Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics' and 'The Architecture of Theories'

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10 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
7920 Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: Descriptive metaphysics (e.g. Aristotle and Kant) is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world; revisionary metaphysics (e.g. Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley) is concerned to produce a better structure.
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
     A reaction: This distinction by Strawson was incredibly helpful in reinstating metaphysics as a feasible activity. I don't want to abandon the revisionary version. We can hammer the current metaphysics into a more efficient shape, or even create new concepts.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
7922 Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: Descriptive metaphysics is primarily concerned with categories and concepts which, in their fundamental character, change not at all. They are the commonplaces of the least refined thinking, and the indispensable core for the most sophisticated humans.
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
     A reaction: This seems to be the basic premise for a modern metaphysician such as E.J.Lowe, though such thinkers are not averse to suggesting clarifications of our conceptual scheme. The aim must be good foundations for a successful edifice of knowledge.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
7921 Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: Up to a point, the reliance upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in philosophy.
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
     A reaction: Probably the last bold assertion of ordinary language philosophy, though Strawson goes on the defend his 'deeper' version of the activity, which he says is 'descriptive metaphysics', rather than mere 'analysis'. Mere verbal analysis now looks hopeless.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
9282 I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: One can ascribed states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one can identify other subjects of experience, and they cannot be identified only as subjects of experience.
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4)
     A reaction: A neat linguistic twist on the analogy argument, but rather dubious, if it is actually meant to prove that other minds exist. It is based on his view of predicates - see Idea 9281. If the rest of humanity are zombies, why would I not apply them?
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
9263 A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type.
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4)
     A reaction: As Frankfurt points out, merely requiring the entity to be 'conscious' is a grossly inadequate definition of what we mean by a person, which is typically a being that is self-aware and capable of rational decisions between alternatives.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
14802 Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The question about minds is whether 1) physical and psychical laws are independent (monism, my neutralism), 2) the psychical laws derived and physical laws primordial (materialism), 3) physical law is derived, psychical law primordial (idealism).
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Architecture of Theories [1891], p.321)
     A reaction: I think you are already in trouble when you start proposing that there are two quite distinct sets of laws, and then worry about how they are related. Assume unity, and only separate them when the science forces you to (which it won't).
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
9281 The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: The idea of a predicate is correlative with a range of distinguishable individuals of which the predicate can be significantly, though not necessarily truly, affirmed.
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4 n1)
     A reaction: Said to be one of Strawson's most important ideas. The idea is that you understand a predicate if you understand its range, not just a one-off application. So you must understand the implied universal, whatever that is.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
468 Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
14800 The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Exact law obviously never can produce heterogeneity out of homogeneity; and arbitrary heterogeneity is the feature of the universe the most manifest and characteristic.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Architecture of Theories [1891], p.319)
     A reaction: This is the view of laws of nature now associated with Nancy Cartwright, but presumably you can explain the apparent chaos in terms of the intersection of vast numbers of 'laws'. Or, better, there aren't any laws.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
14801 Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Darwinian evolution is evolution by the operation of chance, and the destruction of bad results.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Architecture of Theories [1891], p.320)
     A reaction: The 'destruction of bad results' is a much better slogan for Darwin that Spencer's 'survival of the fittest'. It is, of course, a rather unattractive God who makes progress by endlessly destroying huge quantities of failed (but living) experiments.