4 ideas
| 13965 | Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames] |
| Full Idea: There are two senses of 'semantic' - as theory of meaning or as truth-based theory of logical consequence, and they are very different. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance [2008], p.78) | |
| A reaction: This subtle point is significant in considering the role of logic in philosophy. The logicians' semantics (based on logical consequence) is in danger of ousting the broader and more elusive notion of meaning in natural language. |
| 13964 | Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames] |
| Full Idea: The semantic content of a sentence is not the set of circumstances supporting its truth. It is rather the semantic content of a structured proposition the constituents of which are the semantic contents of the constituents of the sentence. | |
| From: Scott Soames (Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance [2008], p.74) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure I get this, but while I like the truth-conditions view, I am suspicious of any proposal that the semantic content of something is some actual physical ingredients of the world. Meanings aren't sticks and stones. |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 7101 | Virtue theory needs an external standard to judge behaviour and character [Inwagen, by Statman] |
| Full Idea: Virtue theory leaves out something essential, namely, the existence of a standard of behaviour which is prior to and independent of human character, in terms of which we evaluate the behaviour and character of ourselves and others. | |
| From: report of Peter van Inwagen (Response to Slote [1990]) by Daniel Statman - Introduction to Virtue Ethics §5 | |
| A reaction: This sounds very like Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy. Personally I prefer Aristotle's naturalistic reliance on human nature and function to Moore's totally unjustified intuitionist Platonism. How can anything be good if it isn't supposed to do anything? |