51 ideas
4456 | Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Ockham's Razor has an epistemological version, which says we should not multiply existences or explanations without adequate reason, and an ontological version, which says reality is simple, and so a simpler ontology represents it more accurately. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: A nice distinction. Is it reality which is simple, or us? One shouldn't write off the ontological version. If one explanation is simpler than the others, there may be a reason in nature for that. |
19482 | Current physics says matter and antimatter should have reduced to light at the big bang [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Our best theories of physics imply we shouldn't be here. The big bang ought to have produced equal amounts of matter and antimatter particles, which would have almost immediately annihilated each other, leaving nothing but light. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.05.23) | |
A reaction: This is not, of course, a rejection of physics, but a puzzle about the current standard model of physics. |
19483 | CP violation shows a decay imbalance in matter and antimatter, leading to matter's dominance [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The phenomenon of charge-parity (CP) violation says that under certain circumstances antiparticles decay at different rates from their matter counterpart. ...This might explain matter's dominance in the universe, but the effect is too small. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.05.23) | |
A reaction: Physicists are currently studying CP violations, hoping to explain why there is any matter in the universe. This will not, I presume, explain why matter and antimatter arrived in the first place. |
4474 | Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating [Moreland] |
Full Idea: A theory of existence should 1) be consistent with what actually exists, 2) be consistent with what could exist, 3) not make existence impossible (e.g. in space-time), 4) not violate logic, 5) make knowing the theory possible. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: A nice bit of metaphilosophical analysis. I still doubt whether a theory of existence is possible (something has to be 'given' a priori), but this is a good place to start the attempt. |
4461 | Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Tropes are (says Campbell) substances (in Hume's sense), and indeed resemble his impressions conceived realistically rather than idealistically. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: An interesting link. It doesn't get rid of the problem Hume has, of saying when two impressions are the same. Are they types or tokens? Trope-theory claims they are tokens. Hume's ontology includes 'resemblance'. |
4462 | A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland] |
Full Idea: A property-instance must be spread out in space, or it is not clear how a colour nature can be present, but then it has to be a complex entity, and tropes are supposed to be simple entities. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Seems a fair point. Nothing else in reality can be sharply distinguished, so why should 'simple' and 'complex'? |
4463 | In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland] |
Full Idea: If a decorator says that they used four colours to decorate a house, four tropes is not what was meant, and the statement seems to view colours as universals. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Although I am suspicious of using language to deduce ontology, you have to explain why certain statements (like this) are even possible to make. |
4453 | One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland] |
Full Idea: One version of realism says that the universal does not enter into the being of its instances, and thus is a One-Over-Many. One version of this is the model/copy view, but this is not widely held, because of difficulties such as the Third Man Argument. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This presumably arises if the model is held to have the properties of the copy (self-predication), and looks like a bad theory |
4464 | Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Traditional realism is the view that a property is a universal construed as a multiply exemplifiable abstract entity that is a numerically identical constituent in each of its instances. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Put like that, it seems hard to commit oneself fully to realism. How can two red buses contain one abstract object spread out between them. Common sense says there are two 'rednesses' which resemble one another, which is a version of nominalism. |
4451 | If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland] |
Full Idea: If properties are universals, what account can be given of the individuation of two entities that have all their pure properties in common? | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Is this a big problem? Maybe only a space-time location can do it. Or, in the nice case where the universe is just two identical spheres, it may be impossible. |
4450 | The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Historically the problem of universals has mainly been about the "One over Many", which involves giving an account of the unity of natural classes. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This still strikes me as the main problem (rather than issues of language). If universals are not natural, they must be analysed as properties, which break down into causation, which is seen as a human convention. |
4449 | Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Those who believe in universals appeal to the meaningfulness of language, the lawlike nature of causation, the inter-subjectivity of thinking, our ability to classify new entities, gradation, and the need for perfect standards or paradigms. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Of these, language and communication ought to be explicable by convention, but classification and natural laws look to me like the best evidence. |
4454 | The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Another version of realism says is One-In-Many, where the universal is not another particular, but is literally in the instances. The universal is an abstract entity, in the instances by means of a primitive non-spatiotemporal tie of predication. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This sounds like Aristotle (and is Loux's view of properties and relations). If they are abstract, why must they be confined to particulars? |
4468 | How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Many properties (being even) and relations (musical intervals, being a father) are such that it is not clear what it would mean to take them as natural things existing in space. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: 'Being even' certainly seems to be a property, and it is a struggle to see how it could exist in space, unless it is a set of actual or potential brain states. |
4452 | Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Realism about universals is supported by the phenomenon of abstract reference - that is the fact that properties themselves have properties ('red is a colour'), and stand in relation to other properties ('red is more like orange than like blue'). | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: While a property may be an obviously natural feature, properties of properties seem more likely to be the produce of human perception and convention. It is a good argument, though. |
4467 | A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland] |
