36 ideas
6161 | Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands] |
Full Idea: Structuralism is a form of neo-Kantian idealism, in which the job of creating Kant's phenomenal world has been taken over by language instead of forms of sensibility and categories of the understanding. | |
From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: A helpful connection, which explains my aversion to any attempt at understanding the world simply by analysing language, either in its ordinary usage, or in its underlying logical form. |
13520 | A 'tautology' must include connectives [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: 'For every number x, x = x' is not a tautology, because it includes no connectives. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], 1.2) |
13524 | Deduction Theorem: T∪{P}|-Q, then T|-(P→Q), which justifies Conditional Proof [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: Deduction Theorem: If T ∪ {P} |- Q, then T |- (P → Q). This is the formal justification of the method of conditional proof (CPP). Its converse holds, and is essentially modus ponens. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], 1.3) |
13521 | Universal Specification: ∀xP(x) implies P(t). True for all? Then true for an instance [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: Universal Specification: from ∀xP(x) we may conclude P(t), where t is an appropriate term. If something is true for all members of a domain, then it is true for some particular one that we specify. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], 1.3) |
13522 | Universal Generalization: If we prove P(x) with no special assumptions, we can conclude ∀xP(x) [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: Universal Generalization: If we can prove P(x), only assuming what sort of object x is, we may conclude ∀xP(x) for the same x. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: This principle needs watching closely. If you pick one person in London, with no presuppositions, and it happens to be a woman, can you conclude that all the people in London are women? Fine in logic and mathematics, suspect in life. |
13523 | Existential Generalization (or 'proof by example'): if we can say P(t), then we can say something is P [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: Existential Generalization (or 'proof by example'): From P(t), where t is an appropriate term, we may conclude ∃xP(x). | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], 1.3) | |
A reaction: It is amazing how often this vacuous-sounding principles finds itself being employed in discussions of ontology, but I don't quite understand why. |
13529 | Empty Set: ∃x∀y ¬(y∈x). The unique empty set exists [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: Empty Set Axiom: ∃x ∀y ¬ (y ∈ x). There is a set x which has no members (no y's). The empty set exists. There is a set with no members, and by extensionality this set is unique. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], 2.3) | |
A reaction: A bit bewildering for novices. It says there is a box with nothing in it, or a pair of curly brackets with nothing between them. It seems to be the key idea in set theory, because it asserts the idea of a set over and above any possible members. |
13526 | Comprehension Axiom: if a collection is clearly specified, it is a set [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: The comprehension axiom says that any collection of objects that can be clearly specified can be considered to be a set. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], 2.2) | |
A reaction: This is virtually tautological, since I presume that 'clearly specified' means pinning down exact which items are the members, which is what a set is (by extensionality). The naïve version is, of course, not so hot. |
13534 | In first-order logic syntactic and semantic consequence (|- and |=) nicely coincide [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: One of the most appealing features of first-order logic is that the two 'turnstiles' (the syntactic single |-, and the semantic double |=), which are the two reasonable notions of logical consequence, actually coincide. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], 5.3) | |
A reaction: In the excitement about the possibility of second-order logic, plural quantification etc., it seems easy to forget the virtues of the basic system that is the target of the rebellion. The issue is how much can be 'expressed' in first-order logic. |
13535 | First-order logic is weakly complete (valid sentences are provable); we can't prove every sentence or its negation [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: The 'completeness' of first order-logic does not mean that every sentence or its negation is provable in first-order logic. We have instead the weaker result that every valid sentence is provable. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Peter Smith calls the stronger version 'negation completeness'. |
6163 | If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands] |
Full Idea: If you reject the principle of bivalence (that a proposition is either determinately true or false), then statements are also not subject to the Law of Excluded Middle (P or not-P). | |
From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I think Rowlands is wrong about this. Excluded Middle could be purely syntacti, or its semantics could be 'True or Not-True'. Only bivalent excluded middle introduces 'True or False'. Compare Idea 4752. |
13531 | Model theory reveals the structures of mathematics [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: Model theory helps one to understand what it takes to specify a mathematical structure uniquely. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], 5.1) | |
A reaction: Thus it is the development of model theory which has led to the 'structuralist' view of mathematics. |
