Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Interview with Philippa Foot' and 'The Journals of Kierkegaard'

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17 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Fixed ideas should be tackled aggressively [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: Fixed ideas are like a cramp in your foot: the best remedy is to stomp on them.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (The Journals of Kierkegaard [1850], JP-III, 635)
     A reaction: Sound philosophical advice at any time. [SY] Does this apply in seminars, as well as in private meditation? [PG]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Philosophy can't be unbiased if it ignores language, as that is no more independent than individuals are [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: If the claim of philosophers to be unbiased were all it pretends to be, it would have to take account of language and its significance...Language is partly given and partly develops freely. As individuals cannot be truly independent, so too with language.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (The Journals of Kierkegaard [1850], 1840.07.18)
     A reaction: A surprisingly prophetic entry from Kierkegaard anticipating the linguistic turn. [SY]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Full rationality must include morality [Foot]
     Full Idea: You haven't got a full idea of rationality until you've got morality within it.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.35)
     A reaction: Does this mean that mathematical proofs are not rational, or that they are moral?
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot]
     Full Idea: Practical rationality is goodness in respect of reason for actions, just as rationality of thinking is goodness in respect of beliefs.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.35)
     A reaction: It is very Greek to think that rationality involves goodness. There seems to be a purely instrumental form of practical reason that just gets from A to B, as when giving accurate street directions to someone.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot]
     Full Idea: One would need a very special, very Humean, view about reasons for actions to think a man doesn't have a reason unless he cares.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.34-5)
     A reaction: She says she used to believe this, but was wrong. It is hard to imagine acting for reasons if they don't care about anything at all (even that it's their job). But then people just do care about things.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot]
     Full Idea: We describe defects in human beings in the same way as we do defects in plants and animals. …You cannot talk about a river as being defective.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33)
     A reaction: This is a much clearer commitment to naturalistic ethics than I have found in her more academic writings. My opinion of Foot (which was already high) went up when I read this interview. …She says vice is a defect of the will.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot]
     Full Idea: A plant needs strong roots in the same way human beings need courage.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33)
     A reaction: I'm not quite convince by the analogy, but I strongly agree with her basic approach.
Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot]
     Full Idea: There are concepts which apply only to living things, considered in their own right, which would include function, welfare, flourishing, interests and the good of something.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33)
     A reaction: This is a very Aristotelian view, with which I entirely agree. The central concept is function.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot]
     Full Idea: If you say 'an owl should be able to see in the dark' …you're not going to think that there's a gap between facts and evaluation.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33)
     A reaction: I take this to be a major and fundamental idea, which pinpoints the failure of Humeans to understand the world correctly. There is always total nihilism, of course, but that is a sort of blindness to how things are. Demanding 'proof' of values is crazy.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot]
     Full Idea: I don't believe in ultimate principles that must be simply affirmed or denied, but rather in an appeal to the necessities of human life.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.37)
     A reaction: I agree. Humans have a strong tendency to elevate anything which they consider important into an absolute (such as the value of life, or freedom).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
     Full Idea: You lose the sense of 'should' if you go on saying 'why should I?' when you've finished the argument about what is rational to do, what you've got reason to do.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], P.34)
     A reaction: Some people reify the concept of duty, so that they do what is required without caring about the reason. I suppose that would wither if they were shown that no reason exists.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
If people marry just because they are lonely, that is self-love, not love [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: People despair about being lonely and therefore get married. But is this love? I should say it is self-love.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (The Journals of Kierkegaard [1850], JP-III, 40-41)
     A reaction: If you decide to marry someone because you don't want to be an old maid/bachelor in your elder years, try to actually love the person you're marrying. Not just for money or sex. [SY]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Our destiny is the highest pitch of world-weariness [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: Our destiny in this life is to be brought to the highest pitch of world-weariness.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (The Journals of Kierkegaard [1850], 1855.09.25), quoted by Alastair Hannay - Kierkegaard 10
     A reaction: The beginning of his last entry. Hardly a great general truth, but interesting. Should we aspire to exhaust life?
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Life may be understood backwards, but it has to be lived forwards [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is perfectly right in saying that life must be understood backwards. But then it forgets the other side - that it must be lived forwards.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (The Journals of Kierkegaard [1850], JP-III, 635)
     A reaction: Some of the best philosophers dwell too much on philosophy, history and the past, while forgetting to actually live and enjoy their lives. [SY]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
The best way to be a Christian is without 'Christianity' [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: One best becomes a Christian - without 'Christianity'.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (The Journals of Kierkegaard [1850], JP-1:214)
     A reaction: A very healthy attitude for followers of Jesus, given today's television evangelists, religious fundamentalist and zealots. [SY]
We need to see that Christianity cannot be understood [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: The problem is not to understand Christianity, but to understand that it cannot be understood.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (The Journals of Kierkegaard [1850], p.146), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 1 'Roots'
     A reaction: This seems to cut us intellectually adrift. We could say the same of supporting Real Madrid. There has to be some magnetism which holds our attention, and there must be something to say about that.