Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Passions' and 'Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression'

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37 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom needs both thought and passion, with each reflecting on the other [Solomon]
     Full Idea: Wisdom is a matter of living both thoughtfully and passionately, bringing understanding to bear on every passion and forcing every passion into the light of reflection.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 3.4)
     A reaction: His main point is that passion is a key part of wisdom, and the idea that wisdom is cold and detached is quite false. Good point. At the very least, wise people must relate sympathetically to others.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Philosophy is creating an intellectual conceptual structure for life [Solomon]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is conceptual sculpture, the shaping and developing of the intellectual structures within which we live our lives.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.1)
     A reaction: Nice. I tend to see philosophy as conceptual analysis (though creating new concepts doesn't quite fit that), but the vision of creating a huge conceptual sculpture sounds good. I would call it a system. (See my book, 'Natural Ideas'!).
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is actually passions, guided by perspicacious reflection [Solomon]
     Full Idea: What is called 'reason' is the passions enlightened, 'illuminated' by reflection and supported by a perspicacious deliberation that the emotions in their urgency normally excluded.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.4)
     A reaction: To suggest that reason more or less is emotions strikes me as missing the point of 'perspicacious', which takes in facts outside our emotional world. We excitedly climb a cliff, then stop when we see the rocks are crumbling.
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
We often trust our intuitions as rational, despite their lack of reflection [Solomon]
     Full Idea: We trust certain rational 'intuitions' in ourselves which dispense with reflection but seem to follow an indisputable logic. (note: it is thought ineffable because reflection is the paradigm of rationality. It is no less rational than reflection).
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4)
     A reaction: [compressed] Solomon uses the example to support that emotion is part of rationality. Since this view of intuition is more or less mine (that intuition can be knowledge, when the justification is obscure), it seems to support his claim.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Distinguishing reason from passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' theory [Solomon]
     Full Idea: The distinction between reason and passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' psychology of the human soul.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.2)
     A reaction: I like faculties, for philosophical purposes, as explanatory tools to account for our metaphysical and conceptual framework, but this point is well made. The danger is that we impose sharp divisions, where reality is more complex.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
I say bodily chemistry and its sensations have nothing to do with emotions [Solomon]
     Full Idea: I shall be making the claim (sujectively) that the chemistry of the body and the sensations caused by that chemistry have nothing to do with the emotions.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 4.1)
     A reaction: Surely an unexpected stabbing pain causes fear? Isn't pain supposed to trigger appropriate emotions? That is not to say that emotions are a feature of body chemistry.
Emotions are judgements about ourselves, and our place in the world [Solomon]
     Full Idea: An emotion is a basic judgement about our Selves and our place in the world, the projection of the values and ideals, structures and mythologies
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 5.3)
     A reaction: Solomon's main theory. What about the Frege-Geach problem - that I feel emotions (and judgements) about fictions and remote events, in which my personal concerns and involvement are zero? Presumably these emotions are parasitic on his primary type?
Emotions are defined by their objects [Solomon]
     Full Idea: Direction, scope and focus set the stage, but the specific object is what defines the emotion.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.3)
     A reaction: This is presumably the main distinction between an emotion and a mood. He emphasises that the objects are subjective, rather than factual.
The heart of an emotion is its judgement of values and morality [Solomon]
     Full Idea: The heart of every emotion is its value judgements, its appraisals of gain and loss, its indictment of offences and its praise of virtue, its often Manichean judgement of 'good' and 'evil'.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.6)
     A reaction: He adds blame and excuse. Some of our strongest emotions can just be identifications, rather than judgements, as when we learn of someone else's triumph or disaster. On the whole I agree, though. This is important for Aristotelian virtue theory.
Emotions can be analysed under fifteen headings [Solomon]
     Full Idea: Emotions can be analysed by direction, scope/focus, object, criteria, status, evaluations, responsibility, intersubjectivity, distance, mythology, desire, power, strategy.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 8)
     A reaction: These are the headings Solomon actually applies in his breakdown of most of the main emotions. See his book for explanations of each of them. If people say philosophy makes no progress, I'd at least point to helpful thinking of this kind.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Some emotions are externally directed, others internally [Solomon]
     Full Idea: 'Outer-directed' emotions (such as fear) are about particular situations, objects, or other people. …The 'inner-directed' emotions (such as vanity or regret) take one's Self as their focal point.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.1)
     A reaction: This is Solomon's own distinction. Some of the emotions he cites, such as vanity, seem to me more like long term virtues or vices, rather than emotions. He did say, though, that you can have emotions without feeling, such as long-term hate.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
The passions are subjective, concerning what is important to me, rather than facts [Solomon]
     Full Idea: The passions are uniquely subjective, although they sometimes pretend to have a certain objective status. They are not concerned with the world, but with my world. They are not concerned with 'the facts', but with what is important.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.5)
     A reaction: Values pick out what is 'important'. This idea sums up Solomon's rather solipsistic view of emotions. I accept that emotions are responses, rather than objective judgements, but there is objectivity in their social dimension. Why care about politics?
