information? [Stanford]
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Full Idea:
Rather than an 'interest-relative' notion of explanation (Putnam), it can be informational content which makes an explanation, which is an 'audience-invariant' contraint, which is not pragmatic, but mainly epistemological and also partly metaphysical.
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From:
Michael Stanford (Explanation: the state of play [1991], p.172)
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A reaction:
[compressed summary of Ruben 1990] Examples given are that Rome burning explains Nero fiddling, even if no one ever says so, and learning that George III had porphyria explains his madness.
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