64 ideas
14721 | Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical enquiry can survive if we are willing to live with highly tentative conclusions. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], Intro) | |
A reaction: Nice. Nothing alienates the rather literal scientific sort of mind quicker that bold, dogmatic and even arrogant assertions about metaphysics. But to entirely close down metaphysical speculation for that reason is absurd. |
23966 | The personal view can still be objective, so I call sciences 'impersonal', rather than objective [Goldie] |
Full Idea: 'Objective' is misleading because it is possible to be, from a personal point of view, more or less objective; objectivity admits of degrees… I prefer to speak of sciences as 'impersonal', because the personal view is lost. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: This evidently relates to Perry's claim that the world contains additional indexical facts. I think I agree with this thought. Objectivity is a mode of subjectivity. Thermometers are not 'objective'. Physics is certainly impersonal. |
14760 | Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider] |
Full Idea: Four-dimensionalism does not respect a deep difference between thing-talk and process-talk, because it tends to place events and things in the same ontological category. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 6.1) | |
A reaction: He then quotes Broad, Idea 14759. This idea is the best reason yet for being sympathetic to the four-dimensionalist view, because I think processes really must have a central place in any decent ontology. |
14194 | Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider] |
Full Idea: A proper ontology should invoke only categorical, or occurrent, properties and relations. Categorical properties involve what objects are actually like, whereas hypothetical properties 'point beyond' their instances. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This spectacularly leaves out powers and dispositions, which are actual properties which 'point beyond' their instances! This is the nub of the powers debate, and the most interesting topic in modern metaphysics. |
14745 | If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider] |
Full Idea: Followers of the view that every entity is associated with some sortal term that answers the question 'what kind of thing is this?', and determines its persistence conditions, must answer the question what kinds of entity there are. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.3) | |
A reaction: [He explicitly refers to David Wiggins here] In other words Wiggins has got it the wrong way round, which is my own view of his theory. Sortal terms don't grow on the trees in the Garden of Eden, available for applications. |
14740 | If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider] |
Full Idea: This powerful puzzle (known to the Stoics, introduced by Geach, popularised by Wiggins) has a cat Tibbles and a proper part Tib, which is all of Tibbles except the tail. If Tibbles loses her tail, the two were distinct, but they now coincide. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Compare a few people leave a football ground, and what was a large part of the crowd becomes the whole of the crowd. Which suggests that there is no problem if cats are like crowds. But we don't like that view of cats. |
14752 | Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider] |
Full Idea: Presumably it is claimed that the artist 'created' the statue because the object created is essentially a statue, and thus cannot be identified with the unformed lump of clay with which the artist began. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001]) | |
A reaction: This is based on Burke's views. This is sortal essentialism, rather than my own view of essence as an inner explanatory mechanism or form. If an old abstract sculpture was no longer recognised as a statue, would it necessarily still be a statue? |
14743 | The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider] |
Full Idea: There are numerous cases in which there is pressure to admit coincident entities. The best way of coming to grips with this, I think, invokes the stage view. ...In the worm theory, coincident objects are no more mysterious than overlapping roads. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.1) | |
A reaction: At this point I get nervous if in order to 'get to grips' with a phenomenon which is hard to articulate but obvious to common sense, we have to invoke a rather startling metaphysics that completely upends the common sense we started with. |
14747 | 'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider] |
Full Idea: 'Composition as identity' says that when a thing, x, is composed of some other objects, the ys, then this is a kind of identity between the x and the ys. The industrial-strength version says object x just is the ys. Lewis says it is just an analogy. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.3) | |
A reaction: I am averse to such a doctrine, as is Leibniz, with his insistence that an aggregate is not a unity. There has to be some sort of principle that bestows oneness on a many. I take this to be structural, and is an elucidation of hylomorphism. |
14757 | Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider] |
Full Idea: Mereological essentialism says that an object's parts are necessary for its existence. ....It is literally never correct to say that an thing survives a change in its parts. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.7) | |
A reaction: Chisholm is well known for proposing this view. Sider adds a possible toughening clause, that the parts are also sufficient for the object's existence. This is a philosophers' notion of identity, not the normal English language concept. |
