Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Justified Belief as Responsible Belief' and 'Some Models for Implicature'

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9 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley]
     Full Idea: Coherentists try to provide an explication of epistemic rationality in terms of a set of deductive and probabilistic relations among beliefs and properties such as simplicity, conservativeness, and explanatory power.
     From: Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.317)
     A reaction: I have always like the coherentist view of justification, and now I see that this has led me to the question of explanation, which in turn has led me to essentialism. It's all coming together. Watch this space. 'Explanatory' is the key to everything!
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley]
     Full Idea: Externalists are principally interested in understanding what knowledge is, ..while internalists, by contrast, are principally interested in explicating a sense of justification ..from one's own perspective.
     From: Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.314)
     A reaction: I find this very helpful, since I have a strong bias towards internalism (with a social dimension), and I see now that it is because I am more interested in what a (good) justification is than what some entity in reality called 'knowledge' consists of.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley]
     Full Idea: It is rare for pragmatic considerations to influence the rationality of our beliefs in the crass, direct way that Pascal's Wager envisions. Instead, they determine the direction and shape of our investigative and deliberative projects and practices.
     From: Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.320)
     A reaction: [See Idea 6684 for Pascal's Wager] Foley is evidently a full-blown pragmatist (which is bad), but this is nicely put. We can't deny the importance of the amount of effort put into an enquiry. Maybe it is an epistemic duty, rather than a means to an end.
Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley]
     Full Idea: One justifiably believes a proposition if one has an epistemically rational belief that one's procedures with respect to it have been acceptable, given practical limitations, and one's goals.
     From: Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.322)
     A reaction: I quite like this, except that it is too individualistic. My goals, and my standards of acceptability decree whether I know? I don't see the relevance of goals; only a pragmatist would mention such a thing. Standards of acceptability are social.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Grice said patterns of use are often semantically irrelevant, because it is a pragmatic matter [Grice, by Glock]
     Full Idea: The slogan that meaning is use came under scrutiny by Grice's theory of conversational implicature. He said patterns of use shown in analysis were often semantically irrelevant, snce they are due not meanings of expressions but to pragmatic principles.
     From: report of H. Paul Grice (Some Models for Implicature [1967]) by Hans-Johann Glock - What is Analytic Philosophy? 2.8
     A reaction: I think the simplest objection is that words only have use because they have a meaning; The most interesting part of pragmatics is what you DON'T say in conversation.
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
Grice's maxim of quality says do not assert what you believe to be false [Grice, by Magidor]
     Full Idea: Grice's maxim of quality says one ought not to assert what one believes to be false.
     From: report of H. Paul Grice (Some Models for Implicature [1967]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 5.2
     A reaction: The obvious exception is irony, where are truth is asserted, but the listener is supposed to spot that you are not really asserting it.
Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible [Grice, by Magidor]
     Full Idea: Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible.
     From: report of H. Paul Grice (Some Models for Implicature [1967]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 5.2
     A reaction: An alternative maxim of conversation is that there should not be long silences between contributions - which would probably result if the contributions are all curtly abbreviated.
Grice's maxim of quantity says be sufficiently informative [Grice, by Magidor]
     Full Idea: Grice's maxim of quantity says 'make your contributions as informative as required'.
     From: report of H. Paul Grice (Some Models for Implicature [1967]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 5.2
     A reaction: Is the 'requirement' of informative for the speaker or for the listener? It is easy to image situations where, one way or the other, the two people don't agree about informativenss.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?