Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Apriority and Existence' and 'Events and Their Names'

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10 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
8859 The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo]
     Full Idea: Lewis's different systems of modal logic differed about such formulae as □P implies □□P; ◊□P implies □P; and ◊S implies □◊S
     From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §06)
     A reaction: Yablo's point is that the various version don't seem to make much difference to our practices in logic, mathematics and science. The problem, says Yablo, is deciding exactly what you mean by 'necessarily' and 'possibly'.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
8865 If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo]
     Full Idea: If someone says 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', he or she wants to focus on Democrats, not numbers. If the number is 50 million, is 50 million really on the rise?
     From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §14)
     A reaction: This is a very nice warning from Yablo, against easy platonism, or any sort of platonism at all. We routinely say that numbers are 'increasing', but the real meaning needs entangling. Here it refers to people joining a party.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
8863 We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo]
     Full Idea: It is only by making as if to countenance numbers that one can give expression in English to a fact having nothing to do with numbers, a fact about stars and planets and how they are numerically proportioned.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §13)
     A reaction: To avoid the phrase 'numerically proportioned', he might have alluded to the 'pattern' of the stars and planets. I'm not sure which -ism this is, but it seems to me a good approach. The application is likely to precede the theory.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
8862 Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo]
     Full Idea: The means by which platonic objects are simulated is existential metaphor. Numbers are conjured up as metaphorical measures of cardinality.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §12)
     A reaction: 'Fictional' might be a better word than 'metaphorical', since the latter usually implies some sort of comparison.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8978 Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
     A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
8864 We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo]
     Full Idea: It is not that the contents of sentences are inexpressible without quantifying over events, worlds, etc. (they aren't). But the logical relations become much more tractable if we represent them quantificationally.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §13)
     A reaction: Yablo is explaining why we find ourselves committed to abstract objects. It is essentially, as I am beginning to suspect, a conspiracy of logicians. What on earth is 'the empty set' when it is at home? What's it made of?
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
8858 Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo]
     Full Idea: There's a tradition in philosophy of finding 'unexpected objects' in truth-conditions, such as countermodels, possible worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets and properties.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §02)
     A reaction: This is a very nice perspective on the whole matter of abstract objects. If we find ourselves reluctantly committed to the existence of something which is ontologically peculiar, we should go back to the philosophical drawing-board.
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
8861 Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo]
     Full Idea: There is hardly a word in the language - be it an adverb, preposition, conjunction, or what have you - that is devoid of metaphorical potential.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §12)
     A reaction: Yablo goes on to claim that metaphor is at the heart of all of our abstract thinking. 'Dead metaphors' (like the "mouth" of a river) sink totally into literal language. I think Yablo is on the right lines.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
468 Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
10364 Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
     A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).