Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Aristotle's Theory of Substance' and 'In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism'

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9 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties

12354	A 'categorial' property is had by virtue of being or having an item from a category [Wedin]
	Full Idea: A 'categorial' property is a property something has by virtue of being or having an item from one of the categories.
	From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], V.5)
	A reaction: I deny that these are 'properties'. A thing is categorised according to its properties. To denote the category as a further property is the route to madness (well, to a regress).

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

12358	Substance is a principle and a kind of cause [Wedin]
	Full Idea: Substance [ousia] is a principle [arché] and a kind of cause [aitia].
	From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], 1041a09)
	A reaction: The fact that substance is a cause is also the reason why substance is the ultimate explanation. It is here that I take the word 'power' to capture best what Aristotle has in mind.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism

12346	Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock [Wedin]
	Full Idea: The form of a thing (of a given kind) explains why certain matter constitutes a thing of that kind, and with this, Aristotle holds, we have reached explanatory bedrock.
	From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], Intro)
	A reaction: We must explain an individual tiger which is unusually docile. It must have an individual form which makes it a tiger, but also an individual form which makes it docile.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism

12295	3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Three-dimensionalist think a thing is somehow 'stretched out' through its location at a given time though not through the period during which it exists, and it is present in its entirety at a moment when it exists though not at a position of its location.
	From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.1)
	A reaction: This definition is designed to set up Fine's defence of the 3-D view, by showing that various dubious asymmetries show up if you do not respect the distinctions offered by the 3-D view.

12298	Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: In order to have genuine motion, rather than mere variation in position, it is necessary that the object should be 'entirely present' at each moment of the change. Thus without entire presence, or existence, genuine motion will not be possible.
	From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.6)
	A reaction: See Idea 4786 for a rival view of motion. Of course, who says we have to have Kit Fine's 'genuine' motion, if some sort of ersatz motion still gets you to work in the morning?

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism

12296	4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Four-dimensionalists have thought that a material thing is as equally 'stretched out' in time as it is in space, and that there is no special way in which it is entirely present at a moment rather than at a position.
	From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.1)
	A reaction: Compare his definition of 3-D in Idea 12295. The 4-D is contrary to our normal way of thinking. Since I don't think the future exists, I presume that if I am a 4-D object then I have to say that I don't yet exist, and I disapprove of such talk.

18882	You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons]
	Full Idea: Fine says it is acceptable to ask when a wedding was and where it was, and it is acceptable to ask or state where the bride was (at a certain time), but not when she was.
	From: report of Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.18) by Peter Simons - Modes of Extension: comment on Fine p.18
	A reaction: This is aimed at three-dimensionalists who seem to think that a bride is a prolonged event, just as a wedding is. Fine is, interestingly, invoking ordinary language. When did the wedding start and end? When was the bride's birth and death?

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts

12297	Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Even if one is a three-dimensionalist, one might affirm the existence of temporal parts, on the grounds that everything merely endures for an instant.
	From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.2)
	A reaction: This seems an important point, as belief in temporal parts is normally equated with four-dimensionalism (see Idea 12296). The idea is that a thing might be 'entirely present' at each instant, only to be replaced by a simulacrum.

21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality

468	Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
	Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
	From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?