13532 | Model theory 'structures' have a 'universe', some 'relations', some 'functions', and some 'constants' [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: A 'structure' in model theory has a non-empty set, the 'universe', as domain of variables, a subset for each 'relation', some 'functions', and 'constants'. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], 5.2) |
13519 | Model theory uses sets to show that mathematical deduction fits mathematical truth [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: Model theory uses set theory to show that the theorem-proving power of the usual methods of deduction in mathematics corresponds perfectly to what must be true in actual mathematical structures. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], Pref) | |
A reaction: That more or less says that model theory demonstrates the 'soundness' of mathematics (though normal arithmetic is famously not 'complete'). Of course, he says they 'correspond' to the truths, rather than entailing them. |
13533 | First-order model theory rests on completeness, compactness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: The three foundations of first-order model theory are the Completeness theorem, the Compactness theorem, and the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], 5.3) | |
A reaction: On p.180 he notes that Compactness and LST make no mention of |- and are purely semantic, where Completeness shows the equivalence of |- and |=. All three fail for second-order logic (p.223). |
13537 | An 'isomorphism' is a bijection that preserves all structural components [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: An 'isomorphism' is a bijection between two sets that preserves all structural components. The interpretations of each constant symbol are mapped across, and functions map the relation and function symbols. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], 5.4) |
13539 | The LST Theorem is a serious limitation of first-order logic [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: The Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem demonstrates a serious limitation of first-order logic, and is one of primary reasons for considering stronger logics. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], 5.7) |
13538 | If a theory is complete, only a more powerful language can strengthen it [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: It is valuable to know that a theory is complete, because then we know it cannot be strengthened without passing to a more powerful language. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], 5.5) |
13525 | Most deductive logic (unlike ordinary reasoning) is 'monotonic' - we don't retract after new givens [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: Deductive logic, including first-order logic and other types of logic used in mathematics, is 'monotonic'. This means that we never retract a theorem on the basis of new givens. If T|-φ and T⊆SW, then S|-φ. Ordinary reasoning is nonmonotonic. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], 1.7) | |
A reaction: The classic example of nonmonotonic reasoning is the induction that 'all birds can fly', which is retracted when the bird turns out to be a penguin. He says nonmonotonic logic is a rich field in computer science. |
13530 | An ordinal is an equivalence class of well-orderings, or a transitive set whose members are transitive [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: Less theoretically, an ordinal is an equivalence class of well-orderings. Formally, we say a set is 'transitive' if every member of it is a subset of it, and an ordinal is a transitive set, all of whose members are transitive. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], 2.4) | |
A reaction: He glosses 'transitive' as 'every member of a member of it is a member of it'. So it's membership all the way down. This is the von Neumann rather than the Zermelo approach (which is based on singletons). |
13518 | Modern mathematics has unified all of its objects within set theory [Wolf,RS] |
Full Idea: One of the great achievements of modern mathematics has been the unification of its many types of objects. It began with showing geometric objects numerically or algebraically, and culminated with set theory representing all the normal objects. | |
From: Robert S. Wolf (A Tour through Mathematical Logic [2005], Pref) | |
A reaction: His use of the word 'object' begs all sorts of questions, if you are arriving from the street, where an object is something which can cause a bruise - but get used to it, because the word 'object' has been borrowed for new uses. |
6155 | Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands] |
Full Idea: Supervenience is essentially a one-way relation of dependence or determination, …which holds, in the first instance, between properties. | |
From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This definition immediately shows why supervenient properties are in danger of being epiphenomenal (i.e. causally irrelevant). Carefully thought about the notion of a 'one-way' relation will, I think, make it more obscure rather than clearer. |
6154 | It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands] |
Full Idea: Some have argued that a mereological whole should not be identified with the sum of its parts on the grounds that the former possess certain properties - specifically modal and (perhaps) counterfactual properties - that the latter lacks. | |
From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: I am not convinced that modal and counterfactual claims should count as properties. If my pen is heated it melts (a property), but if my pen were intelligent it could do philosophy. Intelligence is a property, but the situation isn't. |
6157 | Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands] |
Full Idea: Tokens are dated, concrete, particular occurrences or instances; types are the general properties that these occurrences exemplify or the kinds to which they belong. | |
From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: It might be said that types are sets, of which tokens are the members. The question of 'general properties' raises the question of whether universals must exist to make kinds possible. |