Emotions are strategies for maximising our sense of dignity and self-esteem [Solomon]
     Full Idea: Every emotion is a strategy, a purposive attempt to structure our world in such a way as to maximise our sense of personal dignity and self-esteem.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref)
     A reaction: This is the main thesis of Solomon's book. There doesn't seem to be much to admire in what he takes to be our chief motivation. I would put a much more social spin on it - that our underlying urge is not self-promotion, but to fit into a community.
Passions exist as emotions, moods and desires, which all generate meaning [Solomon]
     Full Idea: There are three fundamental species passions - emotions, moods, and desires. …What all passions have in common is their ability to bestow meaning to the circumstances of our lives.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 3.2)
     A reaction: Moods are said to be 'generalised emotions', where emotions are about something, and desires add objectives. Solomon criticises rigid divisions between mental faculties and states, but it is hard to disagree with this distinction.
The Myth of the Passions says they are irrational, uncontrolled and damaging [Solomon]
     Full Idea: The Myth of the Passions says emotions are irrational forces beyond our control, disruptive and stupid, unthinking and counterproductive, against our 'better interests', and often ridiculous.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4)
     A reaction: The Myth is very unlikely to be correct, for evolutionary reasons. How could there be a selection for a mental feature which distorts truths and leads to dangerous misjudgements? Most emotions motivate us to act successfully. So why do some run wild?
Which emotions we feel depends on our sense of our own powers [Solomon]
     Full Idea: An emotion depends on an estimation of our own power. If a lover is jealous they welcome confrontation, but if they are just envious they assume impotence from the start.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.12)
     A reaction: This seems particularly true of politics, where the possibility (or not) of influencing events makes a huge difference. We can picture a huge variety of emotions when a fight breaks out in public.
It is only our passions which give our lives meaning [Solomon]
     Full Idea: It is our passions, and our passions alone, which provide our lives with meaning.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref)
     A reaction: This presumably entails that the lives of plants have no meaning. It also seems to be rather egotistical, since it is not clear why anyone else's life should have meaning for me, if I don't directly experience their passions. Interesting, though.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
Feeling is a superficial aspect of emotion, and may be indeterminate, or even absent [Solomon]
     Full Idea: Feeling is the ornamentation of emotion, not its essence. ...For example, what is the difference in feeling between embarrassment and shame? …We may also experience an emotion like subdued anger or envy with no feeling.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 4.2)
     A reaction: This is very persuasive, and supports the idea that what matters in an emotion is its content, rather than its phenomenology. He adds later that we are often mistaken about our own emotions.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
There are no 'basic' emotions, only socially prevalent ones [Solomon]
     Full Idea: There are no 'basic' emotions, only those emotions which are prevalent in a particular society. This reduction to a small set makes it impossible to appreciate the richness of our emotional lives.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 8)
     A reaction: He cites Descartes as a culprit, and John Watson's famous list of fear, dependency and rage. I think Solomon is probably right. He suggests that the lists are usually individualistic and negative. Individuals may have their private basics!
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
It is reason which needs the anchorage of passions, rather than vice versa [Solomon]
     Full Idea: It is not the passions who require the controls and rationalisations of reason. Rather, it is reason that requires the anchorage and earthy wisdom of the passions.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref)
     A reaction: I like the second half of this. We don't just follow the winds of arguments; we decide into which of the many conflicting winds we should steer the rational arguments, and that needs passions. Only a fool doesn't rationally control their passions.
Dividing ourselves into confrontational reason and passion destroys our harmonious whole [Solomon]
     Full Idea: To divide the soul into reason and passion …divides us against ourselves, forcing us each to be defensively half a person, instead of a harmonious whole.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 2.3)
     A reaction: This is the best aspect of Solomon's book. I'm not sure, though, how this works in practice. Should I allow the winds of emotion to alter the course of my reasoning, or stunt my feelings by always insisting that reason plays a part? That's too dualist!
The supposed irrationality of our emotions is often tactless or faulty expression of them [Solomon]
     Full Idea: What is often called the 'irrationality' of our emotions is rather the faulty timing or inept choice of their expressions.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4)
     A reaction: The irrationality can be pretty obvious when having a tantrum over trivia, or resenting some tiny slight, or falling in love with a dead film star. That said, his point is well made.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Emotions are our life force, and the source of most of our values [Solomon]
     Full Idea: Emotions are the life force of the soul, the source of most of our values (not all: there is always hunger, thirst, and fatigue).
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.4)
     A reaction: I am beginning to worry that Solomon's account is too individual and subjective. My personal values may derive from my emotions, but I think human and social values are based much more on objective observations and facts. We are social, not solipsists.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Lovers adopt the interests of their beloved, rather than just valuing them [Solomon]
     Full Idea: It is often said that love takes the interests of the lover as being more important than one's own; but here again we would rather say that love takes the lovers interests as its own.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.9)
     A reaction: This is because he sees emotions as almost entirely self-centred, and almost never altruistic. To me the evolutionary picture suggest a more social view. Many people want the lives of their ex- to go well, without knowing their new interests.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Morality would improve if people could pursue private interests [Weil]
     Full Idea: The common run of moralists complain that man is moved by his private interest: would to heaven it were so!
