8748
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Logical positivists incorporated geometry into logicism, saying axioms are just definitions [Carnap, by Shapiro]
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Full Idea:
The logical positivists brought geometry into the fold of logicism. The axioms of, say, Euclidean geometry are simply definitions of primitive terms like 'point' and 'line'.
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From:
report of Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 5.3
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A reaction:
If the concept of 'line' is actually created by its definition, then we need to know exactly what (say) 'shortest' means. If we are merely describing a line, then our definition can be 'impredicative', using other accepted concepts.
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13933
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Existence questions are 'internal' (within a framework) or 'external' (concerning the whole framework) [Carnap]
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Full Idea:
We distinguish two kinds of existence questions: first, entities of a new kind within the framework; we call them 'internal questions'. Second, 'external questions', concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole.
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From:
Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 2)
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A reaction:
This nicely disposes of many ontological difficulties, but at the price of labelling most external questions as meaningless, so that the internal answers have very little commitment, and the external (big) questions are now banned. Not for me.
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13169
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I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Forms establish the true general principles of nature. Aristotle calls them 'first entelechies'; I call them, perhaps more intelligibly, 'primitive forces', which contain not only act or the completion of possibility, but also an original activity.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
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A reaction:
As in Idea 13168, I take Leibniz to be unifying Aristotle with modern science, and offering an active view of nature in tune with modern scientific essentialism. Laws arise from primitive force, and are not imposed from without.
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13170
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The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
There are only atoms of substance, that is, real unities absolutely destitute of parts, which are the source of actions, the first absolute principles of the composition of things, and, as it were, the final elements in the analysis of substantial things.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.142)
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A reaction:
I like this because it addresses the pure issue of the identity of an individuated object, but also links it with an active view of nature, and not some mere inventory of objects.
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13935
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We only accept 'things' within a language with formation, testing and acceptance rules [Carnap]
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Full Idea:
To accept the thing world means nothing more than to accept a certain form of language, in other words, to accept rules for forming statements and for testing, accepting, or rejecting them.
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From:
Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 2)
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A reaction:
If you derive your metaphysics from your language, then objects are linguistic conventions. But why do we accept conventions about objects?
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13932
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Empiricists tend to reject abstract entities, and to feel sympathy with nominalism [Carnap]
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Full Idea:
Empiricists are in general rather suspicious with respect to any kind of abstract entities like properties, classes, relations, numbers, propositions etc. They usually feel more sympathy with nominalists than with realists (in the medieval sense).
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From:
Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 1)
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A reaction:
The obvious reason is that you can't have sense experiences of abstract entities. I like the question 'what are they made of?' rather than the question 'how can I experience them?'.
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13937
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New linguistic claims about entities are not true or false, but just expedient, fruitful or successful [Carnap]
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Full Idea:
The acceptance of new linguistic forms about entities cannot be judged as being either true or false because it is not an assertion. It can only be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is intended.
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From:
Rudolph Carnap (Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology [1950], 3)
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A reaction:
The obvious problem seems to be that a complete pack of lies might be successful for a very long time, if it plugged a critical hole in a major theory. Is success judged financially? How do we judge success without mentioning truth?
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13167
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We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Considering 'extended mass' alone was not sufficient to explain the principles of mechanics and the laws of nature, but it is necessary to make use of the notion of 'force', which is very intelligible, despite belonging in the domain of metaphysics.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
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A reaction:
We may find it surprising that force is a metaphysical concept, but that is worth pondering. It is a mysterious notion within physics. Notice the emphasis on what explains, and what is intelligible. He sees Descartes's system as too passive.
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