Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Declaration of the Rights of Man' and 'A Structural Account of Mathematics'

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26 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
We only know relational facts about the empty set, but nothing intrinsic [Chihara]
     Full Idea: Everything we know about the empty set is relational; we know that nothing is the membership relation to it. But what do we know about its 'intrinsic properties'?
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 01.5)
     A reaction: Set theory seems to depend on the concept of the empty set. Modern theorists seem over-influenced by the Quine-Putnam view, that if science needs it, we must commit ourselves to its existence.
In simple type theory there is a hierarchy of null sets [Chihara]
     Full Idea: In simple type theory, there is a null set of type 1, a null set of type 2, a null set of type 3..... (Quine has expressed his distaste for this).
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 07.4)
     A reaction: It is bad enough trying to individuate the unique null set, without whole gangs of them drifting indistinguishably through the logical fog. All rational beings should share Quine's distaste, even if Quine is wrong.
Realists about sets say there exists a null set in the real world, with no members [Chihara]
     Full Idea: In the Gödelian realistic view of set theory the statement that there is a null set as the assertion of the existence in the real world of a set that has no members.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 11.6)
     A reaction: It seems to me obvious that such a claim is nonsense on stilts. 'In the beginning there was the null set'?
The null set is a structural position which has no other position in membership relation [Chihara]
     Full Idea: In the structuralist view of sets, in structures of a certain sort the null set is taken to be a position (or point) that will be such that no other position (or point) will be in the membership relation to it.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 11.6)
     A reaction: It would be hard to conceive of something having a place in a structure if nothing had a relation to it, so is the null set related to singeton sets but not there members. It will be hard to avoid Platonism here. Set theory needs the null set.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
What is special about Bill Clinton's unit set, in comparison with all the others? [Chihara]
     Full Idea: What is it about the intrinsic properties of just that one unit set in virtue of which Bill Clinton is related to just it and not to any other unit sets in the set-theoretical universe?
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 01.5)
     A reaction: If we all kept pet woodlice, we had better not hold a wood louse rally, or we might go home with the wrong one. My singleton seems seems remarkably like yours. Could we, perhaps, swap, just for a change?
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
The set theorist cannot tell us what 'membership' is [Chihara]
     Full Idea: The set theorist cannot tell us anything about the true relationship of membership.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 01.5)
     A reaction: If three unrelated objects suddenly became members of a set, it is hard to see how the world would have changed, except in the minds of those thinking about it.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
ZFU refers to the physical world, when it talks of 'urelements' [Chihara]
     Full Idea: ZFU set theory talks about physical objects (the urelements), and hence is in some way about the physical world.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 11.5)
     A reaction: This sounds a bit surprising, given that the whole theory would appear to be quite unaffected if God announced that idealism is true and there are no physical objects.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
A pack of wolves doesn't cease when one member dies [Chihara]
     Full Idea: A pack of wolves is not thought to go out of existence just because some member of the pack is killed.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 07.5)
     A reaction: The point is that the formal extensional notion of a set doesn't correspond to our common sense notion of a group or class. Even a highly scientific theory about wolves needs a loose notion of a wolf pack.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
The mathematics of relations is entirely covered by ordered pairs [Chihara]
     Full Idea: Everything one needs to do with relations in mathematics can be done by taking a relation to be a set of ordered pairs. (Ordered triples etc. can be defined as order pairs, so that <x,y,z> is <x,<y,z>>).
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 07.2)
     A reaction: How do we distinguish 'I own my cat' from 'I love my cat'? Or 'I quite like my cat' from 'I adore my cat'? Nevertheless, this is an interesting starting point for a discussion of relations.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Sentences are consistent if they can all be true; for Frege it is that no contradiction can be deduced [Chihara]
     Full Idea: In first-order logic a set of sentences is 'consistent' iff there is an interpretation (or structure) in which the set of sentences is true. ..For Frege, though, a set of sentences is consistent if it is not possible to deduce a contradiction from it.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 02.1)
     A reaction: The first approach seems positive, the second negative. Frege seems to have a higher standard, which is appealing, but the first one seems intuitively right. There is a possible world where this could work.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Analytic geometry gave space a mathematical structure, which could then have axioms [Chihara]
     Full Idea: With the invention of analytic geometry (by Fermat and then Descartes) physical space could be represented as having a mathematical structure, which could eventually lead to its axiomatization (by Hilbert).
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 02.3)
     A reaction: The idea that space might have axioms seems to be pythagoreanism run riot. I wonder if there is some flaw at the heart of Einstein's General Theory because of this?
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
We can replace existence of sets with possibility of constructing token sentences [Chihara, by MacBride]
     Full Idea: Chihara's 'constructability theory' is nominalist - mathematics is reducible to a simple theory of types. Instead of talk of sets {x:x is F}, we talk of open sentences Fx defining them. Existence claims become constructability of sentence tokens.
