14629
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If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary [Blackburn]
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Full Idea:
If we ask why A must be the case, and A is then proved from B, that explains it if B must be so. If the eventual source cites some truth F, then if F just is so, there is strong pressure to feel that the original necessity has not been explained.
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From:
Simon Blackburn (Morals and Modals [1987], 1)
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A reaction:
[compressed] Ross Cameron wrote a reply to this which I like. I'm fishing for the idea that essence is the source of necessity (as Kit Fine says), but that essence itself is not necessary (as only I say, apparently!).
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14529
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If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
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Full Idea:
Blackburn asks of what theorists propose as underlying the necessity of a proposition, the question whether they themselves are conceived as obtaining of necessity or merely contingently.
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From:
report of Simon Blackburn (Morals and Modals [1987], p.120-1) by Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann - Introduction to 'Modality' 1
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A reaction:
I've seen a reply to this somewhere: I think the thought was that a necessity wouldn't be any less necessary if it had a contingent source, any more than the father of a world champion boxer has to be a world champion boxer.
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2596
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Maybe mind and body are parallel, like two good clocks [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Two clocks in perfect agreement must be by natural influence, or the control of a craftsman, or their perfect construction at the beginning. Only the third way (of "preestablished harmony" by God) is possible.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (The Nature and Communication of Substance [1690], p.121)
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A reaction:
Presumably 'natural influence' would cover the possibility that (unnoticed by you, apparently) one clock is attached to the other clock at the relevant points. If they are unconnected, presumably they are quite unaware of one another's existence.
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