Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Essential Attribution' and 'The Book of Chuang Tzu'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Words of wisdom are precise and clear [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Words of wisdom are precise and clear.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
     A reaction: I can only approve of this. The issue of clarity is much discussed amongs philosophers, especially in the analytic v continental debate. Note, therefore, the additional requirement to be 'precise'. Should we be less clear in order to be precise?
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Don't even start, let's just stay put [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Don't even start, let's just stay put.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
     A reaction: What a remarkable proposal! He seems frightened to make an omelette, because he will have to break an egg, or he might burn himself. I can't relate to this idea, but it's existence must be noted, like other scepticisms.
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Disagreement means you do not understand at all [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: The sage encompasses everything, while ordinary people just argue about things. Disagreement means you do not understand at all.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This is why democracy and western analytical philosophy come as a package. We can't assume that our government is always right, and we can't assume that a 'sage' has managed to encompass everything. Criticism is essential!
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
If you beat me in argument, does that mean you are right? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: If you get the better of me in a disagreement, rather than me getting the better of you, does this mean that you are automatically right and I am automatically wrong?
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Very nice. I don't, though, think that this invalidates the process of argument. What matters about such an exchange is the resulting reflection by the two parties. Only a fool thinks that he is right because he won, or wrong because he lost.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
     Full Idea: An object must have some of its natural properties in this world. Some of those it has in common with objects of some proximate kind (Aristotelian essentialism), and others individuate it from objects of the same kind (individuating essentialism).
     From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Essential Attribution [1971], p.193)
Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
     Full Idea: Aristotelian essentialism may best be understood on a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of the modal operators.
     From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Essential Attribution [1971], p.189)
     A reaction: I record this because I very much like the sound of it, though I have yet to fully understand it.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
     Full Idea: In the range of modal systems for which Saul Kripke has provided a semantics, no essentialist sentence is a theorem. Furthermore, there are models for which such sentences are demonstrably false.
     From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Essential Attribution [1971], p.188)
'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
     Full Idea: We would never use 'is essentially' for 'is necessarily' where vacuous properties are concerned, as in 'Socrates is essentially snub-nosed' or 'Socrates is essentially Socrates'.
     From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Essential Attribution [1971], p.193)
     A reaction: This simple point does us a huge service in rescuing the word 'essential' from several hundred years of misguided philosophy.
'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
     Full Idea: There seems to be surface synonymy between 'is essentially' and de re occurrences of 'is necessarily', but intersubstitution often fails to preserve sense (as in 'Winston is essentially a cyclist' and 'Winston is necessarily a cyclist').
     From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Essential Attribution [1971], p.193)
     A reaction: Clearly the two sentences have different meanings, with 'essentially' being a comment about the nature of Winston, and 'necessarily' probably being a comment about the circumstances in which he finds himself. Very nice. See also Idea 11186.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers make a metaphysical shift, by inventing objects (individual concepts, forms, substances) called 'essences', which have only essential properties, and then worry when they can't locate them by rummaging around in possible worlds.
     From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Essential Attribution [1971], p.192)
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)]
     Full Idea: The usefulness of talk about possible worlds is not for purposes of individuating the object - that can be done in this world; such talk is a way of sorting its properties.
     From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Essential Attribution [1971], p.192)
     A reaction: 'Possible worlds are a device for sorting properties' sounds to me like a promising slogan. Ruth Marcus originated rigid designation, before Kripke came up with the label.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)]
     Full Idea: The strategem of talk about possible worlds is that truth assignments of sentences and extensions of predicates may vary, but individual names don't alter their reference (unless they don't refer). They are a neutral peg for descriptions.
     From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Essential Attribution [1971], p.194)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Do not try to do things, or to master knowledge; just be empty [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Do not try to do things. Do not try to master knowledge. ...Just be empty.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.7)
     A reaction: Stands as a nice challenge to the assumption that knowledge is a good thing. Aristotle's views make a nice contrast (Ideas 548 and 549). Personally I totally agree with Aristotle, and with the western tradition.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
You know you were dreaming when you wake, but there might then be a greater awakening from that [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Often after waking do you know that your dream was a dream. Still, there may be an even greater awakening after which you will know that this, too, was just a greater dream.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], 02), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 9.2
     A reaction: This is the key to the full horror of dream scepticism (as dramatised in the film 'The Matrix'). We can never know whether there is yet another awakening about to occur.
