9 ideas
19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A 'nominal' definition is nothing more than an enumeration of the sufficient distinguishing characteristics. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.284) | |
A reaction: Not wholly clear. Are these actual distinguishing characteristics, or potential ones? Could DNA be part of a human's nominal definition (for an unidentified corpse, perhaps). |
19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear ideas are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283) | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's expansion of Descartes's idea that knowledge rests on 'clear and distinct conceptions'. The ultimate target seems to be close to an Aristotelian 'real definition', which is comprehensive and precise. Does 'intuitive' mean coherent? |
6451 | Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn] |
Full Idea: In the case of vision, sense data are a kind of inner picture show which itself only indirectly represents aspects of the external world. | |
From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.347) | |
A reaction: I'm unsure whether this is correct. Russell says the 'roughness' of the table is the sense datum. If it is even a possibility that there are unsensed sense-data, then they cannot be an aspect of the mind, as Blackburn is suggesting they are. |
2866 | A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn] |
Full Idea: Reliabilism is open to the counterexample that a belief may be the result of some generally reliable process (a pressure gauge) which was in fact malfunctioning on this occasion, when we would be reluctant to attribute knowledge to the subject. | |
From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.327) | |
A reaction: Russell's stopped clock that tells the right time twice a day. A good objection. Coming from a reliable source is very good criterion for good justification, but it needs critical assessment. |
19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An idea is true if what it represents is possible; false if the representation contains a contradiction. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.287) | |
A reaction: Odd in the analytic tradition to talk of a single idea or concept (rather than a proposition or utterance) as being 'true'. But there is clearly a notion of valid or legitimate or useful concepts here. Hilbert said true just meant non-contradictory. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
2864 | The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn] |
Full Idea: Critics say that intuitionism in ethics explains nothing, but may merely function as a disguise for prejudice or passion. | |
From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.198) | |
A reaction: If someone claims to have an important moral intuition about something, you should carefully assess the person who has the intuition. I would trust some people a lot. |
2865 | Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn] |
Full Idea: Critics of prescriptivism have noted the problem that whilst accepting a command seems tantamount to setting oneself to obey it, accepting an ethical verdict is, unfortunately, consistent with refusing to be bound by it. | |
From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.300) | |
A reaction: We nearly all of us accept that our behaviour should be better than it actually is, so we accept the oughts but fail to act. Actually 'refusing', though, sounds a bit contradictory. |
19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In the schools the four causes are lumped together as material, formal, efficient, and final causes, but they have no clear definitions, and I would call such a judgment 'obscure'. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283) | |
A reaction: He picks this to illustrate what he means by 'obscure', so he must feel strongly about it. Elsewhere Leibniz embraces efficient and final causes, but says little of the other two. This immediately become clearer as the Four Modes of Explanation. |