Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom' and 'The Flow of Time'

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10 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy

6859	Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson]
	Full Idea: Certain advances in philosophical standards have been made within analytic philosophy, and there would be a serious loss of integrity involved in abandoning them in the way required to participate in current continental philosophy.
	From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.151)
	A reaction: The reply might be to concede the point, but say that the precision and rigour achieved are precisely what debar analytical philosophy from thinking about the really interesting problems. One might as well switch to maths and have done with it.

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic

6862	Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson]
	Full Idea: Fuzzy logic is based on a continuum of degrees of truth, but it is committed to the idea that it is half-true that one identical twin is tall and the other twin is not, even though they are the same height.
	From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.154)
	A reaction: Maybe to be shocked by a contradiction is missing the point of fuzzy logic? Half full is the same as half empty. The logic does not say the twins are different, because it is half-true that they are both tall, and half-true that they both aren't.

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

6858	Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson]
	Full Idea: As soon as I started learning formal logic, that struck me as exactly the language that I wanted to think in.
	From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001])
	A reaction: It takes all sorts… It is interesting that formal logic might be seen as having the capacity to live up to such an aspiration. I don't think the dream of an ideal formal language is dead, though it will never encompass all of reality. Poetic truth.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance

6863	Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson]
	Full Idea: If one is very close to a conceptual boundary, then one's judgement will be too unreliable to constitute knowledge, and therefore one will be ignorant.
	From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.156)
	A reaction: This is the epistemological rather than ontological interpretation of vagueness. It sounds very persuasive, but I am reluctant to accept that reality is full of very precise boundaries which we cannot quite discriminate.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

6861	What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
	Full Idea: The problem of vagueness is the problem of what logic is correct for vague concepts, and correspondingly what notions of truth and falsity are applicable to vague statements (does one need a continuum of degrees of truth, for example?).
	From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.153)
	A reaction: This certainly makes vagueness sound like one of the most interesting problems in all of philosophy, though also one of the most difficult. Williamson's solution is that we may be vague, but the world isn't.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception

6860	How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson]
	Full Idea: If one takes a spectrum of colours from yellow to red, it might be that given a series of colour samples along that spectrum, each sample is indiscriminable by the naked eye from the next one, though samples at either end are blatantly different.
	From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.151)
	A reaction: This seems like a nice variant of the Sorites paradox (Idea 6008). One could demonstrate it with just three samples, where A and C seemed different from each other, but other comparisons didn't.

21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality

468	Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
	Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
	From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism

22974	Presentists lack the materials for a realist view of change [Price,H]
	Full Idea: The presentist view seems to have lost the materials for a realist view of passage, change or temporal transition.
	From: Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 2)
	A reaction: It is a nice point. How can a presentist talk of change if the only component that exists is the present time slice? Price says change can only be a kind of fiction for the presentist. Change in existence and in properties are distinct concepts.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series

22973	The present moment, time's direction, and time's dynamic quality seem to be objective facts [Price,H]
	Full Idea: The flow of time seems to be an objective feature of reality because of 1) the present moment can be objectively distinguished, 2) time has an objective direction, of earlier and later, and 3) there is something objectively dynamic about time.
	From: Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 1.1)
	A reaction: Price sets out to undermine all three of these claims, in implicit defence of a psychological view. I disagree with him.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow

22975	We must explain either the existence of a time direction, or our psychological sense of it [Price,H]
	Full Idea: If the world comes equipped with a time orientation, where does it come from? If it doesn't, what explains our psychological feeling of a direction for time?
	From: Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 3.5)
	A reaction: The chances of 'explaining' either one look slim to me. That is, the fact would explain our experience, but the experience without the fact looks ridiculous, and I cannot conceive of any time-free entity which could explain the fact.