14727 | Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider] |
Full Idea: Three-dimensionalists say that things have no 'temporal parts', that they 'endure', and that they are wholly present at every moment of their careers. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: An obvious problem case for being wholly present would be the building and fitting of a large ship, where it might seem to be present before it was wholly present. |
14738 | Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider] |
Full Idea: Some might even regard inconsistency with time travel as an advantage of three-dimensionalism, as a vindication of a prior belief that time travel is impossible! I see no merit in these claims. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 7.2) | |
A reaction: I do! Sider cheerfully says that there are good reasons to believe that time travel is possible, and then use this possibility to support his four-dimensional view, but I personally doubt his assumption. The evidence for time travel is flimsy and obscure. |
14726 | Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider] |
Full Idea: Four-dimensionalists say that things have 'temporal parts', that they 'perdure', and that they are spread out over time. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 3) |
14728 | 4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider] |
Full Idea: For four-dimensionalists intrinsic change is difference between successive temporal parts. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 3.2) | |
A reaction: This attempts a reply to the commonest criticism of four-dimensionalism - that you can't explain change if you don't have one enduring thing which undergoes the change. I get stuck of the question 'how big (temporally) is a part?'. |
14729 | 4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider] |
Full Idea: Four-dimensionalism may be formulated as the claim that, necessarily, each spatiotemporal object has a temporal part at every moment at which it exists. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 3.2) | |
A reaction: If there were tiny quantum gaps between temporal parts, that would presumably ruin the story. On this view an object has to be a 'worm', to be the thing which has the parts. |
14730 | Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider] |
Full Idea: My four-dimensionalism implies the existence of temporal parts, but not that those parts are more fundamental, nor that the object is 'constructed' from its parts, nor that identity over time is reducible to parts. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 3.2) | |
A reaction: That's a rather negative account of temporal parts, which makes you ask what their positive role could be. Do they contribute anything to our understanding of a temporally extended object? |
14731 | Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider] |
Full Idea: Unless otherwise noted, I will think of temporal parts as being instantaneous. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 3.2) | |
A reaction: This comes up against all the Augustinian worries about the intrinsic nature of time. How many temporal parts does a typical object possess? Is a third temporal part always to be found between any two of them? How do they 'connect'? |
14758 | How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider] |
Full Idea: How can an instantaneous stage believe anything? Beliefs take time. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.8) | |
A reaction: Sider's four-dimensionalist answer is that the belief is embodied in the earlier counterparts, making belief a 'highly relational property'. I am not impressed by this answer to the very nice problem which he has raised. It's a problem for 3D, too. |
14762 | Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider] |
Full Idea: The sensible four-dimensionalist will claim that current temporal parts are caused to exist by previous temporal parts. The laws that govern this process are none other than the familiar laws of motion. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 6.3) | |
A reaction: I keep struggling with the instantaneous natural of temporal parts, and now I find that they have to do the job of being causal relata. When do they do their job? They've gone home before they've finished clocking in. Continuance requires motion? |
14741 | The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider] |
Full Idea: The Ship of Theseus seems to be a case of 'asymmetric' fission (where one resultant entity has a stronger claim). Many see the continuously rebuilt ship as the stronger candidate, but each candidate, without the other, would be the original ship. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.1) |
14754 | If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider] |
Full Idea: If someone is in pain at t1 and not at t2, we might restrict Leibniz's Law so as not to apply to 'timebound' properties, ..but this is deeply unsatisfying, ...and forfeits one's claim to be discussing identity. The demands of identity are high. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.5) | |
A reaction: [on Myro 1986] Sider's response is unsatisfying. It means a thing loses its identity (with itself?) if it has even a tiny fluctuating in its properties. Quantum changes then destroy all notions of identity. English-speakers don't use 'identity' like that. |
14763 | Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider] |
Full Idea: A counterpart relation is a similarity relation. Since there are different dimensions of similarity, there are different counterpart relations. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 6.4) |
24005 | We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie] |
