5 ideas
13827 | Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz] |
Full Idea: Defining logical consequence in the way Tarski does is a rather meagre result, treating an argument as a black box, observing input and output, while disregarding inner structure. We should define logical consequence on the basis of valid arguments. | |
From: Dag Prawitz (On the General Idea of Proof Theory [1974], §2) |
13826 | Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz] |
Full Idea: In model theory, which has dominated the last decades, one concentrates on logically valid sentences, and what follows logically from what, but one disregards questions concerning how we know these things. | |
From: Dag Prawitz (On the General Idea of Proof Theory [1974], §1) |
3271 | We can't control our own beliefs [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Our beliefs are always due to factors outside of our control. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Moral Luck [1976], p.27) |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
3272 | Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Moral luck involves one's character, the antecedent circumstances of the act, the actual circumstances of the act, and the outcome of the act. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Moral Luck [1976], p.28) | |
A reaction: Meaning, I take it, that there can be luck in any one of those four. A neat slicing up that doesn't quite fit the real world, where things flow. Helpful, though. |