     From: report of Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004]) by Fraser MacBride - Review of Chihara's 'Structural Acc of Maths' p.81
     A reaction: This seems to be approaching the problem in a Fregean way, by giving an account of the semantics. Chihara is trying to evade the Quinean idea that assertion is ontological commitment. But has Chihara retreated too far? How does he assert existence?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If a successful theory confirms mathematics, presumably a failed theory disconfirms it? [Chihara]
     Full Idea: If mathematics shares whatever confirmation accrues to the theories using it, would it not be reasonable to suppose that mathematics shares whatever disconfirmation accrues to the theories using it?
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 05.8)
     A reaction: Presumably Quine would bite the bullet here, although maths is much closer to the centre of his web of belief, and so far less likely to require adjustment. In practice, though, mathematics is not challenged whenever an experiment fails.
No scientific explanation would collapse if mathematical objects were shown not to exist [Chihara]
     Full Idea: Evidently, no scientific explanations of specific phenomena would collapse as a result of any hypothetical discovery that no mathematical objects exist.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 09.1)
     A reaction: It is inconceivable that anyone would challenge this claim. A good model seems to be drama; a play needs commitment from actors and audience, even when we know it is fiction. The point is that mathematics doesn't collapse either.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
I prefer the open sentences of a Constructibility Theory, to Platonist ideas of 'equivalence classes' [Chihara]
     Full Idea: What I refer to as an 'equivalence class' (of line segments of a particular length) is an open sentence in my Constructibility Theory. I just use this terminology of the Platonist for didactic purposes.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 09.10)
     A reaction: This is because 'equivalence classes' is committed to the existence of classes, which is Quinean Platonism. I am with Chihara in wanting a story that avoids such things. Kit Fine is investigating similar notions of rules of construction.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara]
     Full Idea: Causal theories of reference seem doomed to failure for the case of reference to mathematical entities, since such entities are evidently causally inert.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 01.3)
     A reaction: Presumably you could baptise a fictional entity such as 'Polonius', and initiate a social causal chain, with a tradition of reference. You could baptise a baby in absentia.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The purpose of society is to protect the rights of liberty, property, security and resistance [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: The aim of all political associations is the conservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 02)
     A reaction: Radical thinkers will obviously be doubtful about property being on the list, because that entrenches huge inequalities, between peasants and their landlords. Resistance to oppression will bother the likes of Edmund Burke.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The law expresses the general will, and all citizens can participate [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: The law is the expression of the general will. All citizens have the right to take part in person or through their representatives in its formulation. It must be the same for all, whether it protects or whether it punishes.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 06)
     A reaction: Now you are wondering who qualifies as a 'citizen'. Rousseau would have been excited until he found that the citizens could send 'representatives', instead of voting themselves. Rousseau aimed at foundational laws, not all of the laws.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
There is only a constitution if rights are assured, and separation of powers defined [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: Any society in which the guarantee of Rights is not assured, nor the separation of Power determined, has no Constitution.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 16)
     A reaction: I wonder if they had Britain in mind with this one? The British latched onto Magna Carta in the early 19th century, because it offered some semblance of a constitution.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
No one should be molested for their opinions, if they do not disturb the established order [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: No man is to be molested on account of his opinions, even his religious opinions, provided that their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 10)
     A reaction: Virtually any opinion will 'disturb' the established order a little bit, so this gives the option of suppressing quite mild beliefs, on the grounds of their small disturbance. It is still a wonderful proposal, though.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Free speech is very precious, and everyone may speak and write freely (but take responsibility for it) [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of man's most precious rights. Every citizen may therefore speak, write, and publish freely; except that he shall be responsible for the abuse of that freedom in cases determined by law.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 11)
     A reaction: Wonderful, and very nicely expressed. Tom Paine will have been a huge influence on this clause.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
All citizens are eligible for roles in the state, purely on the basis of merit [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: All citizens being equal in the eyes of the law are equally eligible to all honours, offices, and public employments, according to their abilities and without other distinction than that of their virtues and talents.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 06)
     A reaction: This proclamation of meritocracy must have rung bells around the cities of Europe, and was a reason why many people enjoyed being invaded by Napoleon.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Property is a sacred right, breached only when essential, and with fair compensation [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no man may be deprived of it except when public necessity, lawfully constituted, evidently requires it; and on condition that a just indemnity be paid in advance.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 17)
     A reaction: This covers compulsory purchase orders. Is the ownership of slaves inviolable? Will aristocrats be compensated for the confiscation of their vast estates?
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
Everyone must contribute to the state's power and administration, in just proportion [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: For the maintenance of public force and the expenses of administration, a common contribution is indispensable. It must be equally apportioned among all citizens according to their abilities.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 13)
     A reaction: Presumably this enshrines graduated income tax, an eighteenth century invention. Could you contribute just by your labour, or by fighting for the army? Those may be greater contributions than mere money.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
'Gunk' is an individual possessing no parts that are atoms [Chihara]
     Full Idea: An 'atomless gunk' is defined to be an individual possessing no parts that are atoms.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], App A)
     A reaction: [Lewis coined it] If you ask what are a-toms made of and what are ideas made of, the only answer we can offer is that the a-toms are made of gunk, and the ideas aren't made of anything, which is still bad news for the existence of ideas.