Full Idea: We know others' emotions by 1) understanding and explaining them, 2) emotional contagion, 3) empathy, 4) in-his-shoes imagining, and 5) sympathy. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 7 Intro) | |
A reaction: He says these must be clearly distinguished, because they are often confused. In-his-shoes is 'me in their position', where empathy is how the position is just for them. The Simulationist approach likes these two. Sympathy need not share the feelings. |
24006 | Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Empathy and in-his-shoes imagining are not sufficient for sympathy. Nor are they necessary. You can even sympathise with another when these are impossible, with the sufferings of a whale or a dog, for example. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 7 'Sympathy') | |
A reaction: Goldie is right that these distinct faculties are a blurred muddle in most of our accounts of dealing with other people. Empathy with a whale in not actually impossible, because we recognise their suffering, and we understand suffering. |
23978 | 'Having an emotion' differs from 'being emotional' [Goldie] |
Full Idea: There is a contrast in commonsense psychology between 'being emotional' and 'having an emotion'. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 2 'Conclusion') | |
A reaction: Is this just that being emotional is displaying the existing emotion? Though we say someone is 'being emotional' when the emotion seems to take control of their actions. |
23973 | Unlike moods, emotions have specific objects, though the difference is a matter of degree [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Emotions have more specific objects than moods. The difference is a matter of degree, so emotions don't necessarily have a specific object, and moods are not necessarily undirected towards an object, or lacking in intentionality. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 2 'Intentionality') | |
A reaction: Could you simultaneously have an emotion and a mood which were in conflict, such as joy and misery (singing the blues), or love and hate ('odi et amo')? Could one transition into the other, as the object became clear, or faded away? |
23974 | Emotional intentionality as belief and desire misses out the necessity of feelings [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Many philosophers who discuss the intentionality of the emotions seek to capture the intentionality of the emotions in terms of beliefs, or beliefs and desires. I think this is a mistake, and runs the risk of leaving feelings out of emotional experience. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 2 'Intentionality') | |
A reaction: [He gives a list, which includes Kenny and Davidson] I would have thought that desires, at least, necessarily involve feelings, and neuroscientists seem to find emotions everywhere, including as part of belief. Be more holistic? |
23972 | A long lasting and evolving emotion is still seen as a single emotion, such as love [Goldie] |
Full Idea: In narratives the different elements of an emotion are conceived of as all being part of the same emotion, in spite of its complex, episodic and dynamic features. Verbs expressing emotions don not use continuous tenses, such as 'he is being in love'. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 2 'What') | |
A reaction: Goldie is keen on seeing emotions as part of a life narrative. An intriguing problem for the metaphysics of identity. If someone's love for a person comes and goes, is it the same love each time? |
23992 | Some Aborigines have fifteen different words for types of fear [Goldie] |
Full Idea: The Pintupi Aborigines of the Western Australian Desert have no less than fifteen words for different types of fear, including one for a sudden fear which leads one to stand up to see what caused it. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Evidence') | |
A reaction: Reminiscent of the many Inuit words for snow, but this time it is about human experience, rather than the environment. We must assume they can distinguish the different types, so these gradations are real. |
23979 | Emotional responses can reveal to us our values, which might otherwise remain hidden [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Our emotional responses can reveal to us what we value, and what we value might not be epistemically accessible to us if we did not have such responses. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 2 'Conclusion') | |
A reaction: This obviously invites the question of whether the emotion reveals the value, or determines the value. I suspect it is more the latter, because it is hard to see what art (for example) could have for us if we had no emotional responses. |
23976 | If we have a 'feeling towards' an object, that gives the recognition a different content [Goldie] |
Full Idea: The content of the recognition in 'feeling towards' is different from the content of the recognition where no emotion is involved. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 2 'Education') | |
A reaction: ['Feeling toward' is Goldie's coinage, to capture the intentionality in felt emotion] Interesting, but not convinced. Maybe the emotion just follows fast after the mere recognition. When I recognise a friend in a crowd, that triggers a feeling. |
23977 | When actions are performed 'out of' emotion, they appear to be quite different [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Consider striking a blow or seeking safety unemotionally. Now consider when you act out of emotion: angrily striking the blow, or fearfully running away. The phenomenology of such actions is fundamentally different in character. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 2 'Explanation') | |