6159 | Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands] |
Full Idea: Neo-Kantian idealism, and the excesses of recent versions of it, are precisely the sort of mess one can get oneself into through an uncritical acceptance of the dichotomizing of mind and world along Cartesian internalist lines. | |
From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I am unconvinced that internalism about the mind (that its contents can be defined without reference to anything external) leads to this disastrous split. We don't have to abandon the links between an internal mind and the world. |
6152 | Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands] |
Full Idea: The apparent features of mind which are not obviously physical include: rationality, thought, consciousness, subjectivity, infallible first-person knowledge, freedom, meaning and self-awareness. | |
From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: A helpful list, some of which can be challenged. Ryle challenges first-person infallibility. Hume challenges self-awareness. Quine challenges meaning. Lots of people (e.g. Spinoza) challenge freedom. The Churchlands seem to challenge consciousness. |
6173 | Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands] |
Full Idea: Content externalism threatens the idea of first-person authority in all its forms, and does so because it calls into question the idea that the access we have to our own mental states is privileged in the way required for such authority. | |
From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: I am inclined to respond by saying that since we clearly have privileged access to our own minds, that means there must be something wrong with content externalism. |
6174 | If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands] |
Full Idea: If someone knew that a thinker had, without realising it, been transported to Twin Earth, they would almost certainly be a higher authority on the content of the thinker's thoughts than would the thinker. | |
From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: They would certainly be a higher authority on the truth of the thinker's thoughts, but only in the way that you might think I hold a diamond when I know it is a club. If the thinker believes it is H2O, the fact that it isn't is irrelevant to content. |
6158 | Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands] |
Full Idea: One often finds a supervenience thesis concerning the relation between mental and physical properties combined with a token identity theory concerning the relation between mental and physical particulars. | |
From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This brings out the important clarifying point that supervenience is said to be between properties, not substances. The point is that supervenience will always cry out for an explanation, preferably a sensible one. |
6168 | The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands] |
Full Idea: The content of the thought that the sky is blue is simply the meaning of the sentence "The sky is blue". | |
From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This seems to imply that it is logically impossible for a non-language-speaker, such as a chimpanzee, to think that the sky is the same colour as the water. If we allow propositions, we might be able to keep meanings without the sentences. |
6167 | Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands] |
Full Idea: An action is a bodily movement that is caused by intentional states such as beliefs, desires and so on. | |
From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: A useful definition, and clearly one that has no truck with attempts at giving behaviourist definitions of action. The definition of a 'moral action' needs to be built on this one. Particular types of belief and desire, presumably. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
6177 | Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands] |
Full Idea: The faculty of moral intuition seems to be unevenly distributed between people. | |
From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This would be a good argument if it was thought that the source of moral intuitions was divine, but people vary enormously in their intuitions about maths, about character, about danger. If you believe in any intuition at all, you must accept its variety. |
6156 | The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands] |
Full Idea: The seventeenth century revolution reintroduced the classical concept of the atom in somewhat new attire as an essentially mathematical entity whose primary qualities could be precisely quantified as modes or aspects of Euclidean space. | |
From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Obviously this very abstract view of atoms didn't last, once they began to identify specific physical atoms, such as oxygen. This view fits in with Newton's use of pure (abstract) points such as the 'centre of gravity'. |
6170 | Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands] |
Full Idea: Part of what it means to be a natural kind is that they are defined by a real essence, a constitution that marks them out as the substance they are (as water is essentially H2O, and gold essentially has atomic number 79). | |
From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: A 'real essence' would be the opposite of a 'conventional essence', which is just a human way of seeing things. |
6178 | It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands] |
Full Idea: In recent environmental philosophy it is common to see the value of nature identified with one or another natural feature of the environment: life, diversity, ecosystemic integrity and so on. | |
From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This thought seems to be asking for the Open Question argument. What is so good about life, or diversity? Our strongest intuition must be that the survival of the ecosystem, and whatever makes that possible, is the highest value. |