17 ideas
7426 | Critical philosophy is what questions domination at every level [Foucault] |
Full Idea: In its critical aspect, philosophy is that which calls into question domination at every level | |
From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.300) | |
A reaction: A very French view of the subject. It is tempting to say that they had their adolescent outburst in 1789, and it is time to grow up. With rights come responsibilities... |
7423 | Philosophy and politics are fundamentally linked [Foucault] |
Full Idea: The relationship between philosophy and politics is permanent and fundamental. | |
From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.293) | |
A reaction: This idea is one of the biggest gulfs between continental and analytical philosophy. Many aspects of philosophy are turning out to be much more social than analytical philosophers might have thought - epistemology, for example. |
7420 | When logos controls our desires, we have actually become the logos [Foucault] |
Full Idea: Plutarch says if you have mastered principles then logos will silence your desires like a master silencing a dog - in which case the logos functions without intervention on your part - you have become the logos, or the logos has become you. | |
From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.286) | |
A reaction: If you believe that logos is pure reason, you might be quite happy with this, but if you thought it was a cultural construct, you might feel that you had been cunningly enslaved. If I ask 'what is 7+6?', logos interrupts me to give the answer. |
8358 | There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: Neither Aristotelian nor Russellian rules give the exact logic of any expression of ordinary language; for ordinary language has no exact logic. | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950], §5) | |
A reaction: This seems to imply that it is impossible to find precise logical forms, because of the pragmatic element in language, but I don't see why. Even more extreme modern pragmatics (where meaning is shifted) doesn't rule out precise underlying propositions. |
6413 | 'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it [Strawson,P, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Strawson argues that in saying 'the present King of France is bald' one is not stating that a present King of France exists, but presupposing or assuming that it does. | |
From: report of Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: We have the notion of a leading question, such as 'when did you stop beating your wife?' But is a presupposition not simply an implied claim, as Russell said it was? |
8354 | Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: The way in which Russell arrived at his analysis was by asking himself what would be the circumstances in which we would say that anyone who uttered the sentence 'The King of France is wise' had made a true assertion. | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950], §1) | |
A reaction: This seems to connect Russell's theory of definite descriptions with the truth conditions theory of meaning which is associated (initially) with Frege. Truth will require some reference to what actually exists. |
7424 | Saying games of truth were merely power relations would be a horrible exaggeration [Foucault] |
Full Idea: When I talk about power relations and games of truth, I am absolutely not saying that games of truth are just concealed power relations - that would be a horrible exaggeration. | |
From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.296) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a denial of the more absurd forms of relativism. I think there is an interesting convergence between this kind of continental thinking, and the social view of justification found in the later work of Alvin Goldman. |
7422 | A subject is a form which can change, in (say) political or sexual situations [Foucault] |
Full Idea: The subject is not a substance but a form, which is not always identical to itself. You do not have the same relation to yourself when you go to vote and when you seek to fulfil your desires in a sexual relationship. | |
From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.290) | |
A reaction: I don't think I believe this. If it were true, the concept of 'sexual politics' would mean nothing to me. A brutal or sympathetic nature is likely to express itself in both situations. |
8356 | The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: To give the meaning of an expression is to give general directions for its use to refer to or mention particular objects or persons; in like manner, sentences are for use to make true or false assertions. | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950], §2) | |
A reaction: The influence of Wittgenstein? I don't like it. The general idea that you can say what something is by giving directions for its use is what I think of as the Functional Fallacy: confusing the role of x with its inherent nature. Shirt as goalpost. |
10430 | Reference is mainly a social phenomenon [Strawson,P, by Sainsbury] |
Full Idea: Strawson's early work gave a new direction to the study of reference by stressing that it is a social phenomenon. | |
From: report of Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950]) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.2 | |
A reaction: The question is whether speakers refer, or sentences, or expressions, or propositions. The modern consensus seems to be that some parts of language are inherently referring, but speakers combine such tools with context. Sounds right. |
10448 | If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: Strawson claimed that virtually any expression that can be used to refer to one thing in one context can be used to refer to something else in another context. Maybe expressions still refer, but only relative to a context. | |
From: comment on Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950]) by Kent Bach - What Does It Take to Refer? 22.2 | |
A reaction: If there is complete freedom, then Bach's criticism doesn't sound plausible. If something is semantically referential, that should impose pretty tight restrictions on speakers. Why distinguish names as intrinsically referential, and descriptions as not? |
8355 | Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: 'Mentioning', or 'referring', is not something an expression does; it is something that someone can use an expression to do. | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950], §2) | |
A reaction: That can't be whole story, because I might make a mistake when referring, so that I used the expression to refer to x, but unfortunately the words themselves referred to y. The power of language exceeds the intentions of speakers. |
8357 | If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: If an utterance is not talking about anything, then the speaker's use is not a genuine one, but a spurious or pseudo-use; he is not making either a true or a false assertion, though he may think he is. | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950], §2) | |
A reaction: This is Strawson's verdict on 'The present King of France is bald'. His view puts speculative statements in no man's land. What do we make of 'Elvis lives' or 'phlogiston explains fire'? |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
7419 | Ethics is the conscious practice of freedom [Foucault] |
Full Idea: What is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the conscious [réfléchie] practice of freedom? | |
From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.284) | |
A reaction: Makes Foucault sound very existentialist. I'm not sure I understand this kind of remark, given that serial killers seem to be exceptionally good at 'practising their freedom'. However, the idea is akin to Kant's notion of a truly good will (Idea 3710). |
7425 | The aim is not to eliminate power relations, but to reduce domination [Foucault] |
Full Idea: The problem is not to dissolve power relations in a utopia of transparent communications, but to acquire the rules of law, the management techniques, the morality, the practice of the self, that allows games of power with minimum domination. | |
From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.298) | |
A reaction: If you are a democrat it is hard to disagree with this, though I am still unclear why being dominated should rank as a total disaster. A healthy personal relationship might involve domination. 'Management techniques' is interesting. |
7418 | The idea of liberation suggests there is a human nature which has been repressed [Foucault] |
Full Idea: I am somewhat suspicious of the notion of liberation, because one runs the risk of falling back on the idea that there is a human nature, that has been concealed or alienated by mechanisms of repression. | |
From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.282) | |
A reaction: Personally I think there is (to some extent) a human nature, and that it fails to flourish if it gets too much 'liberation. However, the world contains a lot more repression than liberation, so we should all be fans of liberty. |