A reaction: True, I guess. This has the behaviourist's problem of Superactors and Superspartans, of pretended or suppressed anger or fear. There is a sliding scale from stone cold to frenzied emotion. |
23980 | It is best to see emotions holistically, as embedded in a person's life narrative [Goldie] |
Full Idea: The best understanding of a person's emotions …will be holistic in its overall approach, seeing feelings as embedded in an emotion's narrative, as part of a person's life. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 3 Intro) | |
A reaction: Sounds reasonable, but I didn't find it very helpful. When told that my Self or my life has a 'narrative' I don't learn much. The concept of narrative relies on selves and lives. Ditto for being told that emotions or language are 'holistic'. |
23982 | If emotions are 'towards' things, they can't be bodily feelings, which lack aboutness [Goldie] |
Full Idea: If emotion has the world-directed intentionality of 'feeling towards' it follows that it is not bodily feeling, for bodily feelings lack the required 'direct' (as contrasted with 'borrowed') intentionality. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 3 'Towards') | |
A reaction: This is a direct response to William James's view, and seems correct. It is a widely held view that emotions are usually 'about' something, and it is hard to see how getting red in the face could do that. |
23968 | If reasons are seen impersonally (as just causal), then feelings are an irrelevant extra [Goldie] |
Full Idea: If someone thought that reasons can be characterised impersonally, say in terms of causal role …it is then glaringly obvious that feelings cannot be left out, so they have to be added on. Hence I introduce the idea of 'feeling towards'. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: [compressed] That is, he wants us to see feelings as intentional, active, motivating and causal, and not the marginal epiphenomena implied by an impersonal account. I think he is right. |
23969 | We have feelings of which we are hardly aware towards things in the world [Goldie] |
Full Idea: One can be unreflectively emotionally engaged with the world, having feelings towards some object in the world, and yet at that moment not be reflectively aware of having those feelings. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm thinking that we do not just await some 'object' to trigger a background feeling, because we always have feelings. They are the continuous shifting wallpaper of our mental dwellings - which we sometimes notice. |
23984 | An emotion needs episodes of feeling, but not continuously [Goldie] |
Full Idea: I see no need to insist that feelings …must be present at all times whilst you are having an emotion, …but without at least episodes of feeling, of which you can be more or less aware, an experience would not be an emotional one. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 3 'Unreflective') | |
A reaction: [He cites William James] An odd situation, but it is the same as many chronic illnesses. Presumably because of the actual episodes the person will be aware of the emotion as a background state of potential episodes. |
24001 | Moods can focus as emotions, and emotions can blur into moods [Goldie] |
Full Idea: A mood can focus into an emotion, and an emotion can blur out of focus into the non-specificity of mood. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 6 'Mood') | |
A reaction: I am struck by how the strong emotion of a vivid dream can remain as an inarticulate mood for the rest of the day. |
23986 | Early Chinese basic emotions: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking [Goldie] |
Full Idea: The Chinese Li Chi encyclopaedia (1st century BCE) says there are seven 'feelings of men': joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Evidence') | |
A reaction: [In J.Russell 1991] Love sounds like a stronger version of liking. If you are trying to train your feelings, it is helpful to have a basic list of them, even if the list is rather speculative. |
23991 | Cross-cultural studies of facial expressions suggests seven basic emotions [Goldie] |
Full Idea: It has been suggested that there are seven 'basic' emotions, based on cross-cultural studies of facial expressions. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Evidence') | |
A reaction: [Paul Ekman is cited] This makes the idea of universal basic emotions much more plausible. Goldie respects the research, but is cautious about inferences, mainly because digging deeper (such as interviews) makes it more complex. |
23970 | Emotions are not avocado pears, with a rigid core and changeable surface [Goldie] |
Full Idea: In an evolutionary and cultural account of emotions, I resist the 'avocado pear' conception of emotions, that our emotional behaviour comprises an inner core of 'hard-wired' reaction, and an out element which is open to cultural influences. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: He is concerned with whether emotions can be educated, and defends the view that they can all be channelled or changed. In particular he rejects the idea that the stone consists of 'basic' emotions, which are untouchable. |
23985 | A basic emotion is the foundation of a hierarchy, such as anger for types of annoyance [Goldie] |
Full Idea: The idea of basic emotions is that our concepts of emotions are hierarchically organised. For example, if anger is a basic emotion, then less basic species of anger might be annoyance, fury, rage, indignation, and so forth. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Evidence') | |
A reaction: Most modern theorists seem to reject this idea. In a family of related emotions (each having a similar focal object), it is hard to see which one of them is basic, other than being the best known. Maybe the weakest one is basic? |
