10 ideas
12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: Logical space is not given independently of the individuals that occupy it, but is abstracted from the world as we find it. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.85) | |
A reaction: I very much like the second half of this idea, and am delighted to find Stalnaker endorsing it. I take the logical connectives to be descriptions of how things behave, at a high level of generality. |
12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: If we are to make sense of the bare particular theory, a property must be not just a rule for grouping individuals, but a feature of individuals in virtue of which they may be grouped. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.76) | |
A reaction: He is offering an objection to the thoroughly extensional account of properties that is found in standard possible worlds semantics. Quite right too. We can't give up on the common sense notion of a property. |
12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: If necessity is explained in terms of possible worlds, ...then an essential property is a property that a thing has in all possible worlds in which it exists. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.71) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be a quite shocking confusion of necessary properties with essential properties. The point is that utterly trivial properties can be necessary, but in no way part of the real essence of something. |
12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: We can remain anti-essentialist while allowing some necessary properties: those essential to everything (self-identity), relational properties (being what it is), and world-indexed properties (being snub-nosed-only-in-Kronos). | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.73) | |
A reaction: [a summary] He defined essential properties as necessary properties (Idea 12761), and now backpeddles. World-indexed properties are an invention of Plantinga, as essential properties to don't limit individuals. But they are necessary, not essential! |
12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: I argue that one cannot make semantical sense out of bare particular anti-essentialism within the framework of standard semantics for modal logic. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.71) | |
A reaction: Stalnaker characterises the bare particular view as ANTI-essentialist, because he has defined essence in terms of necessary properties. The bare particular seems to allow the possibility of Aristotle being a poached egg. |
12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: I cannot think of any point in making the counterfactual supposition that Babe Ruth is a billiard ball; there is nothing I can say about him in that imagined state that I could not just as well say about billiard balls that are not him. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.79) | |
A reaction: A bizarrely circumspect semanticists way of saying that Ruth couldn't possibly be a billiard ball! Would he say the same about a group of old men in wheelchairs, one of whom IS Babe Ruth? |
22371 | Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors [Foot] |
Full Idea: The determinism which worries the defender of free will is that if human action is subject to a universal law of causation, there will be for any action a set of sufficient conditions which can be traced back to factors outside the control of the agent. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.63) | |
A reaction: She draws on Russell for this, but neither of them mention whether the causation is physical. Free will seems to imply non-physical causation. |
22372 | Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot] |
Full Idea: We do not expect that everything a rational man does should be done with a motive, ...but we do expect a man to have a motive for many things that he does, and would count anyone who constantly performed troublesome actions without a motive as irrational. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.66) | |
A reaction: Interestng, because the assessment of whether someone is 'rational' therefore needs a criterion for when a motive seems required and when not. 'Significant' actions need a motive? |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
22373 | People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot] |
Full Idea: It makes sense to say that a man acts out of vanity on a particular occasion although he is not in general vain, or even vain about this kind of thing. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.69) | |
A reaction: Aristotle tells us that virtues and vices are habits, and also have an intellectual component, implying that the person believes in that sort of behaviour. Anyone can have 'a little moment of vanity'. |