7024
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Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil]
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Full Idea:
Armstrong takes properties to be universals, and believes there are no 'uninstantiated' universals.
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From:
report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by John Heil - From an Ontological Point of View §9.3
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A reaction:
At first glance this, like many theories of universals, seems to invite Ockham's Razor. If they are always instantiated, perhaps we should perhaps just try to talk about the instantiations (i.e. tropes), and skip the universal?
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9478
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Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird]
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Full Idea:
Armstrong says all properties are categorical, but a dispositional predicate may denote such a property; the dispositional predicate denotes the categorical property in virtue of the dispositional role it happens, contingently, to play in this world.
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From:
report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 3.1
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A reaction:
I favour the fundamentality of the dispositional rather than the categorical. The world consists of powers, and we find ourselves amidst their categorical expressions. I could be persuaded otherwise, though!
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18948
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There is an object for every set of properties (some of which exist, and others don't) [Parsons,T, by Sawyer]
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Full Idea:
According to Terence Parsons, there is an object corresponding to every set of properties. To some of those sets of properties there corresponds an object that exists, and to others there corresponds an object that does not exist (a nonexistent object).
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From:
report of Terence Parsons (Nonexistent Objects [1980]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 5
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A reaction:
This I take to be the main source of the modern revival of Meinong's notorious view of objects (attacked by Russell). I always find the thought 'a round square is square' to be true, and in need of a truthmaker. But must a round square be non-triangular?
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10728
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A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver]
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Full Idea:
Armstrong says that if it can be proved a priori that a thing falls under a certain universal, then there is no such universal - and hence there is no universal of a thing being identical with itself.
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From:
report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], II p.11) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 11
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A reaction:
This is a distinctively Armstrongian view, based on his belief that universals must be instantiated, and must be discoverable a posteriori, as part of science. I'm baffled by self-identity, but I don't think this argument does the job.
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