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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents' and 'Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas'

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11 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
19426 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: A 'nominal' definition is nothing more than an enumeration of the sufficient distinguishing characteristics.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.284)
     A reaction: Not wholly clear. Are these actual distinguishing characteristics, or potential ones? Could DNA be part of a human's nominal definition (for an unidentified corpse, perhaps).
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19424 Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear ideas are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
     A reaction: This is Leibniz's expansion of Descartes's idea that knowledge rests on 'clear and distinct conceptions'. The ultimate target seems to be close to an Aristotelian 'real definition', which is comprehensive and precise. Does 'intuitive' mean coherent?
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
23681 The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid]
     Full Idea: That the first motion, or the first effect, whatever it be, cannot be produced necessarily, and, consequently, that the First Cause must be a free agent, has been demonstrated clearly and unanswerably.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 8)
     A reaction: He has said that the First Cause can only be conceived by us as an 'agent'. If there is an agential First Cause, then he must be right. It is this need for God to be free which makes scepticism about free will unacceptable to many.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
23676 A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid]
     Full Idea: There can be no will without such a degree of understanding, at least, as gives the conception of that which we will.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 1)
     A reaction: Presumably this 'conception' includes an understanding of the probable consequences, but they are of infinite complexity. I see this as an objection to 'ultimate' free will and responsibility, because there are only ever degrees of understanding.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
23680 We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid]
     Full Idea: I believe in moral liberty first because we have a natural conviction of belief that in many cases we act freely, second because we are accountable, and third because we can prosecute an end by a long series of means adapted.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5)
     A reaction: This is his final summary of why he believes in free will. Why didn't Plato and Aristotle have this natural belief? He could only believe we are 'accountable' because he believes in free will. Ants and bees pursue lengthy projects. Hm.
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
19427 True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: An idea is true if what it represents is possible; false if the representation contains a contradiction.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.287)
     A reaction: Odd in the analytic tradition to talk of a single idea or concept (rather than a proposition or utterance) as being 'true'. But there is clearly a notion of valid or legitimate or useful concepts here. Hilbert said true just meant non-contradictory.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23678 A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid]
     Full Idea: A motive is equally incapable of action and of passion; because it is not a thing that exists, but a thing that is conceived. …Motives may be compared to advice or exhortation.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 4)
     A reaction: We say people are motivated by greed or anger or love, which seems a bit stronger than mere advice.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
468 Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
19425 In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: In the schools the four causes are lumped together as material, formal, efficient, and final causes, but they have no clear definitions, and I would call such a judgment 'obscure'.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
     A reaction: He picks this to illustrate what he means by 'obscure', so he must feel strongly about it. Elsewhere Leibniz embraces efficient and final causes, but says little of the other two. This immediately become clearer as the Four Modes of Explanation.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
23677 We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid]
     Full Idea: Every man who understands the language knows that neither priority, nor constant conjunction, nor both taken together, imply efficiency.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 2)
     A reaction: This invites the question of how we do know causal events, if none of our experiences are enough to prove it. Reid says we have an innate knowledge that all events are caused, but that isn't much help. The presence of power?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
23679 The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid]
     Full Idea: The law of nature respecting matter is grounded upon this principle: That matter is an inert, inactive substance, which does not act, but is acted upon.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5)
     A reaction: A clear statement (alongside Euler's) of the 18th century view, still with us, but strikes me as entirely wrong. Their view needs the active power of God to drive the laws. Matter has intrinsic primitive powers, and laws describe patterns of behaviour.