Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Syntagma' and 'Truth'

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9 ideas

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition

14965	Truth rests on Elimination ('A' is true → A) and Introduction (A → 'A' is true) [Gupta]
	Full Idea: The basic principles governing truth are Truth Elimination (sentence A follows from ''A' is true') and the converse Truth Introduction (''A' is true' follows from A), which combine into Tarski's T-schema - 'A' is true if and only if A.
	From: Anil Gupta (Truth [2001], 5.1)
	A reaction: Introduction and Elimination rules are the basic components of natural deduction systems, so 'true' now works in the same way as 'and', 'or' etc. This is the logician's route into truth.

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth

14968	A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate [Gupta]
	Full Idea: If a classical language is expressively weakened - for example, by dispensing with negation - then it can contain its own truth predicate.
	From: Anil Gupta (Truth [2001], 5.2)
	A reaction: Thus the Tarskian requirement to move to a metalanguage for truth is only a requirement of a reasonably strong language. Gupta uses this to criticise theories that dispense with the metalanguage.

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox

14964	The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences [Gupta]
	Full Idea: There is the idea that the Liar paradox is solved simply by noting that truth is a property of propositions (not of sentences), and the Liar sentence does not express a proposition. But we then say 'I am not now expressing a true proposition'!
	From: Anil Gupta (Truth [2001], 5.1)
	A reaction: Disappointed to learn this, since I think focusing on propositions (which are unambiguous) rather than sentences solves a huge number of philosophical problems.

14969	Strengthened Liar: either this sentence is neither-true-nor-false, or it is not true [Gupta]
	Full Idea: An example of the Strengthened Liar is the following statement SL: 'Either SL is neither-true-nor-false or it is not true'. This raises a serious problem for any theory that assesses the paradoxes to be neither true nor false.
	From: Anil Gupta (Truth [2001], 5.4.2)
	A reaction: If the sentence is either true or false it reduces to the ordinary Liar. If it is neither true nor false, then it is true.

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes

16730	If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi]
	Full Idea: Since these atoms are the whole of the corporeal matter or substance that exists in bodies, if we conceive or notice anything else to exist in these bodies, that is not a substance but only some kind of mode of the substance.
	From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.6.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.4
	A reaction: If the atoms have a few qualities of their own, are they just modes? If they are genuine powers, then there can be emergent powers, which are rather more than mere 'modes'.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction

16619	We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi]
	Full Idea: Nothing beyond qualities is perceived by the senses. …When we refer to the substance in which the qualities inhere, we do this through induction, by which we reason that some subject lies under the quality.
	From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.6.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.1
	A reaction: He talks of 'induction' (in an older usage), but he seems to mean abduction, since he never makes any observations of the substances being proposed.

21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality

468	Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
	Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
	From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism

16593	Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi]
	Full Idea: The vulgar think atoms lack parts and are free of all magnitude, and hence nothing other than a mathematical point, but it is something solid and hard and compact, as to leave no room for division, separation and cutting. No force in nature can divide it.
	From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.3.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.2
	A reaction: If you gloatingly think the atom has now been split, ask whether electrons and quarks now fit his description. Pasnau notes that though atoms are indivisible, they are not incorruptible, and could go out of existence, or be squashed.

16729	How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi]
	Full Idea: If the only material principles of things are atoms, having only size, shape, and weight, or motion, then why are so many additional qualities created and existing within the things: color, heat, flavor, odor, and innumerable others?
	From: Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.5.7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.4
	A reaction: This is pretty much the 'hard question' about the mind-body relation. Bacon said that heat was just motion of matter. I would say that this problem is gradually being solved in my lifetime.