Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary' and 'Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?'

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10 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
13857 Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington]
     Full Idea: How likely is a fair die landing on an even number to land six? My approach is, assume an even number, so three possibilities, one a six, so 'one third'; the truth-functional approach is it's true if it is not-even or six, so 'two-thirds'.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 3)
     A reaction: The point is that in the truth-functional approach, if the die lands not-even, then the conditional comes out as true, when she says it should be irrelevant. She seems to be right about this.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
13853 It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington]
     Full Idea: The mistake philosophers have made, in trying to understand the conditional, is to assume that its function is to make a statement about how the world is (or how other possible worlds are related to it), true or false, as the case may be.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 1)
     A reaction: 'If pigs could fly we would never catch them' may not be about the world, but 'if you press this switch the light comes on' seems to be. Actually even the first one is about the world. I've an inkling that Edgington is wrong about this. Powers!
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
13855 A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington]
     Full Idea: A conditional does not have truth conditions.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 1)
13859 X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington]
     Full Idea: X believes that if A, B, to the extent that he judges that A & B is nearly as likely as A, or (roughly equivalently) to the extent that he judges A & B to be more likely than A & ¬B.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 5)
     A reaction: This is a formal statement of her theory of conditionals.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
13854 Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington]
     Full Idea: It is often necessary to suppose (or assume) that some epistemic possibility is true, and to consider what else would be the case, or would be likely to be the case, given this supposition. The conditional expresses the outcome of such thought processes.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 1)
     A reaction: This is the basic Edgington view. It seems to involve an active thought process, and imagination, rather than being the static semantic relations offered by possible worlds analyses. True conditionals state relationships in the world.
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
23633 Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid]
     Full Idea: There are many truths so obvious to the human faculties, that it should be expected that men should universally agree in them. And this is actually found to be the case with regard to many truths, against which we find no dissent.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary [1785], 2)
     A reaction: He says that a few sceptical philosophers may disagree. This is a nice statement of his creed of common sense. I agree with him, and Aristotle observes the same fact.
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
23630 Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid]
     Full Idea: The vulgar allow that an 'idea' implies a mind that thinks, an act of mind which we call thinking, and an object about which we think. But the philosopher conceives a fourth - the idea, which is the immediate object. …I believe this to be a mere fiction.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary [1785], 1)
     A reaction: Another example, to add to Yablo's list, of abstract objects invented by philosophers to fill holes in their theories. This one is illuminating, because we all say 'I've got an idea'. Cf discussions of the redundancy of truth. Cf propositions.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
23629 The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid]
     Full Idea: There is no greater impediment to the advancement of knowledge than the ambiguity of words.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary [1785], 1)
     A reaction: He means that ambiguity leads to long pointless disagreements.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
468 Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
23632 Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid]
     Full Idea: A first principle is that similar effects proceed from the same or similar causes; that we ought to admit of no other causes …but such as are sufficient to account for the effects.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary [1785], 2)
     A reaction: He treats these as a priori axioms of natural philosophy. In evolution similar causes seem to produce startlingly divergent effects, such as the mating needs of male birds.