Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Letters from a Stoic' and 'Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right'

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46 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom does not lie in books, and unread people can also become wise [Seneca]
     Full Idea: What grounds could I possibly have for supposing that a person who has no acquaintance with books will never be a wise man? For wisdom does not lie in books.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 088)
     A reaction: A useful warning to the likes of me, who may have retreated from the hurly-burly of the agora (see Callicles in Plato's 'Gorgias'), under the illusion that detachment is needed for wisdom. Maybe involvement is needed for wisdom.
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise people escape necessity by willing it [Seneca]
     Full Idea: There is nothing a wise man does reluctantly; he escapes necessity because he wills what necessity is going to force on him.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 054)
     A reaction: He is discussing death in this letter. The difficulty here is sliding into fatalism. For instance, if you are informed that you have cancer, it is tempting to become 'wise' and will your own death, but lots of people fight it, and win.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims at happiness [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Philosophy takes as her aim the state of happiness.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 090)
     A reaction: A startlingly forthright view. It seems to neglect what I take to be the main aim of philosophy, which is to achieve understanding. I presume true happiness would follow from that. Seneca must now explain why soporific pleasure is wrong.
What philosophy offers humanity is guidance [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Shall I tell you what philosophy holds out for humanity? Counsel.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 048)
     A reaction: See Quine for a flat modern denial of this claim (Idea 9764). There is a modern tendency to see ethics and political thought operating at a meta- or metameta- level. I take the main ethical theories to be very illuminating of real life.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Because there is only one human reason, there can only be one true philosophy from principles [Kant]
     Full Idea: Considered objectively, there can only be one human reason, there cannot be many philosophies; in other words, there can only be one true philosophy from principles, in however many conflicting ways men have philosophised about the same proposition.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Pref)
     A reaction: An idea that embodies the Enlightenment ideal. I like the idea that there is one true philosophy, because there is only one world. Kant is talking of philosophy 'from principles', which means his transendental idealism.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
That something is a necessary condition of something else doesn't mean it caused it [Seneca]
     Full Idea: There's no reason for you to assume that, X being something without which Y could never have come about, Y came about as a result of the assistance of X.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 088)
     A reaction: This thought originates with Carneades, reported by Cicero. This is a clear message to the likes of Mackie, who are in danger of thinking that giving the preconditions of something is sufficient to give its causes.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Even philosophers have got bogged down in analysing tiny bits of language [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Even the philosophers have descended to the level of drawing distinctions between the uses of different syllables and discussing the proper meanings of prepositions and conjunctions.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 088)
     A reaction: How wonderfully prescient! The vast industry of modern philosophy of language exactly fits Seneca's description. I don't quite share his contempt, of course, and I think Seneca would have a bit of sympathy with modern analysis (just a bit!).
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
We are equipped with the a priori intuitions needed for the concept of right [Kant]
     Full Idea: Reason has taken care that the understanding is as fully equipped as possible with a priori intuitions for the construction of the concept of right.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Intro E)
     A reaction: A priori intuitions are not the same as innate knowledge or innate concepts, but they must require some sort of inbuilt inner resources. Further evidence that Kant is a rationalist philosopher (if we were unsure).
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
To the four causes Plato adds a fifth, the idea which guided the event [Seneca]
     Full Idea: To the four Aristotelian causes Plato adds a fifth in the model - what he himself calls the 'idea' - this being what the sculptor had constantly before his eyes as he executed the intended work.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 065)
     A reaction: A very interesting interpretation. I take the four 'causes' to be primarily the four 'explanations', and it exactly fits how we should understand Plato, as offer a crucial underlying explanation. The statue is Aristotle's example.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
If everything can be measured, try measuring the size of a man's soul [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Nothing's outside your scope when it comes to measurement. Well, if you're such an expert, measure a man's soul; tell me how large or how small that is.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 088)
     A reaction: This is Descartes's non-spatial argument, which I take to be one of the four main props to his mind-body dualism. As always, it is expressed with beautiful concision by Seneca.