Full Idea: If a property is held to be at the location of the particular, then if there are two objects having the same property, and one object is stationary and the other is moving, the realist is forced to say that the universal is both moving and at rest. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The target of this comment is D.M.Armstrong. The example nicely illustrates the problem of trying to combine science and metaphysics. It pushes you back to Platonism, but that seems wrong too… |
4469 | There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland] |
Full Idea: When one attends to something existing in space, one attends to an instance of redness, not to redness itself (which is a colour, which resembles orange). The facts about red itself are not spatial facts, but are traditionally seen as a priori synthetic. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is the fact that properties can themselves have properties (and so on?), which seems to take us further and further from the natural world. |
4472 | Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Four arguments for Platonism: 1) there are truths about redness (it's a colour) even if nothing red exists, 2) redness does not depend on particulars, 3) most universals are at some time not exemplified, 4) universals satisfy the criteria of existence. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This adds up to quite a good case, particularly the point that things can be said about redness which are independent of any particular, but the relationships between concepts and the brain seems at the heart of the problem. |
4459 | Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Clearly there is going to be quite a struggle to make sense of 'exists' here (Russell tries 'subsists). Presumably each property must be a particular? |
4458 | Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Resemblance Nominalism is clearly superior to Class Nominalism, since the former offers a clear ground for distinguishing between natural and unnatural classes. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Important. It seems evident to me that there are natural classes, and the only ground for this claim would be either the resemblance or the identity of properties. |
4457 | There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Linguistic predicates are neither sufficient nor necessary for specifying a property. Predicates can be contrived which express no property, properties are far more numerous than linguistic predicates, and properties are what make predicates apply. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to me conclusive, and is a crucial argument against anyone who thinks that our metaphysics can simply be inferred from our language. |
4471 | We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Some argue that compared to sets, the identity conditions for properties are obscure, and so properties, including realist depictions of them, should be rejected. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: I have never thought that difficulty in precisely identifying something was a good reason for denying its existence. Consider low morale in a work force. 2nd thoughts: I like this! |
4476 | Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: This is as opposed to the generally accepted 'indiscernibility of identicals'. 'Discernment' is an epistemological concept, and 'identity' is an ontological concept. |
19737 | A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: If we can train a system for prediction, it can essentially infer the structure of the world it's looking at by doing this prediction. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.12.12) | |
A reaction: [AI expert] This seems to be powerful support for the centrality of mathematical laws of nature in achieving understanding of the world. We may downplay the 'mere' ability to predict, but this idea says that the rewards of prediction are very great. |
4460 | Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing [Moreland] |
Full Idea: If something is 'abstract' it is got before the mind by an act of abstraction, that is, by concentrating attention on some (but not all) of what is presented. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Presumably it usually involves picking out the behavioural or causal features, and leaving out the physical features - though I suppose it works for physical properties too… |
19736 | Neural networks can extract the car-ness of a car, or the chair-ness of a chair [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Early neural nets were really good at recognising general categories, such as a car or a chair. Those networks are good at extracting the 'chair-ness' or the 'car-ness' of the object. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.12.12) | |
A reaction: [Interview with Yann LeCun, Facebook AI director] Fregean philosophers such as Geach think that extracting features is a ridiculous idea, but if even a machine can do it then I suspect that human beings can (and do) manage it too. |
16419 | No one has yet devised a rationality test [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The financial sector has been clamouring for a rationality test for years. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.10.29) | |
A reaction: Many aspects of intelligence tests do actually pick out what I would call rationality (which includes 'rational intuition', a new favourite of mine). But they are mixed in with rather mechanical geeky sort of tests. |
16417 | About a third of variation in human intelligence is environmental [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Possibly a third of the variation in our intelligence is down to the environment in which we grew up - nutrition and education, for example. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.10.29) | |
A reaction: This presumably leaves the other two-thirds to derive from genetics. I am a big believer in environment. Swapping babies between extremes of cultural environment would hugely affect intelligence, say I. |
16418 | People can be highly intelligent, yet very stupid [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: You really can be highly intelligent, and at the same time very stupid. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.10.29) | |
A reaction: This is closely related to my observation (from a lifetime of study) that a talent for philosophy has a very limited correlation with standard notions of high intelligence. What matters is how conscious reasoning and intuition relate. Greek 'phronesis'. |
19484 | Psychologists measure personality along five dimensions [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Psychologists have long thought that measuring on a scale of just five personality dimensions - agreeableness, extroversion, neuroticism, conscientiousness and openness to new experiences - can capture all human variations in behaviour and attitude. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.06.13) | |
A reaction: Researchers are considering a sixth - called 'honesty-humility' - which is roughly how devious people are. The five mentioned here seem to be a well entrenched orthodoxy among professional psychologists. Is personality more superficial than character? |
4455 | It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland] |
Full Idea: It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: For example, Davidson on truth. There is an onus to demonstrate why all attempted analyses fail. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
19950 | Entropy is the only time-asymmetric law, so time may be linked to entropy [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: All our physical laws are time-symmetric, ...so things can run forwards or backwards. But entropy is an exception, saying that disorder increases over time. Many physicists therefore suspect that the flow of time is linked to entropy. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2017.02.04) |