23967 | Some emotions are direct responses, and neither rational nor irrational [Goldie] |
Full Idea: It is perfectly intelligible and entirely human to experience an emotion when seeing a low-flying bat, where we would not want to say that the experience was either rational or irrational. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: Goldie is attacking the common tendency of philosophers to over-intellectualise emotions. This example makes his point conclusively. |
23971 | Emotional thought is not rational, but it can be intelligible [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Emotions are not based on syllogistic reasoning ….but the thoughts involved in an emotion can show it to be intelligible, intelligibility being a thinner notion than rationality. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 1 Intro) | |
A reaction: A nice distinction. The emotion is the best explanation. Compare 'intuition' and 'sensible' behaviour as also intelligible. An obvious problem is that if a person runs amok because they have a brain tumour, that is intelligible, but in no way rational. |
23975 | Learning an evaluative property like 'dangerous' is also learning an emotion [Goldie] |
Full Idea: The process of teaching a child how to identify things which are dangerous is typically one and the same process as teaching that child when fear is merited. ...'Dangerous' is an evaluative property, meriting a certain sort of response. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 2 'Education') | |
A reaction: I like this, because it shows the unity between our inner life and our experience of the external world. Concepts and emotions are usually responses, rather than private initiatives. |
23983 | We call emotions 'passions' because they are not as controlled as we would like [Goldie] |
Full Idea: In feeling towards things the imagination tends to 'run away with you', which is partly why the emotions are 'passions'; your thoughts and feelings are not always as much under your control as you would want them to be. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 3 'Towards') | |
A reaction: This may have the chronology wrong. 'Passion' doesn't mean uncontrolled. I take it that 'passion' was an older word for 'emotion', and became attached to the older view of emotions as dangerous and corrupting. |
23999 | Emotional control is hard, but we are responsible for our emotions over long time periods [Goldie] |
Full Idea: To some extent our emotions cannot be controlled. But to say that we are not responsible for our emotions is to ignore the possibility of educating them over time, so that, ideally, our responses come to be consonant with deliberated rational choices. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Education') | |
A reaction: So people go on anger management courses, or talk through crises with councellors. This idea describes most people correctly, but some are in the grips of passions which seem impossible to control. |
23994 | Emotions are not easily changed, as new knowledge makes little difference, and akrasia is possible [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Our emotional capabilities are not fully open to be developed. …First, they are to some extent cognitively impenetrable. Secondly, they can ground certain sorts of weakness of will, or akrasia. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Education') | |
A reaction: Education makes us more receptive to evidence. We could probably rate emotions on a scale indicating how easy they are to change. Jealousy seems tenacious. Most fears respond quickly to clear evidence. |
23998 | Emotional control is less concerned with emotional incidents, and more with emotional tendencies [Goldie] |
Full Idea: It is a mistake to speak as if emotional control is always a matter of controlling a token emotional response or action; …rather, it is like reshaping the channel along which future emotions can run. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Education') | |
A reaction: Presumably wise parents direct habitual feelings, where less wise parents respond to outbursts. The very best parents therefore presumably achieve complete brainwashing, and eliminate all initiative. Er, perhaps I've misunderstood? |
23995 | Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie] |
Full Idea: I call it 'last ditch' akrasia when we deliberately decide to do something, and then don't do it, and 'impetuous' akrasia when we rush into doing something which, if we had deliberated, we would not have done. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Education') | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced that his impetuous version counts as akrasia, which seems to be vice of people who deliberate. [But he cites Aristotle 1150b19-]. |
24000 | Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie] |
Full Idea: A justifying reason will show that what you did, all things considered, was the right thing to do; an excusing reason will not justify, but will give some excuse to explain why you did what you did. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 6 Intro) | |
A reaction: There are also internal reasons before the event, and explicit reasons afterwards. A mistaken justification might still be an excuse. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
24003 | Character traits are both possession of and lack of dispositions [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Most traits are dispositions of a relatively stable sort, but traits need not be dispositions. A trait can be a lack of disposition. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 6 'Traits') | |
A reaction: Presumably only the lack relatively normal dispositions will count as traits. |
24002 | We over-estimate the role of character traits when explaining behaviour [Goldie] |