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Referring to a person, and speaking about him, are very different [Seneca]
     Full Idea: It makes a very great difference whether you refer to the person directly, or speak about him.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 117.13), quoted by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.3.2
     A reaction: We seem to think that the distinctiveness of reference was first spotted by Frege. Not so.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Trouble in life comes from copying other people, which is following convention instead of reason [Seneca]
     Full Idea: One of the causes of the troubles that beset us is the way our lives are guided by the example of others; instead of being set to rights by reason we're seduced by convention.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 123)
     A reaction: An interesting practical spin and critique of the standard metaethical idea that morality is just convention. If you think morality is convention, presumably your moral duty is to imitate your neighbours. Nice deconstruction.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Humans acquired the concept of virtue from an analogy with bodily health and strength [Seneca, by Allen]
     Full Idea: Seneca held that human beings owe the original acquisition of the concept of virtue to an analogy with bodily health and strength
     From: report of Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 120.5) by James Allen - Soul's Virtue and the Health of the Body p.76
     A reaction: This is an unusual view, even for a stoic, but shows how close the concepts of health and virtue were. Notice that it is strength as well as health. Plato just emphasises mental and physical harmony.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
We know death, which is like before birth; ceasing to be and never beginning are the same [Seneca]
     Full Idea: I already know what death is like - it will be the same after me as it was before me. ..Only an utter idiot would think a lamp was worse off when it was put out than before it was lit. ..What does it matter whether you cease to be or never begin?
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 054)
     A reaction: These sentiments are, interestingly, derived from the epicureans, rather than from the stoic tradition, but to us they probably look close together, where they looked like opponents at the time.
Living is nothing wonderful; what matters is to die well [Seneca]
     Full Idea: There's nothing so very great about living - all your slaves and all the animals do it. What is, however, a great thing is to die in a manner which is honourable, enlightened and courageous.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 077)
     A reaction: You get the feeling that Seneca actually thought suicide was better than a natural death. Did he actually seek his own death? It is an odd interpretation of his own stoic injunction to 'live according to nature'.
It is as silly to lament ceasing to be as to lament not having lived in the remote past [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Wouldn't you think a man a prize fool if he burst into tears because he didn't live a thousand years ago? A man is such a fool for shedding tears because he isn't going to be alive a thousand years from now.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 077)
     A reaction: These thoughts are traditional, dating back to Epicurus, but Seneca is exceptionally going at finding new variations and examples to reinforce the basic thought.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Is anything sweeter than valuing yourself more when you find you are loved? [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Can anything be sweeter than to find that you are so dear to your wife that this makes you dearer to yourself?
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 104)
     A reaction: Another lovely penetrating remark from Seneca. I suppose a symptom of low self-esteem might be 'why does she love someone as worthless as me?', but that would be unusual.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Selfishness does not produce happiness; to live for yourself, live for others [Seneca]
     Full Idea: No one can lead a happy life if he thinks only of himself and turns everything to his own purposes. You should live for the other person if you wish to live for yourself.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 048)
     A reaction: It is important to see this as a key aspect of the ancient aspiration to virtue. The end result is not far from Christianity. It is simplistic to see the quest for virtue as a crass self-obsessed quest for self-improvement. We are social.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
A man is as unhappy as he has convinced himself he is [Seneca]
     Full Idea: A man is as unhappy as he has convinced himself he is.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 078)
     A reaction: Seneca is a very penetrating thinker about ordinary life - an aspect of philosophy which is nowadays totally neglected by the most eminent philosophers.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Life is like a play - it is the quality that matters, not the length [Seneca]
     Full Idea: As it is with a play, so it is with life - what matters is not how long the acting lasts, but how good it is.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 077)
     A reaction: A very nice epigram, culminating the wonderful Letter 77 on the subject of death. A play needs to be a decent length if it is to exhibit its qualities. It would be heartbreaking if all of Shakespeare's plays were just 20-minute sketches.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
We are scared of death - except when we are immersed in pleasure! [Seneca]
     Full Idea: You are scared of death - but how heedless of it you are while you are dealing with a dish of choice mushrooms!
