8 ideas
299 | What is fine is always difficult [Plato] |
Full Idea: The proverb says 'Anything fine is difficult'. | |
From: Plato (Hippias Major [c.392 BCE], 304e) | |
A reaction: attributed (as usual) to Solon |
297 | What is fine is the parent of goodness [Plato] |
Full Idea: Fineness is the father of goodness. | |
From: Plato (Hippias Major [c.392 BCE], 297b) |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
23674 | If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid] |
Full Idea: If a man should give to his neighbour a potion which he really believes will poison him, but which, in the event, proves salutary, and does much good; in moral estimation, he is a poisoner, and not a benefactor. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5) | |
A reaction: I take Reid to mean that morality concerns how we assess the agent, and not the results of his actions. Mill and Bentham concede that we judge people this way, but don't think morality mainly concerns judging people. |
23675 | We shouldn't do to others what would be a wrong to us in similar circumstances [Reid] |
Full Idea: It is a first principle of morals, that we ought not to do to another what we should think wrong to be done to us in like circumstances. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 6) | |
A reaction: This negative form of the rule is more plausible than the positive form, presumably because there is more consensus about what we all dislike than what we all prefer. But presents for people that they would like, not that you like. |
23672 | To be virtuous, we must care about duty [Reid] |
Full Idea: A man cannot be virtuous, if he has no regard to duty. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5) | |
A reaction: Thus are Aristotle and Kant united in a simple sentence. Aristotle thinks that a virtuous person thereby sees what is the right thing to do, but I take 'duty' to imply a requirement which comes not from good character but from external society. |
23673 | Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid] |
Full Idea: I presume it will be granted, that, in every man of real worth, there is a principle of honour, a regard to what is honourable or dishonourable, very distinct from a regard to his interest. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5) | |
A reaction: Note that there is a 'principle' of honour in a person's character, and there are also actions which are intrinsically honourable or not. I fear that only the worthy are honourable, and only the honourable are worthy! |
298 | While sex is very pleasant, it should be in secret, as it looks contemptible [Plato] |
Full Idea: As for sex, everyone agrees that, while it is extremely pleasant, it should be indulged in (if at all) in secret, because it is a highly contemptible sight. | |
From: Plato (Hippias Major [c.392 BCE], 299a) |