19478 | Light moves at a constant space-time speed, but its direction is in neither space nor time [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: A light ray always moves at one unit of space per unit of time - a constant diagonal on the graph. ...But the direction that light rays travel in is neither space nor time, and is called 'null'. It is on the edge between space and time. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
A reaction: Don't understand this, but it sounds fun. |
19474 | Quantum states are measured by external time, of unknown origin [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: When we measure the evolution of a quantum state, it is to the beat of an external timepiece of unknown provenance. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
A reaction: It is best not to leap to philosophical conclusions when studying modern physics. Evidently time has a very different status in quantum mechanics and in relativity theory. |
19473 | The Schrödinger equation describes the evolution of an object's wave function in Hilbert space [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: A quantum object's state is described by a wave function living in Hilbert space, encompassing all of its possible states. We see how the wave function evolves in time, moving from one state to another, using the Schrödinger equation. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
A reaction: [These idea are basic explanations for non-scientific philosophers - please forgive anything that makes you wince] |
19953 | In string theory space-time has a grainy indivisible substructure [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: String theory suggests that space-time has a grainy substructure - you can't keep chopping it indefinitely into smaller and smaller pieces. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.11.07) | |
A reaction: Presumably the proposal is that strings are the true 'atoms'. |
19954 | It is impossible for find a model of actuality among the innumerable models in string theory [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: String theory has more than 10-to-the-500th solutions, each describing a different sort of universe, so it is nigh-on impossible to find the one solution that corresponds to our geometrically flat, expanding space-time full of particles. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.11.07) |
19476 | String theory needs at least 10 space-time dimensions [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: String theory needs at least 10 space-time dimensions to be mathematically consistent. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
A reaction: Apparently because of 'Ads/CFT', it may be possible to swap this situation for a more tractable 4-dimensional version. |
19947 | Hilbert Space is an abstraction representing all possible states of a quantum system [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The elements of the abstract mathematical entity called Hilbert Space represent all the possible states of a quantum system | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 1017.02.04) |
19948 | Einstein's merging of time with space has left us confused about the nature of time [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Our hunt for the most basic ingredients of reality has left us muddled about the status of time. One culprit for this was Einstein, whose theory of general relativity merged time with space. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2017.02.04) |
19955 | Space-time may be a geometrical manifestation of quantum entanglement [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: A promising theory (based on the 'Maldacena duality' - that string equations for gravity are the same as quantum equations for surface area) is that space-time is really just geometrical manifestations of quantum entanglement. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.11.07) | |
A reaction: This is a speculation which might unite the incompatible quantum and general relativity theories. |
19475 | Relativity makes time and space jointly basic; quantum theory splits them, and prioritises time [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Relativity says space and time are on the same footing - together they are the fabric of reality. Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, treats time and space differently, with time occasionally seeming more fundamental. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
A reaction: Interesting. When talking about time, people glibly cite relativistic space-time to tell you that time is just another dimension. Now I can reply 'Aaah, but what about time in quantum mechanics? Eh? Eh?'. Excellent. |
19949 | Quantum theory relies on a clock outside the system - but where is it located? [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: After general relativity, quantum mechanics reinstated our familiar notion of time. The buzzing of the quantum world plays out according to the authoritative tick of a clock outside the described system, ...but where is this clock doing its ticking? | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2017.02.04) |
4473 | 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists [Moreland] |
Full Idea: 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: And Greek scepticism doubted even the present, since there is no space between past and future. It is a delightfully vertigo-inducing idea. |
19951 | Entropy is puzzling, so we may need to build new laws which include time directionality [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Smolin observes that if entropy increases, the early universe must have been highly ordered, which we cannot explain. Maybe we need to build time directionality into the laws, instead of making time depend on entropy. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2017.02.04) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
19477 | General relativity predicts black holes, as former massive stars, and as galaxy centres [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Black holes are predicted by general relativity, and are thought to exist where massive stars once lived, as well as at the heart of every galaxy. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.06.15) | |
A reaction: Since black holes now seem to be a certainty, that is one hell of an impressive prediction. |
19952 | Black holes have entropy, but general relativity says they are unstructured, and lack entropy [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Black holes have a temperature, and hence entropy. ...But if a black hole are just an extreme scrunching of smooth space-time, it should have no substructure, and thus no entropy. This is probably the most obvious incompleteness of general relativity. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2015.11.07) |
16420 | 84.5 percent of the universe is made of dark matter [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Dark matter makes up 84.5 percent of the universe's matter. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2013.10.29) |
17604 | We are halfway to synthesising any molecule we want [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Ei-ichi Negishi (Nobel chemist of 2010) says 'the ultimate goal is to be able to synthesise any molecule we want. We are probably about halfway there'. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2010.10.16) |
17603 | Chemistry just needs the periodic table, and protons, electrons and neutrinos [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Ei-ichi Negishi (Nobel chemist of 2010) says 'I work with the periodic table in front of me at all times, and approach all challenges in terms of three particles, positively charged protons, negatively charged electrons, and neutral neutrinos'. | |
From: New Scientist writers (New Scientist articles [2013], 2010.10.16) |