3 ideas
| 19569 | We have a basic epistemic duty to believe truth and avoid error [Chisholm, by Kvanvig] |
| Full Idea: Chisholm says our fundamental epistemic duties arise from the fundamental duty to (do one's best to) believe the truth and avoid error. | |
| From: report of Roderick Chisholm (Theory of Knowledge (2nd ed 1977) [1966]) by Jonathan Kvanvig - Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal 'Epistemic' | |
| A reaction: Since it strikes me as impossible to perceive something as being true, and yet still not believe it (except in moments of shock), I don't see why we need to introduce dubious claims about 'duty' here. Stupidity isn't a failure of duty. |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 23688 | Noncognitivism tries to avoid both naturalism and mysterious morality [Hacker-Wright] |
| Full Idea: Noncognitivism is an attempt to avoid the alleged problems of naturalism without the mysteries of Moore's non-naturalism. | |
| From: John Hacker-Wright (Philippa Foot's Moral Thought [2013], 1) | |
| A reaction: R.M. Hare is the best example of this approach. Moore's Open Question argument was said to prove the Naturalistic Fallacy, which imagined that morality could be a feature of nature. It led Moore to platonism. I prefer Philippa Foot. |