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 077)
     A reaction: A beautifully simple observation, from the greatest philosopher of death. Maybe hospices should concentrate on sex, drugs and rock and roll.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
The whole point of pleasure-seeking is novelty, and abandoning established ways [Seneca]
     Full Idea: The whole object of luxurious living is the delight it takes in irregular ways and in not merely departing from the correct course but going to the farthest point away from it, and in eventually even taking a stand diametrically opposed to it.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 122)
     A reaction: A rather conservative and puritanical remark, but worthy of contemplation even for committed hedonists. It is just a sad facts that most pleasures diminish with familiarity. Small children make delightful remarks. Imagine if they repeated them.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
Nature doesn't give us virtue; we must unremittingly pursue it, as a training and an art [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Nature does not give a man virtue; the process of becoming a good man is an art. ...Virtue only comes to a character which has been thoroughly schooled and trained and brought to a pitch of perfection by unremitting practice.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 090)
     A reaction: This is an important gloss from a leading stoic on the slogan of 'live according to nature'. One might say that the natural life must be 'tracked' (as Philip Larkin says we track happiness). The natural life is, above all, the rational life, for stoics.
Living contrary to nature is like rowing against the stream [Seneca]
     Full Idea: For those who follow nature everything is easy and straightforward, whereas for those who fight against her life is just like rowing against the stream.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 102)
     A reaction: A classic statement of the well-known stoic slogan, but expressed with Seneca's characteristic elegance. There is always a slight hidden of dubious fatalism in the slogan. 'Rage, rage, against the dying of the light!' - Dylan Thomas.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Character is ruined by not looking back over our pasts, since the future rests on the past [Seneca]
     Full Idea: What really ruins our characters is the fact that none of us looks back over his life. We think a little about what we are going to do, and fail to think about what we have done, yet plans for the future depend on the past.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 083)
     A reaction: One always assumes that writings about the wisdom of daily life will be one mass of clichés, but Seneca proves otherwise. With a pang I realise that I may be too guilty of not thinking about the past. I've even been proud of it.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
It's no good winning lots of fights, if you are then conquered by your own temper [Seneca]
     Full Idea: What's the use of overcoming opponent after opponent in the wrestling or boxing rings if you can be overcome by your temper?
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 088)
     A reaction: He has such a nice way of presenting what might be traditional and commonplace ideas. If you see life as a battle, then you should think very carefully about who the opponents are - because they may be hiding within.
Excessive curiosity is a form of intemperance [Seneca]
     Full Idea: To want to know more than is sufficient is a form of intemperance.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 088)
     A reaction: This comes as a bit of a surprise, given the high value that philosophers place on knowledge. I'm reminded of Auberon Waugh's criticism of the Scots as a 'wildly over-educated people'. I think the problem is what you could have been doing instead.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
A power-based state of nature may not be unjust, but there is no justice without competent judges [Kant]
     Full Idea: The state of nature need not be a state of injustice merely because those who live in it treat one another in terms of power. But it is devoid of justice, for if a dispute over right occurs in it, there is no competent judge to give valid decisions.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §44)
     A reaction: Could you not achieve justice by means of personal violence? Might not a revered older person have been accepted as a judge?
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
To govern used to mean to serve, not to rule; rulers did not test their powers over those who bestowed it [Seneca]
     Full Idea: In the Golden Age, to govern was to serve, not to rule. No one used to try out the extent of his power over those to whom he owed that power in the first place.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 090)
     A reaction: I spent my professional career trying to persuade people that management should be a subjection to the managed. Wake up! The second half of this idea is the interesting bit - the temptation to just 'try out' your powers gets to them all.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
Monarchs have the highest power; autocrats have complete power [Kant]
     Full Idea: A monarch has the highest power, while an autocrat or absolute ruler is one who has all the power.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §51)
     A reaction: If society is strictly hierarchical (like an army) then the monarch also has all the power. At the other extreme the one holding the highest power may have very little power, because so many others have their share of the power.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Hereditary nobility has not been earned, and probably won't be earned [Kant]
     Full Idea: A hereditary nobility is a distinction bestowed before it is earned, and since it gives no ground for hoping that it will be earned, it is wholly unreal and fanciful.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen D)
     A reaction: As the controller of the region of a country, a hereditary noble is the embodiment of a ruling family, which is a well established way of running things. Daft, perhaps, but there are probably worse ways of doing it. Single combat, for example.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Actions are right if the maxim respects universal mutual freedoms [Kant]
     Full Idea: Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual's will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Intro C)
