Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000' and 'works'

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer]
     Full Idea: From the intuitionist standpoint the dogma of the universal validity of the principle of excluded third in mathematics can only be considered as a phenomenon of history of civilization, like the rationality of pi or rotation of the sky about the earth.
     From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (works [1930]), quoted by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite VI.2
     A reaction: [Brouwer 1952:510-11]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge]
     Full Idea: The second half of the twentieth century has seen the development of a vastly more sophisticated sense of logical form, as applied to natural languages.
     From: Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.462)
     A reaction: Burge cites this as one of the three big modern developments (along with the critique of logical positivism, and direct reference/anti-individualism). Vagueness may be the last frontier for this development.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: In his early writing, Brouwer took a real number to be a Cauchy sequence determined by a rule. Later he augmented rule-governed sequences with free-choice sequences, but even then the attitude is that Cauchy sequences are potential, not actual infinities.
     From: report of Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (works [1930]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 6.6
     A reaction: This is the 'constructivist' view of numbers, as espoused by intuitionists like Brouwer.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge]
     Full Idea: Anti-individualism is the view that not all of an individual's mental states and events can be type-individuated independently of the nature of the entities in the individual's physical or social environment environment.
     From: Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.453)
     A reaction: While the Twin Earth experiment emphasises the physical environment, Burge has been responsible for emphasising the social environment. The suspicion is that the whole concept of 'individual' minds will collapse on this view.
Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge]
     Full Idea: Certain thought experiments made trouble for standard functionalism, which limits input/output to the surface of an individual; proposals to extend this into the environment reduces the reliance on a computer paradigm, but increases complexity.
     From: Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.454)
     A reaction: [He has the Twin Earth experiment in mind] The jury is out on this, but it looks a bit of a slippery slope. Accounts of action and responsibility need a fairly sharp concept of an individual. Externalism begins to look like just a new scepticism.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge]
     Full Idea: The idea of anti-individualism raised problems about self-knowledge. The question is whether anti-individualism is compatible with some sort of authoritative or privileged warrant for certain types of self-knowledge.
     From: Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.457)
     A reaction: [See under 'Nature of Minds' for 'Anti-individualism'] The thought is that if your mind is not entirely in your head, you can no longer be an expert on it. It might go the other way: obviously we can be self-experts, so anti-individualism is wrong.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
     Full Idea: There appear to be qualitative aspects of experience that have no function in the life of the organism. They constitute dysfunction or noise. Blurriness in a visual experience is an example.
     From: Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.460)
     A reaction: The best account of blurred vision would seem to be adverbial - I see 'in a blurred way' (nay, blurredly). Hence maybe blurred vision is functional, but it just isn't functioning very well.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?