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.65)
     A reaction: Her point is that currently people have to sacrifice their own interests to communal activities which offer dubious benefits.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
'Absurdity' is just the result of our wrong choices in life [Solomon]
     Full Idea: The 'absurdity of life' is nothing than our own unsatisfactory choices, typically of defensiveness and resentment, competition, and 'meaningless' routines.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref)
     A reaction: He seems to have Camus particularly in mind. He sees love and co-operation as the cure. I sort of agree, but somewhere in all of our minds there lurks an abyss, with the good life looking like a distraction from it.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
In oppressive societies the scope of actual control is extended by a religion of power [Weil]
     Full Idea: Every oppressive society is cemented by a religion of power, which falsifies all social relations by enabling the powerful to command over and above what they are able to impose.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.69)
     A reaction: A rather acute and accurate observation, I think. Flashy cars, grand uniforms, lots of medals, rituals of deference….. Sometimes I like the order and security this brings, but Simone Weil could quickly change my view.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation
No central authority can initiate decentralisation [Weil]
     Full Idea: It is quite patently impossible for decentralisation to be initiated by the central authority.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.113)
     A reaction: This is contradicted by the creation of regional parliaments and mayors, but we see nothing beyond that. A state could crumble into small parts if there were'lots of autonomous regional groups. Easier for weird minorities to take control.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
After a bloody revolution the group which already had the power comes to the fore [Weil]
     Full Idea: There is no real break in continuity after a bloody struggle for regime change; for the victory just sanctions forces that before the struggle were the decisive factor in community life, patterns which were replacing those of the declining regime.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.73)
     A reaction: [from Marx] I assume she has in mind the French Revolution, and perhaps the Russian Revolution, though in the latter the new bourgeois leaders also got swept away. So revolutions are not nearly as dramatic as they appear to be.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
Ideologies are mythologies which guide our actions [Solomon]
     Full Idea: Mythologies become ideologies when we play a role in them, live in them, take action and take sides.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.1)
     A reaction: This may well be a sceptical American attitude to ideology, since 'mythology' implies a fiction. But I think for most of us there exists the possibility of a good ideology, which correctly points us towards a better life. Dangerous things, though!
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Decentralisation is only possible by co-operation between strong and weak - which is absurd [Weil]
     Full Idea: The only possibility of salvation would lie in a co-operation between weak and strong, with a view to accomplishing a progressive decentralisation of social life; but the absurdity of such an idea strikes one immediately.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.113)
     A reaction: I take this to be a judgement on the anarchist ideal, rather than a bit of modest devolution. The UK government set up regional parliaments. She says centralisation is remorseless.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Only individual people of good will can achieve social progress [Weil]
     Full Idea: The enlightened goodwill of men acting in an individual capacity is the only possible principle of social progress.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.57)
     A reaction: I identify with this. Virtually every admirable institution in a society can be traced back to the initiative of a few individuals. Every helpful technology was someone's brainwave.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
In the least evil societies people can think, control community life, and be autonomous [Weil]
     Full Idea: The least evil society is that in which the general run of men are most often obliged to think while acting, have the most opportunities for exercising control over collective life as a whole, and enjoy the greatest amount of independence.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.97)
     A reaction: So Simone Weil was a liberal. How do you stop the most dynamic thinkers, social controllers, and exercisers of their own independence from coming to dominate the others? Only liberal institutions, such as the law and education, can do this.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
Marx showed that capitalist oppression, because of competition, is unstoppable [Weil]
     Full Idea: Marx gives a first-rate account of the mechanism of capitalist oppression; but so good is it that one finds it hard to visualise how this mechanism could cease to function. …The exploitation is the competitive need to expand as rapidly as possible.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.39)
     A reaction: [Last bit compressed] This pinpoints the main motivation for desiring to overthrow capitalism. Resistance to that view is presumably the fear that an even worse oppression might replace it.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
The pleasure of completing tasks motivates just as well as the whip of slavery [Weil]
     Full Idea: The sight of the unfinished task attracts the free man as powerfully as the over-seer's whip stimulates the slave.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.94)
     A reaction: This is Weil's key social idea - that freely performed productive work can be, and should be, a joy, as long as it is accompanied by respect and friendship, rather than oppression. Did this idea ever occur to a slave owner?
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Inequality could easily be mitigated, if it were not for the struggle for power [Weil]
     Full Idea: Inequality could easily be mitigated by the resistance of the weak and the feeling for justice of the strong, …were it not for the intervention of a further factor, namely, the struggle for power.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.62)
     A reaction: The implication is that many of 'the strong' are inclined to diminish inequality, but find themselves trapped and unable to do so, because of irresistable capitalist forces. Sounds plausible.