Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Euthydemus' and 'Frege'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


8 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Aristotelian logic dealt with inferences about concepts, and there were also proposition inferences [Weiner]
     Full Idea: Till the nineteenth century, it was a common view that Aristotelian logic could evaluate inferences whose validity was based on relations between concepts, while propositional logic could evaluate inferences based on relations between propositions.
     From: Joan Weiner (Frege [1999], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Venn diagrams relate closely to Aristotelian syllogisms, as each concept is represented by a circle, and shows relations between sets. Arrows seem needed to represent how to go from one proposition to another. Is one static, the other dynamic?
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato]
     Full Idea: Are fine things different from or identical to fineness? They are different from fineness itself, but fineness itself is in a sense present in each of them.
     From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 301a)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality [Plato]
     Full Idea: If there exists the knowledge of how to make men immortal, but without the knowledge of how to use this immortality, there seems to be no value in it.
     From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 289b)
     A reaction: I take this to be not a gormless utilitarianism about knowledge, but a plea for holism, that knowledge only has value as part of some larger picture. The big view is the important view. He's wrong, though. Work out the use later.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato]
     Full Idea: If each of you says how many teeth the other has, and when they are counted we find you do know, we will believe your other claims as well.
     From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 294c)
     A reaction: This is the clairvoyant problem for reliabilism, if truth is delivered for no apparent reason. Useful, but hardly knowledge. HOW did you know the number of teeth?
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
What knowledge is required to live well? [Plato]
     Full Idea: What knowledge would enable us to live finely for the rest of our lives?
     From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 293a)
     A reaction: A successful grasp of other people's points of view might lead to respect for them. Also a realisation that we are not isolated individuals. We really are all in it together.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
Only knowledge of some sort is good [Plato]
     Full Idea: Nothing is good except knowledge of some sort.
     From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 292b)
     A reaction: I've heard it suggested that truth is the only value. This is the Socratic idea that moral goodness is a matter of successful rational judgement. Not convinced, but interesting.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato]
     Full Idea: Something which is composed of two factors which are bad for different purposes and lies midway between them is better than either of the factors.
     From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 306a)