Did Chuang Tzu dream he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dream he was Chuang Tzu? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Once I, Chuang Tzu, dreamt that I was a butterfly, flitting around and enjoying myself. Suddenly I woke and was Chuang Tzu again. But had I been Chuang Tzu dreaming I was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming I was now Chuang Tzu?
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Plato (Idea 2047) also spotted this problem, later made famous by Descartes (Idea 2250). Given the size of a butterfly's brain, this suggests that Chuang Tzu was a dualist. What can't I take the idea seriously, when reason says I should?
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The perfect man has no self [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: As the saying goes, 'The perfect man has no self'
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This seems to be quoted with approval. This is interesting because it implies that lesser beings do have a self, and that having a self is a moral issue, and one which can be controlled. One could, I suppose, concentrate on externals.
To see with true clarity, your self must be irrelevant [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: When a man discerns his own self as irrelevant, he sees with true clarity.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.6)
     A reaction: Seeing 'with clarity' is only one of the ways of seeing, and one mustn't unquestioningly assume that it is the best. Wisdom should contemplate vision with and without the self, and then rise higher and compare the two views. Compare Parfit (Idea 5518).
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
If words can't be defined, they may just be the chirruping of chicks [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Our words are not just hot air. Words work because they are something, but the problem is that, if we cannot define a word's meaning, it doesn't really say anything. Can we make a case for it being anything different from the chirruping of chicks?
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This obviously points us towards Quine's challenge to analyticity, and hence the value of definitions (Ideas 1622 and 1624). Even for Chuang Tzu, it seems naïve to think that you cannot use a word well if you cannot define it.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Words are for meaning, and once you have that you can forget the words [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Words are for meaning: when you've gotten the meaning, you can forget the words.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], 26), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 9.VI
     A reaction: 'What exactly did this person say?' 'Don't know, but I've given you the accurate gist'. This is such an obvious phenomenon that I amazed by modern philosophers who deny propositions, or deny meaning entirely.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Great courage is not violent [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Great courage is not violent.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
     A reaction: A very nice remark. This, I think, is what the Greeks were struggling to say about courage, but they never quite pinned it down as Chuang Tzu does.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)]
     Full Idea: Being gold or being a man is not accidental. ..Such essences are dispositional properties of a very special kind: if an object had such a property and ceased to have it, it would have ceased to exist or have changed (as if gold is transmuted to lead).
     From: Ruth Barcan Marcus (Essential Attribution [1971], p.202)
     A reaction: Ruth Marcus is an important founder of modern scientific essentialism, by not only proposing the notion we call rigid designation, but by explicitly defending the essential identities that seem to emerge from modal logic.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
As all life is one, what need is there for words? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: As all life is one, what need is there for words?
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
     A reaction: In a sense this is nonsense, but it has an appeal. I presume that God would not need words, any more than he would need arithmetic. Life is obviously a complex one, with parts which can be discussed.
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 2. Taoism
Go with the flow, and be one with the void of Heaven [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Don't struggle, go with the flow, and you will find yourself at one with the vastness of the void of Heaven.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.6)
     A reaction: Ugh. I've got all eternity to do that. The underlying assumption of Taoism seems to be that it is better not to have been born, and if you are thus unfortunate, you should try to pretend that it never happened. Much too negative for my taste.
Fish forget about each other in the pond and forget each other in the Tao [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
     Full Idea: Fish forget about each other in the pond and forget each other in the Tao.
     From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.6)
     A reaction: Strikingly different from Christianity. No wonder Europeans used to describe orientals as 'enigmatic'; the faces of Taoists presumably express indifference. Not for me, I'm afraid. I identify with my fellow humans, because of our shared predicaments.