     A reaction: This idea shows the moral basis for Kant's liberalism in politics. If all individuals acted without contact or reference to other individuals (a race of hermits) then that would appear to be optimum moral right, by this standard.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Women have no role in politics [Kant]
     Full Idea: Women in general …have no civil personality.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §46)
     A reaction: In case you were wondering. This is five years after Mary Wollstonecraft's book.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 3. Legal equality
Equality is not being bound in ways you cannot bind others [Kant]
     Full Idea: Our innate equality is independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Div B)
     A reaction: This doesn't seem to capture the whole concept. The two of us may be unequally oppressed by a third. We are unequal with the third, but also with one another, though with no binding relationships.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
In the contract people lose their rights, but immediately regain them, in the new commonwealth [Kant]
     Full Idea: By the original contract all members of the people give up their external freedom in order to receive it back at once as members of a commonweath.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §47)
     A reaction: This tries to give the impression that absolutely nothing is lost in the original alienation of rights. It is probably better to say that you give up one set of freedoms, which are replaced by a different (and presumably superior) set.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
If someone has largely made something, then they own it [Kant]
     Full Idea: Whatever someone has himself substantially made is his own undisputed property.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §55)
     A reaction: To this extent Kant offers clear agreement with Locke about a self-evident property right. Ownership of land is the controversial bit.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Human life is pointless without justice [Kant]
     Full Idea: If justice perishes, there is no further point in men living on earth.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen E)
     A reaction: I suspect that human life is also pointless if it only involves justice, and nothing else worthwhile. Are there other things so good that we might sacrifice justice to achieve them? How about maximal utilitarian happiness?
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Justice asserts the death penalty for murder, from a priori laws [Kant]
     Full Idea: All murderers …must suffer the death penalty. This is what justice, as the idea of judicial power, wills in accordance with universal laws of a priori origin.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen E)
     A reaction: Illustration of how giving a principle an a priori origin puts it beyond dispute. Kant is adamant that mercy mustn't interfere with the enactment of justice. And Kant obviously rejects any consequentialist approach. Remind me what is wrong with murder?
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The church has a political role, by offering a supreme power over people [Kant]
     Full Idea: The church [as opposed to religion] fulfils a genuine political necessity, for it enables the people to regard themselves as subjects of an invisible supreme power to which they must pay homage.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen C)
     A reaction: I'm sure I remember Marx putting a different spin on this point… This idea captures the conservative attitude to established religion, at least in the UK.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Both teachers and pupils should aim at one thing - the improvement of the pupil [Seneca]
     Full Idea: A person teaching and a person learning should have the same end in view: the improvement of the latter.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 108)
     A reaction: [He cites a philospher called Attalus for this remark] This is worthy to be up in the hall of every educational institution in the world, and especially in the staff rooms.
One joy of learning is making teaching possible [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Part of my joy in learning is that it puts me in a position to teach.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 006)
     A reaction: This doesn't quite distinguish between bad learning and good learning, but I take a commitment to wanting to teach what you know as an essential part of wanting to know.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Suicide may be appropriate even when it is not urgent, if there are few reasons against it [Seneca]
     Full Idea: There are many occasions on which a man should leave life not only bravely but for reasons which are not as pressing as they might be - the reasons which restrain us being not so pressing either.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 077)
     A reaction: This is an interesting and startling claim from the great champion of suicide, who nobly and memorably committed suicide himself. But we all dread a loved one miscalculating Seneca's dialectic, and dying when living would have been better.
If we control our own death, no one has power over us [Seneca]
     Full Idea: No one has power over us when death is in our own power.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 091)
     A reaction: A classic slogan for the stoic view of suicide, an idea that crops up in Shakespeare's 'Julius Caesar'. He doesn't seem to have understood that they can take away your shoelaces.
Sometimes we have a duty not to commit suicide, for those we love [Seneca]
     Full Idea: There are times when, however pressing one's reasons to the contrary, one's dying breath must be held back as it is passing one's lips, even if this is torture, simply out of consideration for one's dear ones.
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 104)
     A reaction: This is, of course, a highly significant counterbalance to his normal acceptance of suicide. I wish anyone who is planning suicide would heed it. They have no idea how much suffering will usually result from their action.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Does time exist on its own? Did anything precede it? Did it pre-exist the cosmos? [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Look how many questions there are on time. Does it have an existence of its own? Does anything exist prior to time, independently of it? Did it begin with the universe, or did it exist even before then?
     From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 088)
     A reaction: I'm not sure that the questions have shifted or become any clearer after two thousand years, despite Einstein and co. Note that discussions of time were not initiated by Augustine.