Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Against the Ethicists (one book)' and 'Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
5021 An idea is analysed perfectly when it is shown a priori that it is possible [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Every idea is analysed perfectly only when it is demonstrated a priori that it is possible.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking [1679], p.3)
     A reaction: I take it he means metaphysical possibility, rather than natural, or we can't think about pigs flying. He probably has maths in mind. Seeing the possibility of something may well amount to understanding its truth conditions.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
22752 Reasoning is impossible without a preconception [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: It is not possible either to seek or to doubt without a preconception.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.22)
     A reaction: [Sextus quotes this from 'the sapient Epicurus'] I think this may be a message across the centuries to Hegel, who attempted this impossible feat. My picture of philosophy is a continual shift of the preconceptions, to explore thoroughly.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
5020 Our thoughts are either dependent, or self-evident. All thoughts seem to end in the self-evident [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Whatever is thought by us is either conceived through itself, or involves the concept of another. …Thus one must proceed to infinity, or all thoughts are resolved into those which are conceived through themselves.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking [1679], p.1)
     A reaction: This seems to embody the rationalist attitude to foundations. I am sympathetic. Experiences just come to us as basic, but they don't qualify as 'thoughts', let alone knowledge. Experiences are more 'given' than 'conceptual'.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
468 Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
22754 Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Asserting that the good is 'the useful', or 'what is choiceworthy for its own sake', or 'that which contributes to happiness', does not teach us what good is but states its accidental property.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.35)
     A reaction: This seems to be a pretty accurate statement of Moore's famous Open Question argument. I read it in an Aristotelian way - that that quest is always for the essential nature of the thing itself, not for its role or function or use.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
22755 Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Just as fire which is warmth-giving by nature warms all men, and does not chill some of them, so what is good by nature ought to be good for all, and not good for some but not good for others.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.69)
     A reaction: This is going to confine the naturally good to the basics of life, which we all share. Is a love of chess a natural good? It seems to capture an aspect of human nature, without appealing to everyone. Sextus says nothing is good for everyone.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
5019 Supreme human happiness is the greatest possible increase of his perfection [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The supreme happiness of man consists in the greatest possible increase of his perfection.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking [1679], p.1)
     A reaction: I fear that (being a great intellectual) he had a rather intellectual interpretation of 'perfection'. This is in danger of being a tautology, but if the proposal is given an Aritotelian slant I am sympathetic.
22756 If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: If the desire for wealth or health is desirable, we ought not to purse wealth or health, lest by acquiring them we cease to desire them any longer.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.81)
     A reaction: He is investigating whether desires can be desirable, and if so which ones. Roots of this are in Plato's 'Gorgias' on drinking water. Similar to 'if compassion is the highest good then we need lots of suffering'. Desire must be a means, not an end.