Full Idea: We significantly overestimate the role of character traits in explaining and predicting people's action: the so-called Fundamental Attribution error. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 6 'Traits') | |
A reaction: I think this point is incredibly important in daily life. 'When someone shows you who they are, believe them!' is a good thought. But we must distinguish the deeply revealing moment from the transient superficial one. |
24004 | Psychologists suggest we are muddled about traits, and maybe they should be abandoned [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Empirical psychologists have suggested that our practice of trait ascription is systematically prone to error. Some philosophers have concluded that the whole business of trait ascription, and of virtue ethics, should be abandoned. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 6 'Traits') | |
A reaction: [He cites Ross and Nisbet, and Gilbert Harman as a sceptic] I suspect the problem is that character traits are not precise enough for scientific assessment. How else are we going to describe a person? What else can we say at funerals? |
14725 | Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider] |
Full Idea: There is an alternative to the Russellian 'at-at' theory of motion, according to which dynamical quantities are intrinsic to times. Whether and how an object is moving at a time is a fact about what that object is like then. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I think I find this quite appealing, because there is too much of a tendency to think of objects as passive and inert, with laws, forces, motions etc. imposed from the outside. But nature is active and dynamic. However, motion can't be wholly intrinsic. |
14735 | Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider] |
Full Idea: Unlike time, space has three dimensions and lacks a distinguishing direction; unlike space, time seems to be specially connected with causation. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 4.5) | |
A reaction: These strike me as nice reasons to doubt (what I already prima facie doubt) that there is a single manifold that is 'space-time', for all that twentieth century physics tells us it is so. A century is a mere click of a clock where truth is concerned. |
14722 | Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider] |
Full Idea: Intermediate between the polar opposites of presentism and eternalism is the view (defended by Broad 1923 and Tooley 1997) that the past is real but the future is not. Reality consists of a growing four-dimensional manifold, the 'growing block universe'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 2.1) | |
A reaction: The obvious and plausible basis for this is that statements about the past seem to have truthmakers, but statements about the future lack them. Does a truth always require ontological commitment? Death is cessation of existence. |
14724 | Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider] |
Full Idea: The presentist must deny the truth of everyday claims that concern multiple times taken together. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 2.2) | |
A reaction: This rests on the extent to which every truth has an ontological commitment. You can deny the literal existence of multiple times without denying such truths. |
14756 | For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider] |
Full Idea: The Presentist acknowledges that no atemporal description of the case can be given; a vantage point must be chosen for any description. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 5.5) | |
A reaction: This is because Presentists are committed to tense, which have to be either explicit or implicit in any sentence. But what of famously 'timeless' truths such as '2 and 2 are 4'? |
14723 | Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider] |
Full Idea: The temporal reductionist claims that tensed locutions are indexical - 'present' being the time of utterance etc. This generalises to say that nothing corresponding to tense need be admitted as a fundamental feature of the world. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 2.1) | |
A reaction: [He particular cites Mellor for this view] Highly implausible. I very much doubt whether it is possible to explain the indexicality of a word like 'now' without referring to tenses. Does time only exist when sentences and thoughts occur? |
14734 | The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider] |
Full Idea: The B-series has two components: eternalism - the thesis that all future entities are real - and the thesis of reducibility of tense. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 4.2) |
14736 | The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider] |
Full Idea: The B-theoretic description of the world is completely adequate except that it leaves out information about which time is present. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 4.6) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a pretty basic deficiency. How could there a time which lacked a present moment? The present is when things happen. How would it qualify as time at all if it lacked past, present and future? |
23993 | Our capabilities did not all evolve during the hunter gathering period [Goldie] |
Full Idea: It is an unwarranted assumption that the only relevant evolutionary period in which our capabilities for emotions evolved is the period in which our ancestors were hunting and gathering. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Education') | |
A reaction: Goldie says that the evolution of emotions could well extend to much earlier times. Presumably this also applies to other traits, notably those not obviously needed for hunting. Gathering needs long term planning. |