Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', '74: Reply to Colotes' and 'In Defense of Absolute Essentialism'

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14 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
13804 A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: A property P is an essential property of an object x iff x could not exist and lack P, that is, as they say, iff x has P at every world at which x exists.
     From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 1)
     A reaction: This immediately places the existence of x outside the normal range of its properties, so presumably 'existence is not a predicate', but that dictum may be doubted. As it stands this definition will include trivial and vacuous properties.
13805 Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: Essential properties may be trivial or nontrivial. It is characteristic of P's being trivially essential to x that x's possession of P is not grounded in the specific nature of x.
     From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)
     A reaction: This is where my objection to the modal view of essence arises. How is he going to explain 'grounded' and 'specific nature' without supplying an entirely different account of essence?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13808 A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: A relation R is essential to x and y (in that order) iff Rxy holds at every world where x and y both exist.
     From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)
     A reaction: I find this bizarre. Not only does this seem to me to have nothing whatever to do with essence, but also the relation might hold even though it is a purely contingent matter. All rabbits are a reasonable distance from the local star. Essence of rabbit?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
13806 Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: The main groups of trivially essential properties are (a) existence, self-identity, or their consequences in S5; and (b) properties possessed in virtue of some de dicto necessary truth.
     From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)
     A reaction: He adds 'extraneously essential' properties, which also strike me as being trivial, involving relations. 'Is such that 2+2=4' or 'is such that something exists' might be necessary, but they don't, I would say, have anything to do with essence.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
13807 A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: P is 'extraneously essential' to x iff it is possessed by x at any world w only in virtue of the possession at w of certain properties by other objects.
     From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)
     A reaction: I would say that these are the sorts of properties which have nothing to do with being essential, even if they are deemed to be necessary.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
13809 One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: In the case of artefacts, there is an essentialism about original matter; for instance, it would be said of any particular bronze statue that it could not have been cast from a totally different quantity of bronze.
     From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 3)
     A reaction: Forbes isn't endorsing this, and it doesn't sound convincing. He quotes the thought 'I wish I had made this pot from a different piece of clay'. We might corrupt a statue by switching bronze, but I don't think the sculptor could do so.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
13810 The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: It is widely held that the source of de dicto necessity is in concepts, ..but I deny this... even with simple de dicto necessities, the source of the necessity is to be found in the properties to which the predicates of the de dicto truth refer.
     From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 3)
     A reaction: It is normal nowadays to say this about de re necessities, but this is more unusual.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / c. Self as brain controller
5952 Rather than being the whole soul, maybe I am its chief part? [Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Is each of us not the soul, but the chief part of the soul, by which we think and reason and act, all the other parts of soul as well as of body being mere instruments of its power?
     From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1119)
     A reaction: Socrates is associated with the idea that I am my whole soul (Idea 1650). Plutarch represents an interesting development, which may lead both to the Christian 'soul' and to the Cartesian 'ego'. I think Plutarch is right, but what is the 'soul'?
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
5951 If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind [Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Perception, mind, intelligence and thought cannot so much as be conceived, even with the best will, as arising among void and atoms, things which taken separately have no quality.
     From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1112)
     A reaction: A nice articulation of the intuition of all anti-physicalists. Plutarch would have to rethink his position carefully if he learned of the sheer number of connections in the brain, and of the theory of natural selection. His challenge remains, though.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20796 Action needs an affinity for a presentation, and an impulse toward the affinity [Plutarch]
     Full Idea: The sceptics say there are three movements of the soul: presentation, impulse and assent. …And action requires two things: a presentation of something to which one has an affinity, and an impulse toward what is presented as an object of affinity.
     From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], 1122c)
     A reaction: Not much reasoning involved in this account, which the sceptics say is compatible with suspension of judgement.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
468 Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
5948 The good life involves social participation, loyalty, temperance and honesty [Plutarch]
     Full Idea: To live the good life is to live a life of participation in society, of loyalty to friends, of temperance and honest dealing.
     From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1108)
     A reaction: 'Participation in society' is the interesting one. This might translate as 'doing your duty', or as 'leading a well-rounded life'. Solitude is wrong if you are indebted to others, and it is unhealthy if you are not. Is solitude really immoral, though?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
5950 If only atoms exist, how do qualities arise when the atoms come together? [Plutarch]
     Full Idea: If you accept atomism, you must show how bodies without quality have given rise to qualities of every kind by the mere fact of coming together. For example, how has the quality called 'hot' been imposed on the atoms?
     From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1111)
     A reaction: This argument is still significant in current philosophy of mind. If temperature is 'mean kinetic energy', you are left wondering where the energy came from, and why minds experience the heat. This is the 'Hard Question'.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
5955 No one will ever find a city that lacks religious practices [Plutarch]
     Full Idea: A city without holy places and gods, without any observance of prayers, oaths, oracles, sacrifices for blessings received or rites to avert evils, no traveller has ever seen or will ever see.
     From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1125)
     A reaction: The nearest you might get would be Soviet Moscow, but in 1973 I saw a man there jeering at a woman who was kneeling in the street outside a closed church. Plutarch would be stunned at the decline in religious practices in modern Europe.