Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Nature of Musical Expression' and 'Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics'

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4 ideas

21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
12165 Romantics say music expresses ideas, or the Will, or intuitions, or feelings [Scruton]
     Full Idea: According to the Romantic theory music was an expression of something, of an idea (Hegel), of the Will (Schopenhauer), of 'intuitions' (Croce), or of feelings (Collingwood).
     From: Roger Scruton (The Nature of Musical Expression [1981], p.54)
     A reaction: Deryck Cooke was the culmination of music as expression of feeling, and Stravinsky was the greatest rebel against the whole idea of expression in music. You can set out to create interesting music which does or does not grab the emotions.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 4. Emotion in Art
12164 Expressing melancholy is a good thing, but arousing it is a bad thing [Scruton]
     Full Idea: To describe a piece of music as expressive of melancholy is to give a reason for listening to it; to describe it as arousing or evoking melancholy is to give a reason for avoiding it.
     From: Roger Scruton (The Nature of Musical Expression [1981], p.49)
     A reaction: Expressing sexual desire, while avoiding arousing it, is the nice challenge for a particular type of art. Would Scruton say that expressing joy is a good thing, but arousing it is bad? It is a nice observation, though.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
468 Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
4375 Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg]
     Full Idea: The emotivist gets things backwards: evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotions are types of evaluation.
     From: Deborah Achtenberg (Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics [2002], 6.1)
     A reaction: A nice comment, though a bit optimistic. It is certainly a valuable corrective to emotivist to pin down the cognitive and evaluative aspects of emotion, rather than regarding them as 'raw' feelings.